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Abstract 
This thesis concerns the unity of consciousness - in particular the phenomenal unity of 
consciousness. The idea that consciousness is 'phenomenally unified' is the idea that 
if we attempt to characterise 'what it is like' for a subject just by listing all of the 
distinct experiences had by that subject at and over time, we will leave something 
out. We will leave out the unity of those experiences - the way in which those 
experiences feature together in consciousness. 
We can distinguish between the unity of consciousness at a time, and the unity of 
consciousness over time. I do not attempt to provide an account of the unity of 
consciousness at a time here - I focus instead upon the issue of unity over time. Some 
theorists - Dainton and Tye for instance - have claimed that it is possible to provide 
a single account of unity that solves both problems of unity in the same way. My 
contribution to the issue of unity at a time shall be to argue that such a single account 
is not possible, due to important differences in the phenomenological constraints that 
apply to the two problems. 
I proceed by providing an account of what exactly the constraints on an account of 
unity over time are, and argue that accounts that commit to the 'Principle of 
Simultaneous Awareness' (the accounts of Le Poidevin, Tye, Husserl, and Broad) 
cannot meet these constraints. I then provide a diagnosis of what may have been 
driving acceptance of such a principle in the first place - I argue that driving such 
acceptance is a faiiure to identify the metaphysical category of 'Occurrent State'. I 
PageS 
propose that we can provide a successful and substantive account of diachronic 
unity only if we commit to thinking of a subject's phenomenal states as Occurrent 
States. 
Chapter One: Introduction to the Diachronic and the Synchronic Unity of 
Consciousness 
§1. Overview 
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The subject matter of this thesis is the unity of consciousness - specifically, the 
phenomenal unity of consciousness. The object of investigation for a theory of the 
phenomenal unity of consciousness is phenomenal consciousness itself. More 
precisely, it is the phenomenal consciousness of an individual both at a time, and 
over time. Phenomenal consciousness is the kind of consciousness which an 
individual has when there is 'something that it is like' for them. Here are Bayne and 
Chalmers providing a description of what is meant by phenomenal consciousness: 
A mental state is phenomenally conscious when there is something it is like to be in 
that state. When a state is phenomenally conscious, being in that state involves some 
sort of subjective experience. There is something it is like for me to see the red book - I 
have a visual experience of the book - so my perception of the book is phenomenally 
conscious. There is something it is like to hear the bird singing, and to feel the pain in 
my shoulder, so these states are phenomenally conscious. There is something it is like 
to feel melancholy, and there i,s arguably something it is like when I think about 
philosophy. If so, then these states are phenomenally conscious.! 
1 T. Bayne and D. Chalmers, "What is the unity of consciousness," The unity of consciousness: Binding, 
integration, and dissociation (2003): 7. 
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An investigation into the phenomenal unity of consciousness is a phenomenological 
investigation that concerns a particular aspect of phenomenal consciousness: the 
unity of phenomenal consciousness. The thought driving such an investigation is that 
just as there is 'something it is like' for a subject to experience a pain, a red book, or a 
loud noise, there is also something that it like for a subject's consciousness to be 
unified. 
This investigation into phenomenal unity is traditionally divided up into two parts: 
giving an account of the phenomenal unity of consciousness at a time (synchronic 
phenomenal unity); and giving an account of the phenomenal unity of consciousness 
over time (diachronic phenomenal unity). We can get an intuitive idea of why there 
is thought to be a puzzle about both diachronic and synchronic unity by examining 
the following two slogans: 
Slogan One: 'A conjunction of experiences is not, in itself, an experience of 
conjunction.' 
Slogan Two: 'A succession of experiences is not, in itself, an experience of 
succession.' 
These two different slogans correspond to two different questions we can ask about 
the unity of consciousness: the first slogan corresponds to the synchronic unity 
question, and the second to the diachronic unity question. In both cases, the idea is 
that attempting to characterise 'what it is like' for the subject· of experience just in 
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terms of the resources picked out by the first sections of the slogans 
(conjunction/succession of experiences) will fail to capture the phenomenology 
picked out by the second sections of the slogans (experience of 
conjunction/ succession). 
The slogans are not merely drawing to our attention a distinction between what is 
picked out by their first and their second sections. Rather, both are claims that we 
cannot provide an explanation of an experience of conjunction or succession just in 
terms of a conjunction or successi?n of experiences: the occurrence/existence of 
items picked out in the first section does not suffice for the occurrence/ existence of 
items picked out in the second. Accounting for the difference between a conjunction 
or succession of experiences and the experience of conjunction or succession is the 
business of an account of the phenomenal unity of consciousness. I shall talk more 
about how we ought to think of this difference shortly. 
We can call whatever it is that is lacking from what is picked out by the first section 
of the relevant slogan that renders it insufficient for the occurrence of what is picked 
out by the second section of the slogan the 'unity' of consciousness. Setting up the 
diachronic and synchronic problems in this way - where there is a structural 
similarity between the two problems, with 'unity' being the thing that needs to be 
accounted for, has led some theorists to attempt to provide a generalised account of 
,. 
the unity of consciousness - an account intended to solve both problems in the same 
way. The theorists I have in mind here are Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. 
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Dainton has suggested that positing a primitive phenomenal relation called 'co-
consciousness' is the key to accounting for phenomenal unity, and has claimed that 
lithe diachronic unity of experience is no different, in the essentials, from the 
synchronic: both are the product of co-consciousness."2 Tye, on the other hand, 
attempts to dissolve both problems, suggesting that both problems go away if we 
agree to think that the subject only has one experience per period of unbroken 
consciousness - thus doing away with the items picked out by the first section of 
both slogans entirely. By ruling out the possibility of a subject having multiple 
experiences at or over time, Tye rules out a formulation of the initial puzzle. Tye has 
claimed lithe problem [of diachronic unity], posed in this way [in terms of multiple 
experiences], is no more real than the problem of the unity of experiences at a time."3 
For Tye and Dainton the solution to both problems is the same in both cases: we 
either account for 'unity' by appeal to 'co-consciousness' (Dainton), or deny there is a 
problem in the first place by claiming that there is only one experience at and over 
time (Tye). 
I shall discuss the views of Tye and Dainton in more detail shortly, but I want to note 
that I shall be arguing against the notion that we can provide a generalised account 
of the unity of consciousness. When the synchronic and diachronic problems are 
examined in more detail, it transpires that there is a more complex set of constraints 
present in the diachronic case, and this additional complexity makes it impossible to 
give a successful account of unity that applies to both cases. This argument shall be 
2 B. Dainton, Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 
2006),113. 
3 M. Tye, Consciousness arid persons (MIT Press Cambridge, Mass, 2003), 95. 
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my main contribution to the issue of synchronic unity - I shall not, in what follows, 
attempt to provide an account of the synchronic unity of consciousness. I shall, 
however, provide an account of diachronic unity. These two elements - arguing 
against a generalised account of unity, and providing an account of diachronic unity 
- comprise the main project of the thesis. 
The thesis unfolds as follows: this first chapter is used to set up the synchronic and 
diachronic problems - and to introduce the idea that the set of phenomenological 
constraints in the diachronic case are more complex than those in the synchronic 
case. In the second and third chapters I discuss these diachronic constraints in more 
detail - the second chapter concerns the continuity of consciousness, and the third 
concerns a claim I call the 'Time-Windows' claim. These constraints are used to 
diagnose the various ways in which rival theories of diachronic continuity fail to 
adequately account for the phenomenology, as well as to make it clear what needs to 
be accounted for. In chapters four to six I discuss in detail the phenomenological 
inadequacies of rival accounts - the accounts of Le Poidevin, Zahavi, Husserl, Tye, 
Dainton and Foster. In chapter seven I provide my positive account of diachronic 
unity - an account that succeeds in giving an adequate account of the 
phenomenology of diachronic unity. In the final chapter, I return to the issue of 
synchronic unity, discussing the accounts of Dainton, Tye, and Bayne in more detail, 
and conclude that the more complex constraints in the diachronic case render a 
generalised account of unity impossible. 
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§2. Motivating the Synchronic Unity Problem 
Before beginning this project, however, we need to get clearer on precisely what the 
diachronic and synchronic problems are. At this stage in proceedings, we only have 
the two slogans mentioned above, and the idea that an account of synchronic or 
diachronic unity will provide an account of what it is that is lacking from the first 
section of the relevant slogan. What we don't yet have is any reason for finding the 
slogans persuasive: we don't yet have a grasp of what it is that the first sections of 
the slogans leave unaccounted for. We can call whatever the difference consists in in 
each case the 'unity' of consciousness, but what exactly is the difference being drawn 
to our attention? 
We can begin to answer this question by examining the synchronic slogan: 'A 
conjunction of experiences is not, in itself, an experience of conjunction'. There are a 
number of different ways of motivating this slogan - all of which raise the possibility 
of scepticism about synchronic unity. I shall discuss three such sources of motivation, 
and the corresponding sceptical responses. I shall conclude that the sceptical worries 
don't appear to be decisive, and so we can plausibly still motivate some form of 
synchronic unity problem. 
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§2.1: The Phenomenology 
The first way of motivating the synchronic unity problem (which is the same thing as 
motivating the synchronic unity slogan) involves simply attending to the 
phenomenology. The thought here is that we can locate the element missed out by 
attempting to capture the phenomenology in terms of a conjunction of experiences 
(as opposed to an experience of conjunction) by attending to it when we introspect. 
All of the synchronic unity theorists .whose views I discuss - Tye, Dainton, and Tim 
Bayne - make some attempt to motivate the synchronic unity problem in this way. 
All three provide descriptions of the relevant phenomenology in an attempt to draw 
it to our attention: 
The air was heavy, there were sounds of birds calling to one another, bees buzzing 
around nearby flowers, the smell of damp grass, a profusion of colours. What struck 
me with great intensity was the unity in my experience, the way in which my 
experience presented all these things to me together.4 
In talking of the 'experienced relationship' between the contents of consciousness I 
am not referring to anything mysterious or unfamiliar. To illustrate: look at your 
hand and snap your fingers. What happens? You see and feel a movement and hear a 
sound. These three experiences - one auditory, one visual and one tactile - do not 
4 Ibid., xii. 
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occur in isolation from one another. They occur together in your consciousness, you 
are aware of them all at once (along with a good deal else).5 
At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject 
might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, 
auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp 
pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having 
a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are 
distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing 
birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same 
time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, 
by being aspects of a single encompassing state of consciousness.6 
These are the initial attempts to point us in the direction of the phenomenon of the 
unity of consciousness provided by Tye, Dainton, and Bayne and Chalmers. It seems 
clear that there is something in common being described by all of their descriptions, 
but it also seems clear that different things are being drawn to our attention. Tye notes 
how' experience presents all these things together' - and has also noted how II it is 
phenomenologically as if I were undergoing one [experience]."7 Dainton notes that 
there are 'experienced relationships' between the contents of consciousness, and 
Bayne and Chalmers note that 'experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way ... 
they seem to be aspects of a single encompassing state of consciousness.' 
5 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, xi. 
6 Bayne and Chalmers, "What is the unity of consciousness," 23. 
7 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 17-8. 
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The nature of the positive characterisations provided by Dainton, Bayne and 
Chalmers, and Tye, are related to their formulations of the problem of the unity of 
consciousness. Having noted that' experience presents all these things together', Tye 
describes the problem as a matter of describing the relation "between qualities 
represented in experience, not between qualities of experiences."B 
Dainton, having described an 'experienced relationship', describes the problem as 
providing an answer to the following question: "wh~n experiences are co-conscious, 
what is the nature of this relationship, what can be said about this purely experiential 
phenomenon ?"9 
Finally, Bayne and Chalmers, having noticed that 'experiences seem to be tied 
together in a deep way ... they seem to be aspects of a single encompassing state of 
consciousness', describe the problem as answering this question: "what does it mean 
to say that different states of consciousness are unified with each other, or that they 
are part of a single encompassing state?"10 
These differences in characterisation of the phenomenology - and the corresponding 
differences in how the problem of synchronic unity is formulated - suffice to provide 
8 Ibid., 36. 
9 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 4. 
10 Bayne and Chalmers, "What is the unity of consciousness," 23. 
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grounds for scepticism about there really being such a thing as 'the synchronic unity 
of consciousness'. Recall that at this stage of the dialectic we have a slogan: 'A 
conjunction of experiences is not, in itself, an experience of conjunction', but we 
might not yet be convinced that there is any reason for us to accept the slogan - we 
have no grip upon what it is that would be left out were we to attempt to 
characterise what it is like for the subject merely in terms of a conjunction of 
experiences. 
The sceptic's challenge is that without an independent grip upon what would be left 
out by such a characterisation, the synchronic unity slogan, as well as Bayne, Tye, 
and Dainton's accounts of synchronic unity, are left unmotivated. All three 
descriptions of the phenomenology that we are presented with are given using the 
terminology of the describer's accounts of unity. The sceptic's charge will thus be that 
such descriptions are precisely how we would expect synchronic unity theorists to 
describe the phenomenology, given their acceptance of the synchronic unity slogan 
and their accounts given in response to the slogan, but we still don't have an 
independent grip on where the inadequacy is supposed to lie. 
In response to this challenge, the synchronic unity theorists might reply that the 
sceptic has failed to attend properly to the phenomenology of experience - hasn't 
attended properly to 'what it is like' for them. At this stage of the dialectic, we 
appear to have reached a stalemate - both sides will claim that they are attending, 
and they find unity (the theorists) or they cannot find unity (the sceptic). 
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A better response, then, might be to attempt a neutral formulation of the problem -
perhaps just in terms of experiencing items 'together'. To be fair to Tye, this might be 
what he is up to in his description of the phenomenology, which, to recap, was the 
following: 
The air was heavy, there were sounds of birds calling to one another, bees buzzing 
around nearby flowers, the smell of damp grass, a profusion of colours. What struck 
me with great intensity was the unity in my experience, the way in which my 
experience presented all these things to me together.ll 
How will the sceptic respond to Tye's formulation of the problem here? In response 
to the description of the phenomenology - 'experience presented all these things to 
me together' - the sceptic will say that they can agree with the description, but that 
they can account for it by noting that all that is being picked out is that fact that the 
subject is having a large number of experiences simultaneously. 
For the sceptic, the notion of 'togetherness' is exhausted by the notion of simultaneity. 
In Tye's situation, neutrally interpreted, they will claim that the subject 
Simultaneously has an experience of the birds, an experience of the bees, an 
experience of the grass, and so on. The sceptic will claim that it just isn't clear that 
there is anything to 'togetherness'.or 'unity' beyond this simultaneity. At this point, I 
propose that it isn't clear what we should say in response to this disagreement about 
11 Tye, Consciousness and persons, xii. 
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the phenomenology - and that we ought to turn instead to another possible source of 
motivation for the synchronic slogan. 
§2.2: Split-Brain Cases 
The second source of motivation that we can examine concerns a number of 
experiments that are often referred to as the I split-brain cases'. The split-brain cases 
are taken to motivate the synchronic unity slogan because it looks likely that the 
phenomenology of experience is very different for a- split-brain subject in certain 
circumstances than it would be for a non-split-brain subject in the same 
circumstances. This difference has been thought to be best captured by positing a 
lack of unity in the split-brain subject's experience. This line of thought is discussed 
by Bayne and Chalmers: 
It is widely held that patients in various unusual neuropsychological states have a 
disunified consciousness. The paradigm case here is that of a split-brain patient, whose 
corpus callosum has been severed for medical purposes, preventing the left and right 
hemispheres of the cerebral cortex from communicating directly (although there is still 
some connection through lower areas of the brain). Such a patient behaves in a 
surprisingly normal fashion much of the time, but in certain circumstances they behave 
quite unusually.12 
12 Bayne and Chalmers, "What is the unity of consciousness," 18. 
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The split-brain patients behave normally in everyday situations, but in certain 
experimental conditions they do not. In the relevant experimental conditions, the 
subjects are presented with stimuli in such a way that information from the stimuli 
only directly reaches one brain hemisphere. Nagel describes some of the results of 
these kinds of experiment as follows: 
What is flashed to the right half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the right hand, can 
be reported verbally. What is flashed to the left half field or felt by the left hand cannot 
be reported, though if the word 'hat' is flashed on the left, the left hand will retrieve a 
hat from a group of concealed objects if the person is told to pick out what he has seen. 
At the same time he will insist verbally that he saw nothing. Or, if two different words 
are flashed to the two half fields (e.g. 'pencil' and 'toothbrush') and the individual is 
told to retrieve the corresponding object from beneath a screen, with both hands, then 
the hands will search the collection of objects independently, the right hand picking up 
the pencil and discarding it while the left hand searches for it, and the left hand 
similarly rejecting the toothbrush which the right hand lights upon with satisfaction.13 
In the experimental situations, then, the split-brain patients behave in a 'disunified' 
fashion as far as their actions are concerned. In response to the experimental 
situation they perform two different actions, with each action performed as if the 
subject is oblivious to the information playing a role in motivating and guiding the 
other action. 
13 T. Nagel, "Brain bisection aIld the unity of consciousness," Synthese 22, no. 3 (1971);400. 
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Plausibly, there are strong similarities between the experiences had by a split-brain 
subject and a non-split-brain subject: in the toothbrush and pencil situation, it looks 
as though the subject experiences both the toothbrush and the pencil,' for the subject 
performs actions that appear to require such experiences - searching for the pencil, 
and searching for the toothbrush. 
However, there are clearly also differences between the experiences of the split-brain 
subject and the non-split-brain subject. One plausible way to capture this difference 
is to say that while the split-brain subject has an experience of the toothbrush and an 
experience of the pencil, the subject lacks an experience of the toothbrush and the 
pencil together. If the subject had such an experience, runs the thought, then the 
subject would not perform the relevant actions in the way that she does - apparently 
searching for the toothbrush while unaware of the pencil, and simultaneously 
searching for the pencil while unaware of the toothbrush. 
A number of different models of what is going on in this situation have been 
provided - I shall discuss some of them shortly. For now, we can note that, with the 
split-brains as our source of motivation for the synchronic unity slogan, providing an 
account of the unity of consciousness is the same thing as providing an account of 
the difference between 'what it is like' for the split-brain subjects, and 'what it is like' 
for non-split-brain subjects. 
One sceptical challenge that has been provided in response to this setup is a 
challenge not about the existence of interesting and important differences between 
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the split-brain and non-split-brain subjects, but rather about this difference being a 
phenomenal matter. This kind of scepticism is provided by theorists that Bayne 
describes as 'objectivists'. Bayne suggests that there are two strategies for giving an 
account of 'co-consciousness' - where 'co-consciousness', like 'unity' picks out 
whatever the difference between 'a conjunction of experiences' and 'an experience of 
conjunction' consists in: 
We can divide accounts of the unity of consciousness into two broad classes: 
'objectivist' and 'subjectivist' accounts. Objectivists allow that co-consciousness can 
be at least partially accounted for in terms of factors-that are not accessible from the 
first-person perspective, while subjectivists hold that co-consciousness can only be 
explained in terms of factors that are first-person accessible.14 
The accounts of 'unity' or 'co-consciousness' that I am primarily interested in are the 
'subjectivist' accounts - accounts that attempt to engage with a phenomenological 
question about unity by giving an account of what the additional phenomenal 
unifying element in consciousness is. However, it is worth providing a brief 
discussion of one possible reason for adopting the' objectivist' approach - the reason 
in question being scepticism about the possibility of accounting for the difference 
between non-split-brain subjects and split-brain subjects in phenomenal terms. 
14 T. Bayne, "Co-consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness," Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 8, no. 3 (2001): 81. 
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One thought seized upon by objectivists is that non-split-brain subjects have no idea 
what it is like for the split-brain subjects! Plausibly, the only way that we can even 
attempt to work out what it is like for the split-brain subjects is to try and imagine 
what it is like for them. Susan Hurley has exploited this thought in developing an 
argument in favour of an objectivist account of synchronic unity. 
The setup of Hurley's argument involves a discussion of the subjectivist accounts of 
synchronic unity. As I noted above, objectivists don't want to claim that there is 
nothing to be said about synchronic phenomenal unity - they just think that an 
account of the difference between the split-brain and the non-split-brain subjects 
cannot be given in phenomenal terms. Hurley is arguing for the claim that an 
account of synchronic unity that applies to the 'hard cases' - such as the split-brain 
cases - cannot be given in terms of 'what it is like' for the subject. 
In setting up her argument, Hurley introduces the terminology: 'co-conscious': 
Some conscious states occupying the same stretch of time are together, while others 
are separate. While I talk to you, I see your face and hear my own voice. These 
experiences are together or united within one consciousness: they are co-conscious.15 
15 S. Hurley, "Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism," The Unity of Consciousness: 
Binding, Integration, and Dissociation (2003): 1. 
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In the case of synchronic unity, Hurley suggests, 'co-consciousness' is a transitive 
relation, and consciousness is always 'fully unified': 
We normally assume that consciousness must be fully unified. What does this mean? 
We can use the intuitive idea of togetherness or co-consciousness to explain full 
unity. Full unity requires that if two conscious states are co-conscious at a time, then 
each is also co-conscious with all the states the other is at that time. That is, full unity 
requires that ... is co-conscious and simultaneous with ... is a transitive relation between 
conscious states.16 
Hurley suggests that we can conceive of another way that consciousness could be 
besides being fully unified - it could be partially unified. In this case, co-
consciousness would not be a transitive relation: 
In a partially unified consciousness, two states that are not co-conscious with each 
other can nevertheless both be co-conscious with the same third state.17 
One suggestion that is sometimes made about the split-brain cases is that they are 
cases of partial unity - so in the toothbrush and pencil case discussed above, the 
suggestion is that the experiences of the toothbrush and pencil are not unified with 
the rest of the subject's experiences at a time. Hurley argues that the subjectivist 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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approach doesn't allow us to distinguish between partial unity, and what she calls 
'duplication'. To imagine' duplication', Hurley claims, is not to imagine partial unity: 
It is easy to imagine what it is like to have co-conscious experiences with certain 
contents: to imagine seeing red and feeling hot, or to imagine seeing red while feeling 
dizzy. We can also easily imagine that no experience of feeling hot is together with an 
experience of feeling dizzy. But this is not to imagine partial unity. I could be seeing 
red while feeling hot, and you could be seeing red while feeling dizzy. That wouldn't 
be partial unity, because my experience of seeing red isn't the same particular 
experience as yours, even though it-may be the same qualitative type of experience as 
yours.18 
In order to imagine 'partial unity', Hurley suggests, we need to imagine some 
element missing in the duplication case. Her suggestion is the following: 
To imagine a partially unified consciousness, we must imagine something not just 
about the type and content of experiences, but also something about their identity. 
We'd have to imagine that some experience of seeing red that is together with an 
experience of feeling hot is the very same particular experience as an experience of 
seeing red that is together with an experience of feeling dizzy - even though that 
experience of feeling hot is not together with that experience of feeling dizzy.19 
18 Ibid., 2. 
19 Ibid. 
Page 24 
The problem with this strategy, however, is that it isn't clear what it would be to 
imagine such a thing - as Hurley puts it: 
There is nothing it is like for my experience of seeing red not to be identical with your 
duplicate experience of seeing red. Nor is there anything it is like for my experience 
of seeing red to be identical with itself. The 'what it's like' talk just doesn't apply to 
the identity of experiences in these ways. So being partially unified isn't the kind of 
thing the purely subjective perspective expressed by the 'what it is like' talk could in 
principle get a grip on at all.20 
So, it doesn't appear that there is anything captured by 'what it is like' talk that 
enables us to distinguish between 'partial unity' and 'duplication'. Hurley claims 
that consciousness 'must have some determinate structure or other', but that we 
cannot answer questions about what that determinate structure is by using the 
exclusively phenomenological approach of the subjectivist, because the subjectivist's 
approach to partial unity is unable to provide a determinate account of the 
distinction between partial unity and duplication. 
I want to make the following suggestion about where Hurley's sceptical argument 
leaves us as regards the phenomenal unity slogan. We can note that Hurley's 
argument appears to actually pres~ppose an account of phenomenal unity set up in 
the style of the first source of motivation - it requires a unity relation that is 
transitive in the normal case. If this is the case, then it may be that we cannot be 
20 Ibid. 
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sceptical about all the different ways of setting up the problem at the same time. In 
order to be sceptical about the I split-brains' set-up, we have to think that there is 
something other than Isplit-brains' motivating the synchronic unity slogan, and 
accordingly motivating the idea that I co-consciousness' is a substantive notion. 
The relevant source of motivation could be the first source I described - attending to 
the phenomenology - or it could be the source that I have not yet discussed. The 
source that I have not yet discussed is, in fact, the source that Hurley appeals to in 
order to get her argument going - appeal to the notion of a subject of experience. At 
the start of her argument, Hurley introduces the notion of Ico-consciousness' via 
appeal to distinct subjects of experience: 
Some conscious states occupying the same stretch of time are together, while others are 
separate. While I talk to you, I see your face and hear my own voice. These experiences 
are together or united within one consciousness: they are co-conscious. But you also 
hear my voice, and your experience is separate from mine.21 
I shall discuss this source of motivation in more detail shortly, but before doing this, 
I want to raise the possibility of a less refined scepticism about 'split-brains' than that 
which Hurley provides. Rather than using the 'split-brain' cases in support of an 
objectivist, rather than a subjectivist, account, it is possible to be sceptical about the 
'split-brain' cases motivating the synchronic unity slogan at all. This sceptic responds 
to the I split-brain' cases just by noting that the data we get from the' split-brain' cases 
21 Ibid., 1. 
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affords a number of different interpretations, not all of which involve a 'disunified' 
consciousness. 
To return to the example of the toothbrush and the pencil, some such models suggest 
that the subject is not phenomenally conscious of both items simultaneously - on these 
kinds of model, the subject is conscious of one of the items in such a way that there is 
nothing that it is like for the subject to be aware of it (the subject may be access 
conscious, though not phenomenally conscious, of the relevant item),22 For this 
sceptic, there is nothing about the split-brain cases that supports the synchronic unity 
slogan - and, unlike Hurley's scepticism, it is possible to adopt this form of 
scepticism about the split-brain cases as well as the other sources of motivation 
simultaneously. 
The plausibility of this less-refined form of scepticism about unity depends upon 
interpreting the split-brain data in a way that doesn't give us a unity question. Given 
that, at this point in time, it simply isn't clear what our interpretation of the data 
ought to be, I propose that this form of scepticism about unity shouldn't be treated as 
decisive. 
22 For detailed discussion of the various different models of the 'split-brain' cases that don't treat the 
data as supporting the synchronic unity slogan, see: T. Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness (OUP, 2010). 
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§2.3: Subjects of Experience 
I now want to turn to the third and final suggestion about how to motivate the 
synchronic unity slogan mentioned in conjunction with Hurley's argument: the 
appeal to subjects of experience. Take all of my experiences and all of your 
experiences at a particular time. There must be some story to tell, the phenomenal 
unity theorist claims, about the way all of my experiences are related to one another, 
and the way that all of your experiences are related to one another. What is more, 
they claim, this story must be capable of being told at the phenomenological level -
in terms of 'what it is like' for us. This kind of suggestion can be found in Dainton in 
the following passage: 
My current stream of consciousness has an auditory phenomenal region and a visual 
phenomenal region, and the latter is composed of many smaller visual phenomenal 
regions. The various phenomenal regions comprising my consciousness are unified 
in a distinctive way - in a way that the regions of my consciousness and your 
consciousness are not - so what is responsible for this unity?23 
Against this line of thought, it might be objected that this is not the right way to 
motivate the synchronic unity slogan - we are not being presented with any 
phenomenological data over and aJ;>ove the idea that different subjects can have a 
plethora of numerically distinct experiences at a time. Why should we find it 
23 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 253. 
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convincing that there is some phenomenal story to be told here, rather than Dainton's 
question being answered by an account of how we ought to individuate subjects? 
The sceptic's response in this case will thus be that we can answer Dainton's 
question just by giving an account of how we are to individuate subjects - with no 
account of a phenomenal relation between experiences required. Against this 
sceptical response, the advocate of synchronic unity may respond that an account of 
how we individuate subjects will at least involve an account of what unifies 
experiences together. On this line of response, the notion of a subject of experience is 
intimately connected with the notion of a fully unified consciousness. Just as in the 
case of the split-brain discussion, the sceptical worry doesn't appear decisive - with 
our attitude towards such scepticism perhaps turning on a distinct issue - in this 
case, the issue of how we ought to individuate subjects of experience. 
So, we have examined three different sources of motivation for the synchronic unity 
slogan, and seen that there are sceptical worries corresponding to each of them. The 
sceptical worries discussed above are not intended to decisively show that there is no 
such thing as 'phenomenal unity' - rather they are supposed to demonstrate an 
interesting feature of the synchronic unity slogan: namely, that it is harder to 
articulate the motivation for accepting it than one might expect. Putting these 
sceptical worries to· one side, then, we can begin to examine the theories of Bayne, 
Dainton, and Tye intended to account for the difference between a conjunction of 
experiences and an experience of conjunction. 
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§3. Synchronic Unity 
We can distinguish between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' accounts of the unity of 
consciousness. 'Top-down' accounts take the notion that subjects of experience have 
an 'overall' experience as primitive, and see the project of accounting for the unity of 
consciousness as the project of explaining the relationship that the 'overall' 
experience bears to the less complex experiences had by the subject that' compose' it. 
On this view, the 'experience of conjunction' at a time is taken as primitive, and the 
challenge is to provide an account of how it is related to the 'conjunction of 
experiences' the subject has at the same time. Bayne is an example of a 'top-down' 
theorist, suggesting that the overall experience 'subsumes' the experiences that 
compose it. 
'Bottom-up' theorists, in contrast, take the notion that the subject has a multiplicity of 
experiences - a conjunction of experiences - at a time as primitive, and take their 
project to be that of providing an account of how we can 'build' the subject's overall 
experience - the experience of conjunction - out of the multiplicity. Dainton is our 
example of a 'bottom-up' theorist, suggesting that a conjunction of experiences 
amount to an experience of conjunction when the experiences bear the primitive 
experiential relation of 'co-consciousness' to one another. 
In addition to the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches, we also have the position 
taken by Tye - who attempts to dissolve the problem of the synchronic unity of 
Consciousness by claiming that subjects only have one experience per period of 
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unbroken consciousness. This strategy - denying that subjects have a multiplicity of 
experiences - enables Tye to claim that the synchronic unity slogan ('a conjunction of 
experiences is not, in itself, an experience of conjunction') has no force, for on the 
'one-experience' picture, subjects never have a conjunction of experiences. 
I shall discuss these different views of synchronic unity in more detail in chapter 
eight, but for now I want to observe that, prima facie, all three views appear to have 
some plausibility - there is nothing obviously wrong with any of them. We can now 
proceed to an examination of the problem of diachronic unity. In this discussion I 
shall demonstrate that, while there are various similarities between the synchronic 
and the diachronic puzzles, the diachronic puzzle contains an additional element 
that renders a view like Tye's 'one-experience' view prima facie implausible. This 
additional element is the continuity of consciousness. 
§4. Motivating the Diachronic Unity Problem 
The diachronic unity slogan discussed earlier was the following: 'a succession of 
experiences is not an experience of succession'. Just as in the synchronic case, we can 
ask what it is that is supposed to motivate the slogan. When providing an account of 
diachronic unity, the relevant datum in need of explanation is that we can experience 
temporally extended happenings: movements, changes, and so on. We can, for 
example, visually experience a ball moving between distinct locations. Lets say the 
ball moves between locations Ll-L5 over the interval of time Tl-T5. The ball is in 
location Ll at TI, L2 at T2, and so on. 
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One thing to note about the ball moving between distinct locations is that the ball's 
movement from L1-L5 is something that has temporal parts, and that these temporal 
parts occur in a particular order. The sense of 'temporal part' being used here 
involves only a very weak sense of 'parthood', analogous to the sense in which 
anything spatially extended has parts. If we take a spatially extended object, we can 
note that, at a time, the whole object occupies a range of distinct spatial locations that 
comprise the total spatial region occupied by the object. The object has parts in the 
sense that located at any subregion of the total region occupied by the object in 
question will be some portion of the object" that is not the whole object - rather it is a 
spatial part of the object. 
Analogously, anything temporally extended has temporal parts simply in virtue of 
occupying a range of distinct temporal locations. The movement is divisible into 
various stages - moving from L1-L2, L2-L3, and so on, and there is a particular order 
in which these stages occurred - first Ll-L2, then L2-L3. In fact, we can note that 
even these stages are further divisible - we can continue dividing and dividing these 
stages until the movement of the ball appears to drop out of the picture, and we are 
left with the ball occupying a series of distinct locations Ll at TI, L(1 +n) at T(I +n), 
and so on. 
One thought that ought to strike us now is that the above remarks about the motion 
of the ball from Ll-L5 also appear to apply to our experience of the ball. This is due to 
a phenomenological feature of temporal experience that has been called the Principle 
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of Presentational Concurrence (henceforth 'the PPC). The following discussion of the 
PPC is intended as both a discussion of it as an interesting feature of temporal 
experience, as well as a discussion of what might be motivating the diachronic unity 
slogan. 
§4.1: The PPC 
The PPC was initially formulated by Izchak Miller in Husserl, Perception, and Temporal 
Awareness as follows: 
The duration of a content being presented is concurrent with the duration of the act of 
presenting it. That is, the time interval occupied by a content which is before the mind 
is the very same time interval which is occupied by the act of presenting that very 
content before the mind.24 
In order to avoid commitment to a distinction between' act' and 'content', I want to 
suggest that we can formulate the PPC more neutrally as follows: 
The PPC: It seems as if the duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying. 
241. Miller, Husserl, perception, and temporal awareness (MIT Press, 1984), 107. 
Page 33 
The PPC comprises two components: firstly, that it seems that the order in which the 
objects of experience occur is the same as the order in which those objects are 
experienced; secondly, that it seems that the duration occupied by the objects of 
experience is concurrent with the duration occupied by the relevant portion of 
experience itself. The claim about the apparent relationship between represented 
order and order of representations, we can note, remains true about ways of 
experiencing other than perception. The claim about duration occupied by 
experience and object of experience, however, appears to be a distinctive feature of 
perceptual experience. 
To illustrate this, we can consider the case of episodic memory. I am engaging in 
episodic memory when I recall what it was like to experience a certain event - I can 
recall, for instance, what it was like to arrive by plane in France for the first time. 
This episode of recollection is something that is temporally extended, and in which 
only the 'represented order' component of the PPC appears to apply. In the case of 
episodic recollection, it seems that the order in which the recollected objects feature 
in experience is the same as the order in which those objects are recollected. 
However, it doesn't seem as if the duration occupied by the objects of recollection is 
concurrent with the duration of the ,episode of recollection - for those objects are 
given 'as past'. It is this kind of observation that drives the claim that the PPC is 
distinctive of perceptual experience. One objection to the PPC that has been raised by 
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Tye is that it rests upon an elementary confusion of 'represented order' with 'order of 
representations' : 
It seems to me that there is a serious confusion here ... If I utter the sentence 
The green flash is after the red flash, 
I represent the red flash as being before the green one; but my representation of the 
red flash is not before my representation of the green flash. In general, represented 
order has no obvious link with the order of representations. Why suppose that there 
is such a link for experiential representations?2526 
Of course, if the claim being made about the phenomenology of perceptual 
experience rested on a general principle which stated that represented order does 
have an obvious link with the order of representations in all cases, then Tye's 
objection would be quite right. However, as is made clear by the comparison of the 
perceptual case with the case of episodic recollection, the claim doesn't rest upon a 
general principle of this kind - rather, it is a claim about a specific case: the case of 
perceptual experience. 
In support of the PPC as a claim about the phenomenology of the perceptual case, we 
can look at the comparison between memory and perceptual experience again. In the 
25 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 90. 
26 I will return to Tye's idea that there are parallels to be drawn between sentential and experiential 
representation in chapter five. 
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case of episodic recollection, we noted, we can discern a difference in the temporal 
location of the relevant experience, and the temporal location of the item being 
recollected - the item recollected is experienced as past. In the case of perception, 
however, we are unable to discern any such difference between the temporal location 
of the perceptual experience and the temporal location of the object/ s of experience. 
In order to deny the ppe in the perceptual case, the opponent would have to 
examine the phenomenology of perceptual experience, and find an example of a 
situation in which the object/ s of perceptual experience are experienced as occurring 
before or after their perceptual experience of it! them. This, I propose, cannot be 
done - items don't seem to be experienced in this way in perceptual experience: thus 
the ppe, as a claim about the phenomenology of perceptual experience, rests secure. 
Tye's response to the ppe is a response to it as a metaphysical claim - a claim about 
how experience in fact is, rather than as a phenomenological claim - a claim about 
how experience seems to the experiencing subject 'from the inside'. My response 
here provides a defence of the phenomenological, though not straightforwardly the 
metaphysical claim, the metaphysical claim being the following: 
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Metaphysical PPC: The duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying.27 
The metaphysical version of the PPC is just the PPC without the claim about how 
experience seems - rather than being a claim about how experience seems 'from the 
inside', it is a claim about how experience in fact is. The position I ultimately want to 
adopt involves explaining the phenomenological claim by appealing to the 
metaphysical claim. My answer to Tye's question ('Why suppose that there is such a 
link for experiential representations?') shall be that accounts of temporal experience 
that don't make this metaphysical claim end up getting the phenomenology of 
temporal experience wrong. This failure of other accounts of temporal experience to 
adequately treat the phenomenology, I shall attempt to show, results from their 
failure to adopt the metaphysical ppc. The ppc, then, while not itself a metaphysical 
claim, is something that ought to incline one to adopt the metaphysical ppc. 
At this stage, then, we have two pieces of phenomenological data to be accounted 
for: 
1) It seems as if we can experience temporally extended happenings. 
27 Henceforth, talk about 'the PPC' is talk about the phenomenological claim, and talk about 'the 
metaphysical PPC' is talk about the metaphysical claim. 
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2) The ppe: It seems as if the duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying. 
One account of temporal experience that we could formulate in response to these 
two pieces of phenomenological data is the account of temporal experience that I 
shall call the 'NaIve Theory'.28 
The NaIve Theorist is motivated by two thoughts: the first-is that we can account for 
the ppe by adopting the metaphysical ppe; the second is that if we adopt the 
metaphysical ppe, then experiences will be temporally extended, and divisible - just 
like the movement of the ball - into smaller and smaller temporal parts. Motivated 
by these thoughts, the naIve theorist proposes that we ought to think of a temporal 
stretch of perceptual experience as consisting of a series of 'snapshots'. The idea 
behind 'snapshots' is the thought that if a temporally extended phase of experience is 
divided into earlier and later parts enough times, we arrive at a point at which 
experience is no longer divisible in this way. 
There are two different ways in which we might conceive of 'snapshots'. On the first 
view, 'snapshots' are literally instantaneous portions of experience that represent 
literally instantaneous parts of temporally extended happenings. On the second 
28 I shall also call this kind of view the 'unmodified naIve theory' later on in the chapter, to distinguish it 
from a different, but related, aCCount: the modified naIve theory. 
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view, 'snapshots' are not literally instantaneous: rather, they are temporally 
extended portions of experience that represent portions of temporally extended 
happenings without discernable earlier and later temporal parts. A naIve theorist 
might be more inclined to think of snapshots in the second way if he has some reason 
for denying that there are such things as instants. 
Another reason a naIve theorist might adopt the second view is if he is impressed by 
the results of certain experiments in psychology which have been taken to reveal 
certain facets of the structure of temporal experience. One such experiment is 
particularly relevant at this point. In this experiment, it is noted that if two distinct 
stimuli are presented to the subject over a period of time that is less than 30 m/ s, the 
subject is incapable of determining the order in which the stimuli occurred.29 This 
result has lead some theorists, of which Ruhnau is a good example, to claim that 
temporal experience "is structured by adirectional temporal zones" of 20 m/s.30 This 
period of time, a naIve theorist might think, marks the point at which temporally 
extended experiences are no longer divisible into earlier and later temporal parts: 
this period is a snapshot. 
From now on, when I talk about 'snapshots', I remain neutral as to which of these 
two views (,literal instants', or 'no discernable earlier and later temporal parts') is in 
29 For discussion of this, and other experiments relevant to issues surrounding temporal experience, see: 
E. Ruhnau, "Time-gestalt and the observer," Conscious experience (1995): 165-184. 
30 Ibid., 168. 
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question. Both conceptions of 'snapshot' face the same objection - an objection that 
Dainton has formulated as follows: 
... a succession of still images that are perceived as such do not and cannot amount to a 
direct experience of motion. And what goes for motion goes for change and 
persistence generally.31 
The objection raised by Dainton is that while the naIve theory might be consistent 
with the PPC, it is not consistent with the first datum t.hat we are attempting to 
account for - the datum that we can perceptually experience temporally extended 
happenings. On the naIve theory, we are aware first of one snapshot, then another, 
then another, and so on. What is needed from the naIve theory is some account of 
how it is awareness of these snapshots can amount to awareness of temporally 
extended happenings. 
It is here that we find a source of motivation for the diachronic unity slogan that' a 
succession of experiences is not an experience of succession'. According to the naIve 
theory, the subject has a succession of experiences - a succession of 'snapshots'. 
However, the objection to the naIve theory is that successions of such experiences 
don't in themselves amount to an experience of succession. What is needed, then, is 
some story about unity - a story aboVt what is required over and above a succession 
of experiences in order to get an experience of succession. 
31 B. Dainton, The Phenomenal Self (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 154. 
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Before examining what these stories ought to look like, we need to look at some 
constraints upon the form they must take. One such constraint is the 'Time-
Windows' claim. The 'Time-Windows' claim provides a way of demonstrating 
precisely where the naIve theory goes wrong, and what is required of any proposed 
alternative account. The 'Time-Windows' claim can be illustrated by using an 
example - the example of experiencing a concert. 
§5: Time-Windows 
If I attend a concert that lasts for three hours, and remain conscious of the concert for 
the whole duration of the concert, then I will have been experiencing the concert for 
three hours. To characterise my experience over the course of those three hours, we 
will need to appeal to the whole concert - with all of its three-hour duration. There is 
thus an isomorphism between the duration of the concert, and the duration of the 
relevant portion of experience - both the portion of experience and the concert are 
three hours long. 
I should note at this point that there are number of different ways in which the 
subject of experience can be aware of the concert. After two hours have elapsed, for 
instance, the subject can be perceptually experiencing the concert, can be aware of 
the concert via memory - short-term memory, episodic memory, or semantic memory 
- and can also be entertaining thoughts about the concert - perhaps thinking 'this 
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concert seems to have been going on for an awfully long time', or, hopefully, 'this 
concert seems to have flown by'. 
Despite this glut of ways in which the subject can be aware of the concert after two 
hours have elapsed, I am focussing on the issue of our perceptual awareness of the 
concert. The particular aspect of our perceptual awareness that I am interested in 
here is the following: If, at any point during the concert, we were to att~mpt to 
characterise the subject's perceptual experience - if we were to say to the subject 
'how are things phenomenologically with you now?' - we find that to characterise 
what the subject perceptually experiences at a time, we find that we need to appeal 
to an interval of time. 
It is this feature of temporal experience that the naIve theorist fails to account for. On 
the naIve theory, temporal experience consists of a series of snapshots that occur in a 
particular order. When we come to characterise the subject's experience at a time, on 
the naIve theorist's account, we ought merely to point to the snapshot occurring at 
that time. However, as the case of the concert shows, we need to appeal to more than 
just a snapshot in order to characterise the subject's experience at a time. 
Let's say that after an hour of the concert has elapsed, we ask the subject, 'what are 
you perceptually experiencing now?' He may very well answer 'the concert'. 
However, whim pushed, he will admit that he is not perceptually experiencing the 
first five minutes of the concert, or the five minutes after that - he may be able to 
recall that he did perceptually experience them, but they are not relevant to 
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characterising his perceptual experience now. He will also admit that he is not 
perceptually experiencing the last five minutes of the concert, or the five minutes 
before that - after all, both of those five-minute concert-periods haven't happened 
yet. 
The example of the concert reveals an important feature of temporal experience - the 
feature being that to characterise the subject'S perceptual experience at a time, we 
need to appeal to something of shorter duration than the time for which the subject 
has been experiencing, but something that is nevertheless temporally extended. Of 
course, there will also be situations in which the period of time that we need to 
appeal to is of the same duration as the duration for which the subject has . been 
experiencing - situations in which the subject's current period of experience has only 
been going on for a short time. 
We can call this feature of experience the 'Time-Windows' claim: 
Time-Windows: To characterise a subject's experience at a time we need to 
appeal to some interval that is equal to or shorter than the period of time for 
which the subject has been experiencing. 
Another piece of phenomenological evidence that we can draw on in support of the 
Time-Windows claim is that 'what it is like' for the subject normally changes as time 
passes. As time goes on, w~ normally find that what is relevant to characterising the 
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phenomenology of a subject's experience changes - what once was relevant ceases to 
be relevant, and what once was not relevant becomes relevant.32 
One reason for thinking this concerns the future. If we are interested in what the 
subject is perceptually experiencing after an hour of the concert, it looks like it is a 
mistake to attempt to characterise what the subject is perceptually experiencing at 
that time via appeal to what the subject goes on to experience five minutes later. 
After all, what the subject will perceptually experience five minutes later will be 
determined by things that haven't happened yet, and there are any number of things 
that might happen. It thus looks like it will be a mistake to say that after an hour of 
the concert has elapsed, the subject's experiential state at that time (or, alternatively, 
the phenomenal property instantiated by the subject at that time) will be 
characterised in terms of events that will not occur until five minutes later. 
If this is right, then we ought not to think of there being one psychological state or 
phenomenal property that corresponds to the whole concert-experiencing, but rather 
a series of such things, all of which are to be characterised in terms of intervals of 
time. The psychological property relevant to experiencing what occurs two and a 
half hours into the concert, plausibly, can only be instantiated by the subject after 
32 We can also phrase this thought in terms of phenomenal properties. 'Phenomenal properties' are 
those properties that pick out 'what it is like'for the subject. Phrased in these terms, the thought is that 
rather than thinking of the subject as bearing one phenomenal property that corresponds to the whole 
concert-experiencing, we ought to think of the subject as bearing a series of different phenomenal 
properties. 
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those two and a half hours have elapsed. If this is the case - with different intervals 
of time being relevant to characterising what the subject is experiencing at different 
times - it looks as though it is appropriate to think of the whole concert-experiencing 
as consisting of a series of different Time-Windows. 
So, we have two different arguments for the existence of Time-Windows: the first is 
that when we attempt to characterise a subject's experience at a time, we find that we 
need to appeal to some interval of time. The second is that the phenomenal 
properties instantiated by the subject change as experience unfolds - they change in 
the sense that some of the properties instantiated at some times are not instantiated 
at other times. 'What it is like' for the subject thus changes as the subject's experience 
unfolds, so in order for us to correctly characterise the subject's experience at a time 
we need to appeal to some interval of time that is of duration less than that of the 
period for which the subject has been experiencing. 
§6. The Problem of Diachronic Unity 
Having established that there are Time-Windows involved in temporal experience, 
there are various questions that we can ask about them. One question concerns how 
we ought to account for Time-Windows - how can we accommodate them in a 
theory of temporal experience? Another question concerns how it is that Time-
Windows are manifest in the phenomenology of perceptual experience. I shall 
answer the first question first. 
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The first question gives us a diachronic unity question that is analogous to the 
synchronic unity question. At this stage of proceedings, we have three claims about 
the phenomenology of temporal experience that we need to account for: 
1) It seems as if we can experience temporally extended happenings. 
2) The PPC: It seems as if the duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying. 
3) Time-Windows: To characterise a subject's experience at a time we need to 
appeal to some interval that is equal to or shorter than the period of time for 
which the subject has been experiencing. 
We have seen that the NaIve Theory fails to account for the first datum listed above. 
An obvious way to avoid such failure is to provide an account that explicitly 
attempts to deal with Time-Windows. One way Time-Windows can be thought of 
that makes explicit the parallels between accounting for them and accounting for 
synchronic unity is in terms of 'togetherness'. At a time, the thought goes, we find 
that what is relevant to characterising the subject's experience is neither an instant, 
nor the duration for which the subject has been experiencing. The thought behind 
'experienced togetherness' is that we can distinguish between those portions of time 
that are relevant to characterising the subject's experience at a given time, and those 
that are not, by saying that only the relevant portions are experienced together at a 
time. 
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Once we have arrived at this point in the debate, we are dealing with something that 
is being explicitly formulated as a unity question about consciousness. The account of 
Time-Windows is being conceived of as an account of what is responsible for the 
'unity' or 'togetherness' with which items are experienced in a Time-Window. Now 
we have the notion of being experienced 'together' in play, we need to give some 
account of what it means to experience a collection of things 'together'. 
It is at this point in our examination of the diachronic unity of consciousness that the 
puzzle of temporal experience begins to emerge. The puzzle emerges when we 
consider one strategy for cashing out what 'togetherness' is - in terms of simultaneous 
awareness. For a collection of items that are temporally spread out over an interval to 
be experienced 'together' is, on this proposal, for them to be experienced 
simultaneously. We can sum up this line of thought with the following slogan, which 
we can call 'the Principle of Simultaneous Awareness' - 'the PSA' for short - 'There 
are instants at which we experience intervals'.33 
It is the PSA that generates the puzzle of temporal experience, for while on the one 
hand it provides us with a way of accounting for one phenomenological feature of 
experience - the feature captured by the 'Time-Windows' claim, on the other there is 
a question about whether commitment to the PSA enables us to accommodate the 
Ppc. According to the ppc, it seems as if experiencing something temporally 
extended is something that takes time - for the duration occupied by the experience 
is concurrent with the duration occupied by the object of experience. However, 
33 The PSA - a principle that will' prove crucial in what follows - finds its first expression in the work of 
Izchak Miller (See Miller, Husserl, perception, and temporal awareness.) 
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according to the PSA, experiencing something temporally "extended appears to be 
something that doesn't require a temporally extended portion of experience: it merely 
requires an instantaneous portion of experience. 
The puzzle, then, is generated by the fact that we have two distinct 
phenomenological claims that appear to drive us in two quite different metaphysical 
directions. The PPC drives us in the direction of metaphysical PPC, while the 'Time-
Windows' claim drives us in the direction of the PSA. The puzzle is thus a puzzle 
about whether we can be committed to either metaphysical claim while 
simultaneously accommodating the phenomenological claim accounted for by the 
other metaphysical claim, given that the two metaphysical claims contradict one 
another. 
In fact, things aren't quite this simple with the PSA, for we can distinguish two 
different versions of it: a strong version, and a weak version. It is only the strong 
version of the PSA that raises a puzzle about accommodating the ppc. The two 
different versions of the PSA are best thought of as different interpretations of the 
PSA - different interpretations of what makes the PSA true. 
§6.1: Fat- and Thin- PSA 
The first way of reading the PSA is that the sentence 'there are instants at which we 
experience intervals' requires an instantaneous truth-maker. On this reading, when 
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we consider the instant in question, all that is relevant to determining what is the 
case at that instant is the instant itself, and nothing more. I call this reading of the 
PSA 'Thin-Truthmaker PSA' (hereafter'Thin-PSA'). 
The second way of reading the sentence is not so committed - on this reading, there 
is no commitment to what might make the claim true. On this reading, an interval of 
time could be relevant to determining the truth of the claim - what is the case at a 
time can be determined by what is the case over an interval of time.34 I call this 
reading of the PSA 'Fat-Truthmaker PSA' (Hereafter 'Fat-PSA'). Here, then, are the 
two different versions of the PSA: 
3a. Thin-Truthmaker PSA (Thin-PSA): The claim is made true by the state of 
the subject at an instant. 
3b. Fat-Truthmaker PSA (Fat-PSA): Neutral as to what it is about the subject 
that makes the claim true. 
These two different versions of the psA are not often distinguished in the literature -
the Fat-PSA is often overlooked, with only Thin-PSA being discussed. 
34 On views on which there are no such things as instants, the talk of instants here can be translated into 
talk of 'moments', where 'moments' picks out the smallest portion of time admitted by the view, 
without changing the dialectic in what follows. 
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The Fat-PSA, unlike the Thin-PSA, is compatible with there being an isomorphism 
between the temporal extent of the part of experience whose phenomenology is 
being characterised and the temporal extent of what is required to characterise it. On 
the thin interpretation of PSA, when we characterise what experience is like at a 
time, we need to appeal to something temporally extended to characterise something 
instantaneous (experience at that instant, or an instantaneous experience). On Fat-
PSA, we can talk about what experience is like at a time, but nevertheless hold that 
talk about what experience is like at a time is only made true by what experience is 
like over an interval of time. 
Given that interpreting the PSA as Fat-PSA enables us to avoid the apparent 
difficulty of accounting for the PPC, it might seem puzzling that Fat-PSA is often 
overlooked, with the PSA being conceived of as Thin-PSA. However, if we reflect 
upon the reason that the PSA is introduced into the debate - in an attempt to provide 
an account of experienced 'togetherness' - we can see why the Fat-PSA gets 
overlooked: because it doesn't obviously provide us with an account of 
'togetherness'. The Fat-PSA remains neutral upon what makes it true that there are 
instants at which we experience intervals, so whereas the Thin-PSA tells us that 
'togetherness' is to be thought of as something like 'being represented by the same 
instantaneous portion of experience', the Fat-PSA doesn't tell us how we are to think 
of 'togetherness'. 
One way of getting a grip on the difference between the two different versions of the 
PSA has been suggested by Ian Phillips in his paper 'Perceiving Temporal 
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Properties'. The Thin-PSA is compatible with what he calls 'Russell Worlds'.35 The 
idea behind Russell worlds is that things could be as they are in the present even if 
all of the past events that we take to have happened had, in fact, not happened. As 
Russell puts it: 
There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five 
minutes ago, exactly as it then was, ... There is no logically necessary connection 
between events at different times.36 
Phillips' suggestion is that we can consider an even more extreme view than one 
according to which the world sprang into view 'five minutes ago': we can consider a 
view on which there is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world 
sprang into view this instant. The Thin-PSA is compatible with this state of affairs. 
We can think of the Thin-PSA as comprising of two components: the first component 
is the rejection of the thought that the temporal extension of a subject's experience is 
relevant in making the claim that 'there are instants at which we experience 
intervals' true. The second component is the rejection of the thought that the 
temporal extension of the object of a subject's experience is relevant in making the 
same claim true. I now want to consider two arguments in favour of the Thin-PSA, 
and three different ways of objecting to these arguments. 
35 I. Phillips, "Perceiving Temporal Properties," European Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2010): 5. 
36 Bertrand Russell, TIle analysis of mind (Routledge, 1995), 132. 
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Dainton has suggested the following argument from the thought that 'there are 
instants at which we experience intervals' to the Thin-PSA: 
Suppose one accepts that to experience a temporally extended content, one must 
have an awareness of the first half of the content that is simultaneous with one's 
awareness of the second half. Clearly this awareness cannot begin earlier than the 
second half of the content, but could it occur concurrently with it? Not if the second 
half of the content has some temporal duration, for the same considerations apply ... 
The same applies for any temporally extended contents, no matter how brief. An 
adherent of PSA is thus driven ineluctably to the ... [Thin-PSA] ... 37 
Dainton's proposed argument is that the first point in time at which the subject could 
become aware of all of the items contained within an interval is the point in time at 
which the interval has elapsed. We cannot experience a collection of items together, 
on this line of thought, unless all of those items are present in experience, and items 
cannot be present in experience if they haven't yet occurred. There is thus a first 
instant at which the subject can become aware of all of the relevant items together: the 
first instant at which the interval in question has elapsed. 
The second argument that the Thin-PSA theorist may appeal to in explaining why it 
is that we need to account for' experienced togetherness' in terms of awareness at an 
instant is that the temporal extension of experience is irrelevant to any account of 
Time-Windows. After the subject has been experiencing the concert for two hours, 
37 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 133. 
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there is a weak sense in which everything that the subject has experienced over those 
two hours is experienced 'together', simply in virtue of being represented in the 
same unbroken period of conscious experience. 
However, this sense of 'experienced together' - being represented in the same 
unbroken period of conscious experience - can't be used to account for Time-
Windows, because Time-Windows are set up in terms of there being portions of 
conscious experience that aren't relevant to a characterisation of what it is like for the 
subject at a time. If the temporal extension of experience doesn't suffice to provide us 
with an account of Time-Windows, the thought goes, then we ought not to be 
surprised if an account of Time-Windows is given in terms of a portion of experience 
without temporal extent: the instant. 
At this point, we have two lines of thought that lead us from 'experienced 
togetherness' to the Thin-PSA: the first one being that there is a first instant at which 
different items can be experienced together, and the second being that the temporal 
extension of experience is simply irrelevant to an account of Time-Windows. How 
might one respond to these arguments? 
§6.2: Rejecting the Thin-PSA 
One way to respond is to adopt an 'externalist' response, and claim that in order for 
experience at an instant to have the phenomenal character it does, it is a requirement 
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that the object[s] of experience be temporally extended. According to the externalist, 
perceptual experience is to be conceived of as a relation to mind-independent objects. 
It is thus a requirement upon the subject having a perceptual experience as of 
something temporally extended that there exists some temporally extended object of 
that experience. The 'externalist' rejects the component of the Thin-PSA that claims 
that the temporal extent of the object of experience is of no relevance in making the 
PSA true. 
The' externalist' line of thought - involving commitment to the idea that the objects 
of experience must be temporally extended in order for experience to have the 
character it does - is unavailable to a theorist who holds that the phenomenal 
character of experience can be identical in cases of veridical experience and 
hallucination. 
The second response one might make is what I shall call the 'temporal slice' 
response. On this view, experience at an instant only possesses the phenomenal 
character it does in virtue of being an instantaneous portion - an instantaneous 
'temporal slice' - of a temporally extended experience. It is this claim, I shall argue 
over the course of this thesis, that provides us with the only way of giving a 
satisfactory account of temporal experience. The reason for this is that adopting the 
'externalist' response doesn't suffice to correct the mistaken claims about the 
phenomenology that Thin-PSA commits us to. My proposal, then, is that it isn't 
enough for us to simply reject the Thin-PSA - rather, the Thin-PSA must be rejected 
in a particular way: by making the 'temporal slice' response. 
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The third way of responding to the Thin-PSA is to adopt a position that commits to 
both 'externalism' and to the 'temporal slice' claims. On this view, experience at an 
instant only possesses the phenomenal character it does in virtue of the temporal 
extension of the object[s] of experience and in virtue of the temporal extension of the 
experience that it is a temporal part of. Of course, on my proposal, what will be 
doing the work in correcting the errors of Thin-PSA will not be the 'externalist' 
component of such a view, but rather the 'temporal slice' component. 
However, despite the possibility of these three responses, there is one serious 
problem facing any attempt to reject the Thin-PSA that I want to discuss. This is the 
idea that the only way to give a substantive account of 'experienced togetherness' is 
to commit to some instantaneous temporal part of temporally extended experience 
being responsible for representing a collection of items together. We can illustrate this 
by looking at objections to Dainton's account, for Dainton attempts to provide an 
account of 'togetherness' while denying the Thin-PSA. 
Dainton's attempt to account for what 'it means to say things are experienced 
'together' is to appeal to a 'primitive experiential relation' - the relation of 'co-
consciousness'. He says the following about situations in which a collection of items 
are experienced together: 
How do the contents in a single phenomenal present come to be experienced as a 
unified whole if they are not apprehended by a single act of awareness of the sort 
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posited by advocates of the PSA? The answer, I suggest, is that the contents in 
question are related by co-consciousness, the same primitive inter-experiential 
relationship that is responsible for the unity of consciousness at a given time. Just as 
all the constituent parts of a spatial field of content can be directly co-conscious, so 
too can all the constituent parts of a temporal field of content.38 
A phenomenal present is a unified phenomenal expanse - its earlier and later parts 
are experienced together - and for an experience to be thus its constituents must be 
transitively co-conscious.39 
The problem facing Dainton's attempt to account for 'togetherness' while renouncing 
the Thin-PSA is that it isn't clear that there is anything to 'co-consciousness' beyond 
its being a label for the problem. This challenge to his view - that' co-consciousness' 
is a label, not a solution - is particularly pressing for Dainton, given his claim that, as 
a primitive experiential relation, 'co-consciousness' cannot be defined in terms of any 
simpler notion. 
I shall say a lot more about Dainton's view, and my objections to it, in chapter six, 
but for now I hope to have hinted that there are certainly going to be difficulties for 
any account that accepts the claim that there is such a thing as 'experienced 
togetherness', while simultaneously denying the Thin-PSA. Despite my disagreeing 
with his account, I am nevertheless sympathetic to his cause: the cause being an 
38 B. Dainton, "Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher," Psyche 9, no. 10 (2003): 26. 
39 Ibid., 27. 
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attempt to provide an account of temporal experience that rejects Thin-PSA, and thus 
avoids the difficulty of having to accommodate the PPC while denying the 
Metaphysical ppc. 
One reason that I am in sympathy with Dainton's project is that there are serious 
problems facing the accounts that commit to Thin-PSA. Once again, I do not want to 
go into these problems in too much detail at this point - this will be the business of 
the following chapters. Despite the initial apparent lack of appeal of the Fat-PSA, as 
compared with the Thin-PSA, over the following chapters I shall develop an account 
of diachronic unity that commits to the Fat-, rather than the Thin-, PSA. I propose 
that we ought to attempt to provide an account that doesn't conflict with the 
phenomenology - and whereas the Thin-PSA leads to conflict, the Fat-PSA does not. 
Demonstrating precisely where these accounts go wrong is a difficult matter, and 
requires more constraints and distinctions to be introduced. For now, we can begin 
to get an idea of the kind of things that Thin-PSA Theorists say about the diachronic 
unity of consciousness. 
There are two broad camps into which Thin-PSA theorists fall: they are either 
Memory Theorists, or Specious Present Theorists. Both the Memory Theorists and the 
Specious Present Theorists, in committing to the Thin-PSA, are also committed to the 
denial of the Metaphysical ppc. They both think of temporal experience as having 
the 'triangular' structure described by the diagram below: 
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The diagram above represents a Thin-PSA account, with an instantaneous portion of 
experience representing a temporally extended spread of content. Some Thin-PSA 
theorists hold that the apparent temporal location of the object/ s of experience 
cannot involve locations later than that of the relevant portion of experience, while 
others - Husserl, for instance - disagree. This aspect of Thin-PSA accounts is 
represented by the dotted line in the diagram above. 
While this provides one dimension along which Thin-PSA theorists can disagree, a 
more important source of disagreement for our purposes concerns the disagreement 
between 'Memory Theorists' and 'Specious Present Theorists'. While both are 
committed to instantaneous portions of experience representing temporally extended 
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happenings, they disagree over what is experienced as 'present' or 'happening now'. 
The Memory Theorist claims that only a 'snapshot' can be experienced as present, 
whereas the Specious Present Theorist claims that everything featuring in a Time-
Window can be experienced as present. I shall say more about this disagreement, 
and the debate between the two kinds of account, in the third chapter. 
§7. Conclusion: Diachronic versus Synchronic Unity 
So, at this stage of proceedings we have adiachronic unity question: how are we to 
account for the 'experienced togetherness'-of the contents of a Time-Window? We 
also have a puzzle regarding our answer to this question: we seemingly have to 
choose between giving an account of 'togetherness' in terms of Thin-PSA, and giving 
an account that doesn't face problems in giving an account of the ppe. There is 
clearly some similarity between the diachronic and the synchronic unity questions: 
both require us to provide some account of 'togetherness' in order to account for the 
experience of conjunction (in the synchronic case) or succession (in the diachronic 
case). 
There are also differences between the two questions, however. One crucial 
difference is that there doesn't seem to be the same kind of puzzle in the synchronic 
case as there is in the diachronic case~ In the diachronic case we are faced with the 
dilemma described above: either we account for 'togetherness', or give an account 
that remains consistent with an important aspect of the phenomenology (the PPC), 
but not both. In the synchronic case, however, it doesn't appear that providing an 
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account of 'togetherness' requires us to abandon any plausible phenomenological 
claims: the puzzle just concerns saying what 'togetherness' is. 
A second crucial difference between the two questions is that there is another aspect 
of diachronic unity besides 'Time-Windows' that needs accounting for: this aspect is 
the continuity of consciousness. The phenomenological datum that the 'continuity of 
consciousness' picks out is that it seems to us that temporally extended objects of 
experience can be the temporal parts of a multitude of different events over a period 
of time. I shall illustrate what this means by using an example - the example of 
hearing an A minor scale. For the purposes of the example we can assume that Time-
Windows have a determine length, and that this length allows only three tones to be 
experienced 'together'. 
t1 t2 t3 t4 tS t6 
Time-Window 1 Time-\.\lindow 2 Time 
A B c D E F G 
t1 t2 t3 t4 tS t6 
The diagram represents one possible model of a subject's temporally extended 
experience. On this model, the subject's temporally extended experience is conceived 
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of as consisting of a series of Time-Windows that occur one after the other. In the 
first Time-Window, the tones A, B, and C are experienced together, and in the 
second, the tones 0, E, and F area experienced together. The diagram is intended to 
remain neutral on the issue of what account we are to give of 'togetherness'. 
Now consider how the tone 'C' features in the subject's experience. On the model 
proposed above, tone' C' is only experienced together with tones' A' and 'B'. It looks 
as though, on this model, 'C' is only experienced as a temporal part of the temporally 
extended event A-B-C, but not as part of any temporally extended event involving 
'0', 'E', or 'F' - because, plausibly, 'C' being experienced as a temporal part of a 
temporally extended event requires that 'C' be experienced together with the other 
temporal parts of the relevant event. 
However, when we reflect upon what it is like to hear an A minor scale being 
playing in the above fashion, this result - that tone 'C' is only experienced as a 
temporal part of the event A-B-C - doesn't seem right. 'C' is also experienced as a 
temporal part of an event that includes '0'. At t4, the subject will be experiencing 
tone '0', but '0' will be experienced as following on from 'C'. This example provides 
us with a sense of the way in which consciousness is continuous - the objects of 
experience are experienced in a particular way: as following on from what occurred 
immediately before them. I shall say more about how we ought to conceive of 'the 
continuity of consciousness' in the next chapter. 
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How should we respond to the demonstrated deficiency with the above model? One 
proposal that might seem tempting could be to apply the same solution to the 
'continuity' problem as was applied to the 'succession' problem. That is, it might 
seem tempting to claim that the whole A minor scale is experienced 'together' - for 
that way 'C' gets to be experienced as a temporal part of all of the relevant events (A-
B-C, B-C-D, C-D-E). On this proposal, there is just one experience of the whole scale, 
rather than a series of distinct experiences of various temporal parts of the scale, all 
of which represent a three-tone duration. 
This proposal, however, appears to rule out our giving an account of Time-
Windows. If the whole A minor scale is experienced together, then we have lost sight 
of the datum that, at a time, the subject can only experience a limited temporal extent 
of the scale together. So, it looks as though we are faced with another dilemma 
concerning temporal experience: either we account for Time-Windows (by positing a 
series of distinct experiences), and fail to account for continuity, or we account for 
continuity (by positing one experience), and fail to account for Time-Windows. 
Neither of these positions - successive Time-Windows, or 'one experience' looks as 
though they can provide a plausible account of temporal experience. It is here that 
we can locate an important difference between how we ought to account for 
diachronic and synchronic unity. Whereas in the synchronic unity case, the claim 
that the subject only has one experience at a time looked as though it had some 
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plausibility, in the diachronic case, it looks as though it does not - as it is hard to see 
how such a claim could be reconciled with the 'Time-Windows' claim.4o 
Despite the dilemma posed above - that both successive Time-Windows, and the one 
experience proposal, are inadequate - there is a third proposal that can be made 
when attempting to provide an account of continuity. The relevant proposal is that 
Time-Windows 'overlap' one another - as demonstrated in the diagram below. 
t1 t2 IJ t4 t5 16 
Time-'\'indow 4 
Time-Window J 
Time 
A B c D E F G 
11 12 13 t4 t5 t6 
This proposal enables an account of continuity to be provided - the note 'C' is 
experienced as a temporal part of multiple temporally extended events, as it features 
.' 
40 Michael Tye does, of course, provide an account of diachronic unity according to which the subject 
only has 'one experience' per period of unbroken consciousness. In chapter five I develop this prima facie 
problem into a more powerful objection to his account. 
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in multiple Time-Windows in which it is experienced 'together' with various other 
tones. This 'overlap' proposal is made by nearly all of the theorists whose views I 
shall later discuss. 
The additional aspect of the phenomenology captured by the claim that 
, consciousness is continuous' thus appears to require us to not only provide an 
account of Time-Windows, but also an account of the arrangement of Time-Windows. 
It also appears to, prima facie, make an account that claims that there is only 'one 
experience' implausible. In the synchronic case, however, there is no such prima facie 
objection to the 'one experience' account (though it may be that such an account 
turns out to be unsatisfactory for other reasons). 
Having set up the problems that the diachronic and synchronic accounts of unity are 
supposed to be accounting for, and the prima facie differences between the synchronic 
and diachronic problems, I now want to turn to an examination of diachronic unity. 
In chapter two, I shall provide discussion of the sense in which consciousness can be 
said to be 'continuous' in more detail. In the third chapter, I shall discuss the 
phenomenological nature of the temporally extended events that fall within the Time-
Windows discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter Two: The Phenomenology of Temporal Experience Part One: The Continuity 
of Consciousness 
§1. Introduction 
The purpose of the next two chapters is to get clear on what the phenomenology of 
temporal experience is, in order that we can do two things more easily. The first 
thing is to get exactly clear on what needs to be accounted for by a theory of 
temporal experience. It will be easier to construct such a theory if we know exactly 
what we need to give an account of The second thing is that, in getting clear on the 
phenomenology, it becomes easier to spot exactly where the inadequacies of rival 
accounts lie. 
In this chapter, I focus on what has been called the continuity of consciousness. The 
chapter is structured around two main questions: Firstly, how is 'continuity' to be 
conceived of? Secondly, what aspect of consciousness possesses the property of 
continuity? 
§2. 'Aspects' of Consciousness 
In talking about 'aspects' of consciousness, I initially have in mind O'Shaughessy's 
distinction between 'the stream of experience' and 'the state of consciousness': 
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We must distinguish the stream of experience and the state of consciousness, since 
we are having such experience only because we are conscious, and whereas the 
experiences change with the passage of time the state remains one and the same.41 
The 'state of consciousness' picks out the state that subject of experience is in when 
awake: 
[The state of consciousness is] the vastly familiar light that appears in the head when 
a person surfaces from sleep or anaesthetic or dream. In other words with the state 
we call'waking'.42 
The distinction being made here enables us to discern two different items to which 
the property of 'continuity' might be ascribed: we might think that consciousness is 
'continuous' in the sense that subjects are capable of remaining 'continuously' 
awake, or we might think that the experience had by a subject can be in some sense 
'continuous'. We might, of course, think that both claims can be true - in what 
follows I shall advocate just such a position, though I shall claim that the sense in 
which the state of consciousness can be continuous is importantly different from the 
sense in which experience can be continuous. 
41 B. O'Shaughnessy, Consciousness and the World (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003), 81. 
42 Ibid., 68. 
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When thinking about the continuity of consciousness, then, we could be talking 
about the state of consciousness, the stream of experience, or both. What is it that 
participants in the debate about temporal experience are talking about when they 
talk about the 'continuity of consciousness'? Tye and Dainton have both provided 
discussions of continuity fairly recently, so we can get an idea of the kind of claims 
currently being made about continuity by looking at their views. First of all, we can 
look at Tye's introductory description of what he has in mind by the' continuity of 
consciousness' : 
As I rub my forefinger with my thumb and I feel the smoothness of the skin, my 
experience of smoothness is not merely a succession of independent momentary 
experiences of smoothness. It is a continuous sensation. This continuing of the 
sensation is not just an objective fact about it. It is something I experience, or so it is 
standardly supposed. The streamlike quality of the sensation is itself a phenomenal 
feature ... This is true for experiences generally. My experience of a dull pain that 
lasts several minutes has a continuous character to it that is itself experienced.43 
Tye's description of the' continuity of consciousness' appears to be a description of a 
feature of the stream of experience - he talks of our experience of the continuous 
character of experience itself. One move that is often made in the debate about 
temporal experience is to move from talk about the streamlikeness of experience to 
talk about the continuity of experienc~. This is because the claim that 'consciousness 
is continuous' has been thought to capture the streamlikeness of consciousness. In 
what follows, I shall argue that we can capture the streamlikeness of consciousness 
43 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 85. 
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in terms of a notion of continuity - albeit a notion of continuity that is very different 
from the notion explicitly featuring in the literature. The alternative notion of 
continuity I shall introduce is an attempt to reveal what 'continuity' is implicitly 
being taken to pick out in the debate about temporal experience. 
Despite setting things up in terms of the continuity of experience, Tye goes on to 
suggest that it doesn't, in fact, seem as if conscious experience is continuous. If we find 
his description of the phenomenology above convincing, then, Tye appears to 
suggest, we have been tricked into making what he takes to be an error. The 
purported error is the following: 
When we introspect, we are not aware of our experiences at all ... we are aware of 
things outside, of changes in our bodies or ourselves, and of various qualities these 
items are experienced as having. Thereby we are aware that we are having such and 
such experiences. But we are not aware of the token experiences themselves. So, we 
are not aware of our experiences as unified or as continuing through time or as 
succeeding one another.44 
On Tye's view, when we introspect, we don't find the continuity of the stream of 
experience (as he initially suggests) - he explicitly claims that we are 'not aware of 
our experiences ... as continuing through time'. Rather, he suggests, lithe basic 
intuition with respect to unity through time is surely that things and qualities we 
44 Ibid., 96. 
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experience at successive times are experienced as continuing on or as succeeding one 
another."45 
That Tye attempts to explain the continuity of the stream of experience in terms of 
the represented continuity of the object/ s experience is at least in part - if not 
entirely - to be explained by his commitment to 'Strong Representationalism'. 
According to 'Strong Representationalism' (at least as Tye conceives of it), a 
characterisation of the phenomenology of experience is exhausted by reference to the 
representational content of experience: 
Attention to phenomenal character is a matter of attention to the ways things other 
than the experience seem, that is, to qualities that are not qualities of experiences ... 
the Strong Representationalist proposes... that phenomenal character is identical 
with a certain sort of representational content into which the relevant qualities 
enter.46 
Given Tye's Strong Representationalism, it should corne as no surprise that he 
suggests that we think of the continuity of the stream of experience in terms of the 
continuity of what is represented by the stream of experience. I don't want to embark 
upon a discussion of the merits of Tye's Strong Representationalism, but I do want to 
note that Tye has introduced a third. possible bearer of the property of 'continuity' 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 166. 
Page 69 
being talking about when we talk about the 'continuity of consciousness' - the 
continuity of what is represented by experience. 
While it might not be surprising, given his theoretical commitments, that Tye takes 
the continuity of consciousness to be a feature of what is represented in experience, 
there is one aspect of his view that is rather surprising. Having argued that the 
continuity of consciousness is a matter of represented items being experienced as 
continuing on from one another, Tye returns to talking about experience being 
continuous: 
Chains of experienced succession and flow from one specious present to the next 
bind together qualities experienced as instantiated in nonadjacent specious presents 
into a shared phenomenal content ... With a break in the chain, there is an end to the 
period of consciousness and an end to the continuing experience whose phenomenal 
content encompasses that period.47 
So, despite having argued that" continuity, change, and succession are experienced 
as features of items experienced, not as features of experiences", Tye nevertheless 
wants to claim that consciousness is, as a matter of fact, continuous.48 What, we 
might wonder, motivates the claim that experience in fact is continuous, if not the fact 
that experience seems continuous? I. shall attempt to provide an answer to this 
question in the second half of the chapter. Providing such an answer, however, 
47 Ibid., 100. 
48 Ibid., 97. 
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requires us to specify exactly what is meant by 'continuous' in Tye's discussion. I 
shall turn to this issue shortly, but first I want to turn to Dainton's discussion of 
continuity. 
In Tye, then, we see oscillation between talk about the continuity of the stream of 
experience and talk about the continuity of what is represented by experience that i? 
partially, though not entirely, driven by theoretical commitment. I say 'partially' 
because while the move from talk about experience to talk about the nature of what 
is represented by experience could conceivably be explained by Tye's 'Strong 
Representationalism', his move back to talk abo).lt 'continuing experience' doesn't look 
as though it can be explained in this way. When we look at how Dainton introduces 
talk about continuity, we also see such oscillation taking place. The theoretical 
commitment in Dainton's case is his 'simple conception' of experience, where for Tye 
it was his Strong Representationalism. In contrast to the case of Tye, however, 
Dainton's theoretical commitment does appear to provide a complete explanation of 
his oscillation. Here is Dainton on the' continuity of consciousness': 
Think of what it is like to hear an unvarying auditory tone. Even though the tone 
does not vary in pitch, timbre or volume, we directly experience the tone continuing 
on. It is as though, from moment to moment, there is a continual renewal of the same 
auditory content, a renewal which is directly experienced. Or think of an unvarying 
yet enduring pain sensation; for as long as the pain is felt, it is felt as a continuous 
presence; this presence is not static but dynamic; it is an enduring presence. This 
experienced flow or passage is common to all sensations; indeed a sensation lacking 
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this characteristic seems inconceivable - perhaps this is why a strictly durationless 
sensory experience, existing all by itself, seems impossible to conceive.49 
In the above passage, Dainton begins by talking about the object of experience being 
experienced as 'continuing on', but by the end of the paragraph the property of 
'continuity' appears to be being ascribed to sensory experience itself, with the 
continuity of experience doing the work of explaining why a durationless sensory 
experience is purportedly inconceivable. Like Tye, Dainton also wants to claim that 
experience is, as a matter of fact, continuous - he claims, for instance, that a 1/ stream 
of consciousness is a continuous succession of experiences."so 
As in the case of Tye's transition between bearers of I continuity', Dainton's transition 
is plausibly to be explained by theoretical commitment. Dainton is an advocate of 
what he calls the 'Simple Conception' of experience, according to which: 
When a given phenomenal item comes into being, it comes into being as a conscious 
experience ... phenomenal contents become conscious simply by coming into 
existence.51 
49 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 114. 
50 Ibid., 4. 
51 Ibid., 57. 
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I shall talk about the 'Simple Conception' in more detail in chapter six, but as I read 
it, the Simple Conception is the view that there is no distinction to be drawn between 
conscious experience and the object/ s of conscious experience. Accordingly, there is 
no distinction to be drawn between the properties of conscious experience, and the 
properties of the object/ s of conscious experience - and this is what explains 
Dainton's transition from talk about the object/s of conscious experience as 
continuous, to talk about conscious experience as itself continuous. 
Dainton, like Tye, thus appears to introduce the third potential bearer of the property 
of 'continuity': the continuity of what is repre~ented by experience. To sum up, then, 
at this stage we distinguished between the following three potential exhibitors of 
continuity: 
1) The State of Consciousness 
2) The Stream of Experience 
3) What is Represented by Experience 
Having set out these three options, we now need to turn to an examination of what 
might be meant by 'continuity'. 
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§3. Different Senses of 'Continuity' Part One: Strict Continuity 
We can begin by considering the following remark from Aristotle: 
For both length and time - and, in general, whatever is continuous - are called 
unlimited in two ways: either by division or as to their extremes.52 
The idea that there are two different senses of 'continuity' is something that can be 
used to shed light upon the debate about the continuity of consciousness. One sense 
of 'continuity' concerns the divisibility of some temporally extended item - this sense 
of continuity I shall call strict continuity. The second sense of 'continuity' concerns 
the extremes of some temporally extended item - this sense of continuity I shall call 
extreme continuity. 
I shall argue that even though, when pushed, philosophers interested in temporal 
experience tend to claim that the sense of 'continuity' they have in mind is strict 
continuity, the sense of continuity that features in the phenomenology of temporal 
experience is, in fact, extreme continuity. 
How do these two senses of I continuity' differ? The way that I consciousness is 
continuous' has usually been interpreted in the context of the temporal experience 
52 Quotation taken from: Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (Routledge, 1982),205. 
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debate is as something like 'there are no gaps in consciousness'. This sense of 
continuity is what I shall call strict continuity. In what follows, I shall argue that this 
claim about consciousness fails to capture the phenomenology of temporal 
experience. I set out a rival sense of 'continuity' - extreme continuity - that better 
captures the phenomenology of temporal experience, and thus better captures what 
the'streamlikeness' of consciousness consists in. 
While the primary concern of this chapter is in getting clear on exactly what the 
phenomenology of temporal experience is, so that we have a better idea of what 
accounts of temporal experience are constrained by, there is an additional concern. 
This second concern is with theorists who have claimed that the stream of 
consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory. Dennett, Neumann, and 
Blackmore have all made claims of this kind.53 
53 See: D. C. Dennett, "The Cartesian theater and "Filling In" the stream of consciousness," The nature of 
consciousness: Philosophical debates (1997): 83-88; S. Blackmore, "There Is No Stream of Consciousness. 
What is all this? What is all this stuff around me; this stream of experiences that I seem to be having all 
the time?," Journal of Consciousness Studies, 95, no. 6 (2002): 17-28; O. Neumann, ""Some Aspects of 
Phenomenal Consciousness and Their Possible Functional Correlates" presented at the conference "The 
Phenomenal Mind-How Is It Possible and Why Is It Necessary?"," Zentrum fuer Interdisciplinaere 
Forschung, Bilfeld, Germany, May (1990): 14-17. 
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§3.1: An 'Illusory' Stream of Consciousness? 
In what follows, I shall show that Dennett, Neumann, and Blackmore all presuppose 
that the streamlikeness of consciousness is best characterised in terms of strict 
continuity. I shall argue that, given that experience is best characterised in terms of 
extreme, rather than strict, continuity, their claims about the unreality or illusoriness 
of the stream of consciousness ought not concern us. 
One interpretation of the claim that' consciousness is continuous' involves using the 
'strict' or 'mathematical' notion of continuity - the notion that if something is 
'continuous', then it has no gaps in it. This is what I have called the strict sense of 
continuity. On this interpretation, the claim that 'consciousness is continuous' is 
equivalent to saying 'there are no gaps in consciousness.' 
This claim has been taken by some philosophers (Dennett, Flanagan, James, and 
Neumann) to capture what is meant by the claim that 'consciousness is streamlike'. 
However, rather than attempting to give a theory of temporal experience that tries to 
explain this phenomenological feature of experience, these philosophers have also 
taken it that this 'streamlikeness' could be in some sense 'illusory', and have used 
this idea to set up a particular puzzle about consciousness: 
Tames: Is consciousness really discontinuous, incessantly interrupted and 
recommencing (from the psychologist's point of view)? And does it only seem 
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continuous to itself by an illusion analogous to that of the zoetrope? Or is it at most 
times as continuous outwardly as it inwardly seems?54 
Dennett: The discontinuity of consciousness is striking because of. the apparent 
continuity of consciousness. Neumann points out that consciousness may in general 
be a gappy phenomenon, and as long as the temporal edges of the gaps are not 
positively perceived, there will be no sense of the gappiness of the 'stream' of 
consciousness. 55 
Flanagan: Consciousness feels like a stream. This is its subjective side. But objectively, 
there is evidence of gaps ... 56 
Neumann: What could then be the reason for the usual - illusory - assumption that 
there is a continuous flow of consciousness?57 
All of these philosophers draw a distinction between two different perspectives (the 
subjective, and the objective) upon the same thing - consciousness. I am going to 
adopt this convention of talking in terms of 'two perspectives' on consciousness, 
54 W. James, "The principles of psychology, vols. 1 & 2," New York: Holt (1890): 130-1. 
55 D. C. Dennett, Consciousness explained (Penguin, 1993), 356. 
56 O. Flanagan, "The robust phenomenology of the stream of consciousness," The nature of consciousness: 
Philosophical debates (1998): 89. 
57 Neumann, "Some Aspects of Phenomenal Consciousness and Their Possible Functional Correlates": 
Presented at the conference "The Phenomenal Mind-How Is It Possible and Why Is It Necessary?," 76. 
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even though the 'two perspectives' idea is not necessary for setting up the puzzle 
about consciousness that these philosophers are interested in. 
The puzzle also arises even if we drop the claim that we can take 'objective' and 
'subjective' points of view on consciousness - it still might seem mysterious that 
consciousness can seem continuous even when there are times at which the brain 
activity 'underlying' consciousness is not going on. At this point, however, it is 
worth noting that the claim that consciousness seems strictly continuous and the 
claim that there are times at which certain brain activitt is not going on are not 
straightforwardly rivalrous. 
That the two claims aren't straightforwardly rivalrous can be illustrated by 
considering an example: the example of tapping out a rhythm on a snare drum. 
Prima facie, it looks as though tapping out a rhythm on a snare drum is something 
that can be done continuously: 'Andrew continuously tapped out a rhythm on the 
snare drum for twenty minutes.' One question that we can ask about the snare drum 
case is whether or not the tapping out of the rhythm is something that can be 
described as strictly continuous. 
A temporally extended happening counts as strictly continuous if it is the case that, 
no matter how small the portion of the time occupied by that temporally extended 
happening we consider, we will always find a correspondingly small portion of the 
temporally extended happening in question occupying the relevant portion of time. 
Bearing this in mind, one thing we might be inclined to say about the snare drum 
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case is that it plainly isn't strictly continuous, for there are times at which the tapper 
is not tapping. 
Against this, however, we might think that the snare drum case is a case of strict 
continuity, given that it is constitutive of tapping out a rhythm that there are times at 
which the tapper is not tapping. The absence of a tapping-event at a time is thus not 
a genuine gap in the process of tapping out a rhythm, given that the absence of 
tapping-events in between tapping-events is a requirement upon the process of 
tapping out a rhythm taking place at all. . 
Rather than seeking to adjudicate between these two different proposals about the 
strict continuity or lack of strict continuity in the case of the tapping out the rhythm, I 
want to return to the case of the brain activity underlying consciousness. Just as the 
existence of times at which the tapper is not producing a tapping-event doesn't 
straightforwardly rule out the presence of a strictly continuous tapping process 
going on at that time, so we might think that the absence of a particular kind of brain 
activity at a time doesn't rule out the presence of a strictly continuous process going 
on in the brain at that time. 
If we agree that the absence of an event, a series of which constitutes a process, at a 
particular time is compatible with the process being strictly continuous, then we 
don't appear to have a puzzle about subjective and objective continuity. Just as 
subjective consciousness is (purportedly) strictly continuous, so objective 
consciousness is also strictiy continuous. 
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Presumably, however, James, Dennett, Flanagan, and Neumann will reject this 
proposal, and claim that any process that consists of a series of distinct events cannot 
be continuous. If we allow this claim, then we allow the possibility of a puzzle about 
the relationship between subjective and objective consciousness. Bearing in mind the 
distinction between the three aspects of consciousness introduced earlier, we can 
now consider what generates the puzzle - it is a puzzle about the state of 
consciousness, the stream of experience, or what is represented by experience? 
The puzzle, I want to suggest, isn't a puzzle about the state of consciousness. This is 
because it is plausible that a state can obtain continuously over a period of time in 
virtue of the occurrence of a discontinuous process. Consider an example taken from 
Matthew Soteriou, discussing a state that obtains in virtue of the occurrence of a 
collection of distinct events: 
In the example of the connection between the temperature of a liquid and the motion of 
its molecules, there is a necessary connection between the obtaining of a state of the 
liquid (its temperature) and the occurrence of events involving that liquid (the motion 
of its molecules)-a certain kind of state obtains if and only if events of a given kind 
occur.58 
The above example is a discussion of the relationship between events and state, that 
doesn't yet tell us anything about the issue of continuity. However, we can note that 
58 M. Soteriou, "Content and the Stream of Consciousness," Philosophical Perspectives 21, 'no. 1 (2007): 552, 
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it certainly appears possible for a liquid to remain at a constant temperature strictly 
continuously over an interval of time. It is plausible that the obtaining of the state 
(the temperature of the liquid) could occupy time strictly continuously over an 
interval of time, in virtue of the occurrence of events that are not strictly continuous. 
For instance, the water in my kettle could remain in the same state (at a temperature 
of 21 degrees centigrade) continuously, in virtue of the occurrence of events -
movements of water molecules - that are not themselves continuous. 
If this is the right way to think about the temperature exa~ple, then we have parallel 
reason to think that the worry about the possible unreality or illusoriness of the 
continuity of consciousness cannot be a worry about the state of consciousness. This 
is because the state of consciousness - just like the temperature of the liquid -
plausibly depends upon the occurrence of certain kinds of event in the brain: the 
state of consciousness obtains if and only if events of a given kind occur. If this is 
right, then we can note that - just as in the case of the liquid - the fact that the events 
upon which the occurrence of the state of consciousness depends may not be strictly 
continuous doesn't tell us that the state of consciousness itself doesn't fill time strictly 
continuously. 
The puzzle about continuity, then, doesn't look as if it is a puzzle about the state of 
consciousness. Our two remaining options are that it is a puzzle about the stream of 
,. 
experience, or about what is represented by experience. I want to suggest that we put 
Tye's attempt to reduce questions about the phenomenology of experience to 
questions about the representational content of experience to one side, and treat the 
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puzzle as a puzzle about the continuity of the stream of experience itself. I shall 
return briefly to the issue of Iye's reductionism later on. 
So, conceiving of the puzzle as a puzzle about the continuity of the stream of 
experience, there are at least two important things going on in the setup of the 
puzzle that I want to focus on - both of which have been noted by Flanagan: 
Suppose that neuroscientists discover that consciousness is in fact realised like a 
movie reel consisting of individual images, the moments of consciousness, with small 
separations between them, the gaps. It is not clear that this would or should have any 
impact upon what we say about how consciousness seems from a first-person point 
of view.59 
Flanagan's point here is that the puzzle about the strict continuity of consciousness is 
not being driven by any intuitions we might have about what we would expect to be 
the case, given that the brain processes underlying phenomenal consciousness are 
not strictly continuous. What is it, then, that is puzzling about this puzzle? Flanagan 
makes the following suggestion: 
The interesting question is why subjective consciousness is insensitive, if it is, to 
certain things about itself, objectively construed. Eventually we want a fine-grained 
59 Flanagan, "The robust phenomenology of the stream of consciousness," 89. 
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answer of the sort we can give for how other discrete things, e.g. movies, give a 
continuous impression.60 
What is driving the puzzle, then, is subjective consciousness's insensitivity to certain 
of objective consciousness's properties. In the way this puzzle has been set up by 
Flanagan, Dennett, James, and Neumann, this insensitivity takes the form of 
subjectively viewed consciousness being strictly continuous, and objectively viewed 
consciousness being strictly discontinuous. In what follows, I shall argue that these 
philosophers are correct to set up the puzzle in terms of 'insensitivity', but that we 
can distinguish between two different kinds of insensitivity. 
The first kind of insensitivity is the kind that might make us wary about the reality 
or veracity of the stream of consciousness. This kind of insensitivity I shall call 
'contradictory insensitivity'. For there to be contradictory insensitivity, subjective 
consciousness has to seem to be a particular way, a way that objective consciousness 
is not. 'Contradictory insensitivity' can raise questions about the reality or veracity of 
how subjective consciousness seems, because there is a tension between the 
subjective seeming, and the objective state of affairs. 
The second kind of insensitivity doesn't look as though it ought to make us worried 
,. 
about reality or veracity. This kind of insensitivity I shall call 'ignorant insensitivity'. 
For there to be ignorant insensitivity, it has to be the case that subjective 
60 Ibid. 
Page 83 
consciousness doesn't seem to be a certain way, a way that objective consciousness is. 
Given that there are an extremely large number of features of objective consciousness 
- involving electro-chemical signals that occur in a brain, involving an organ housed 
in the skull - that don't appear to feature in subjective consciousness, it isn't clear 
that we ought to be worried about ignorant insensitivity. 
From the subjective point of view, consciousness doesn't seem to involve an organ 
housed in my skull, but from the objective point of view, the involvement of an 
organ housed in my skull turns out to be a feature of cons<;.iousness. I shall argue that 
the issue of subjective consciousness' insensitivity to its objective strict discontinuity 
is best thought of in this way - as an example of 'ignorant insensitivity'. On my 
proposal, the insensitivity to the. strict discontinuity of objectively viewed 
consciousness is not to be captured by saying that subjectively viewed consciousness 
seems strictly continuous. Rather, subjectively viewed consciousness doesn't seem 
strictly discontinuous. 
I shall thus be claiming that while Flanagan is right that subjective consciousness is 
indeed insensitive, this insensitivity ought not to make us worried about the veracity 
or reality of the stream of consciousness. As I have noted above, the interpretation of 
'continuity' assumed by Flanagan, Dennett, James, and Neumann is the strict 
interpretation. I shall now say more.about what I mean by 'strict' continuity, before 
arguing that, on this interpretation of continuity, we ought not to think that 
subjectively viewed consciousness seems continuous: rather, it doesn't seem 
discontinuous. 
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§3.2: What is 'Strict Continuity'? 
If we interpret 'continuous' strictly, then it means 'no gaps'. This 'strict' 
interpretation of continuity is made in mathematics, where it is often contrasted with 
the property of 'density'. I shall now provide a brief discussion of this distinction, 
and how it can be applied to time, before moving on to consider how it might be 
applied to consciousness. Newton-Smith provides the following discussion of 
density and continuity: 
A set S ordered by relation R is dense if and only if for any pair of distinct elements a, 
b in S there is another element c which is such that Rac and Rcb. The rational 
numbers (the positive and negative fractions) under the standard ordering are 
dense.61 
The rational numbers are all those numbers expressible as fractions. For the rational 
numbers to be 'standardly ordered' is for them to be arranged in ascending or 
descending order. When we consider the rational numbers arranged in this way, it is 
apparent that between any two of them - say 1/4 and 1/2 - we can always find a 
further rational number - 1/3 for 6lxample. This holds for any pair of standardly 
ordered rational numbers - and this is what it is to say that they are dense. However, 
even though we can always find another rational number between any pair of 
61 W. Newton-Smith, The structure of time (Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1984), 113. 
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rational numbers, there are still gaps in the standardly ordered series of rational 
numbers: 
While the rationals are dense, there is a sense in which there are' gaps' in the rational 
numbers. There is, for example, no rational number whose square is 2. In order to fill 
these' gaps' we add to the rationals the irrationals which are numbers that cannot be 
represented as fractions. The resulting system is the real number system whose 
salient characteristic is that it is not only dense but lacks 'gaps' - an idea which we 
express by saying that the real number system is continuous.62 
In the cases of both a continuous and a dense standardly ordered number series, 
there are an infinite number of points between any two rational numbers. But we can 
still draw a distinction between density and continuity by noting that while being 
dense is a necessary condition for being continuous, a continuous series has the 
additional property of having no gaps in it. 
Newton-Smith suggests that the distinction between a dense and a continuous 
number series can also be drawn with respect to time, by replacing talk of numbers 
with talk of instants. He suggests that we might think that time is dense - in which 
case between any two distinct instants of time there will be another instant - or not 
62 Ibid. 
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only dense, but also continuous - in which case there are no gaps left 'unfilled' by 
further instants between any two distinct instants of time.63 
Finally, this distinction can be applied to consciousness, by replacing talk of instants 
with talk of instants in which the subject is consciously experiencing. So, if 
consciousness is dense, then between any two distinct instants of time in which the 
subject is consciously experiencing, there will be another instant in which the subject 
is consciously experiencing. If consciousness is continuous then there will be no gaps 
in which the subject is not consciously experiencing between any two distinct 
instants in which they are. 
Talk of instants in which the subject is consciously experiencing does not commit me 
to the claim that a subject could be consciously experiencing just for an instant. The 
idea is simply that if we can divide time into instants - which is essential if we want 
to talk about strict continuity - then at some, but not all, of these instants, a particular 
subject will be consciously experiencing. 
The claim being made about consciousness from the objective point of view by 
Dennett, Flanagan, James, and Neumann, is that it is neither dense nor strictly 
continuous. Here is an example ta16en from Dennett of the kind of objective gap he 
has in mind: 
63 Ibid., 111. 
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The temporal analogues of scotomata [blind spots in the visual field] might be the 
"absences" that occur during petit mal epileptic seizures. These are noticeable by the 
sufferer, but only by inference: they can't "see the edges" any more than you can see 
the edges of your blind spot, but they can be struck, retrospectively, by 
discontinuities in the events they have experienced.64 
In the case of petit mal epileptic seizures, Dennett claims, there can be gaps in a 
subject's consciousness for some time objectively - gap~ which last longer than an 
instant, and hence render objective consciousness neither dense nor continuous - but 
subjectively, the subject can only become aware of these gaps via retrospective 
inference. 
There are two questions that we can raise about this example: the first is 'Why does 
this· example support the claim that consciousness, viewed subjectively, seems 
continuous, when the subject is capable of becoming aware (inferentially and 
retrospectively) of the gaps in her experience?' The second is 'Why does this example 
support the claim that 'consciousness seems continuous', rather than the claim that 
'consciousness does not seem discontinuous'?' 
The first question is a difficult one for anyone who thinks that the' streamlikeness' of 
consciousness is to be captured by strict continuity - by saying that 'it seems as if 
64 Dennett, "The Cartesian theater and "Filling In" the stream of consciousness," 87. 
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there are no gaps in consciousness.' After all, it very often does seem to us as if there 
are periods of time in which there are gaps in our consciousness - it can seem to me 
that I have just woken up from a good night's dreamless sleep, it can seem to me as if 
I have just nodded off for a brief second. 
If periods of dreamless sleep do count as gaps in consciousness - and they certainly 
seem like good candidates - then it certainly isn't clear that we have to think that we 
are always aware of gaps in subjectively viewed consciousness inferentially. That is, it 
doesn't seem that when I wake up, I have to infer that I_have just been asleep for a 
whole night. However, while thinking of our awareness of gaps in subjective 
consciousness as being inferential might not be right, it looks as though Dennett is 
correct that this awareness is always retrospective. 
So, the sense in which subjective consciousness can be insensitive to its objective 
properties is the following: I cannot be aware of a gap in my consciousness 'as it 
happens' - only retrospectively. The answer to the first question for Dennett is thus 
that in order for a gap to interfere with the apparent continuity of subjectively 
viewed consciousness, I need to be aware of it 'as it happens'. It is plausible that I 
cannot be aware that there is a gap in my consciousness during the gap, because for 
this to be the case, I would have to be conscious of my not being conscious -
conscious while simultaneously unconscious - and this is clearly not possible. 
I shall now answer the second question we posed for Dennett, which was: 
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'Why does this example support the claim that 'consciousness seems 
continuous', rather than the claim that 'consciousness does not seem 
discontinuous'?' 
Dennett's claim in the example of the petit mal seizure is that the gaps in objectively 
viewed consciousness are not manifest in the phenomenology of experience in the 
appropriate way - I can't be aware of them as they happen. Presumably the idea 
behind this argument is that this line of thought applies not just to these unusual 
cases (the petit mal cases) in which there are gaps in objective consciousness, but also 
extends to any cases in which it can be shown that gappy brain processes underlie 
conscious experience. 
So the purported clash between subjectively and objectively viewed consciousness 
here is between the following two claims: 
1. Objectively, there are gaps in consciousness. 
2. Subjectively, it doesn't seem like there are gaps in consciousness. 
However, if we take the 'streamlikeness' of consciousness to consist in its strict 
continuity, we do not yet have a clash between the objective nature of consciousness 
and the claim that' consciousness is subjectively streamlike'. 
If we translate claims 1 and 2 into claims about strict continuity, we get the 
following: 
3. Objectively, consciousness is not strictly continuous. 
Page 90 
4. Subjectively, it doesn't seem like consciousness is not strictly continuous. 
However, 4 is not equivalent to the claim that 'subjectively, it seems that 
consciousness is continuous' - or, put in terms of gaps, - 'subjectively, it seems like 
there are no gaps in consciousness'. What we have here is an example of benign 
'ignorant insensitivity', as opposed to the more troubling 'contradictory 
insensitivity' . 
So the answer to the second question is that the example does not support the claim 
that consciousness seems continuous. All that seems to be going on in the case of the 
petit mal seizure (and presumably in the less unusual cases also) is that the 
objectively viewed gaps are not manifest in the phenomenology of the subject's 
experience. However, while this particular example of Dennett's may not supply any 
reasons to think that, viewed subjectively, consciousness is strictly continuous, 
perhaps there are other ways to establish it. 
How might we establish the truth of the claim that, from the subjective point of view, 
consciousness is continuous? One way of doing this would be to think about whether 
the phenomenology of our experience is compatible with any rival description - if it 
is not, then we can agree that consciousness does seem continuous. However, if the 
phenomenology of experience is compatible with a rival description, then it seems 
fair to say that we are simply unable to tell whether consciousness is continuous or 
not. 
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The idea here is that if consciousness really does seem continuous, then it will not be 
appropriate for it to fall under another description under which it is gappy. Newton-
Smith uses an argument analogous to this in order to demonstrate that it is 
impossible to decide which of two competing accounts of time ('time is dense' or 
'time is continuous') is correct. His argument for this claim runs as follows: 
1. In order to rule out one of 'time is dense' or 'time is continuous', we need 
some reason for believing in the truth of one theory rather than the other. 
2. "Whatever constitutes a reason for believing in the truth of theories that treat 
time as continuous will constitute equally a reason for believing in the truth 
of counterpart theories that treat time as merely dense."65 
3. We cannot rule out either 'time is dense' or 'time is continuous'. 
In more detail, Newton-Smith proposes that the system of Newtonian mechanics 
might, prima facie, seem to provide a reason for believing that 'time is continuous' 
rather than 'time is dense' because its laws are formulated in terms of continuous 
space and continuous time. Newton-Smith's strategy is then to show that these laws 
can be reformulated in terms of dense time in such a way that they will handle all of 
the data dealt with by the original Newtonian mechanics equally well. 
65 Newton-Smith, The structure aftime, 121. 
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There are further complications about exactly how this kind of reformulation is to 
work, and whether or not it can be incorporated into a complete physical theory. I 
shall not discuss them here, however, as I am interested just in the general strategy of 
showing that the set of data can be equally well handled by saying that 'time is 
dense' as by 'time is continuous'. 
Before moving on to introduce the analogous argument about consciousness, it is 
interesting to note two possible conclusions Newton-Smith thinks we can draw once 
we have established that 'we cannot rule out either 'time is dense' or 'time in 
continuous' in this way. He claims that we face a choice between the 'Ignorance 
Response', and the' Arrogance Response'. The Ignorance Response is the following: 
The argument shows a limit to the possible extent of human knowledge. Either the 
world is such that it is true that time is continuous or the world is such that it is true 
that time is merely dense ... we will remain in ignorance as to which of these two 
possibilities obtains. I will call this the Ignorance Response. For it involves assuming 
that there is some matter of fact at stake here, a matter of fact about which evidence is 
just not to be had.66 
And here is the Arrogance Response: 
66 Ibid., 126. 
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If we can form no conception of what would constitute evidence for thinking that the 
facts about the world made one of these hypotheses true or likely to be true rather 
than the other, we are not entitled to assume that there is some matter of fact at stake 
here ... the sentences 'time is continuous' and 'time is dense' are not seen as having a 
meaning which renders them capable of being used to make conjectures about the 
facts. They are not thought of as being, strictly speaking, true or false. 67 
So, once we have established that the data we are accounting for can be accounted 
for equally well by two rival theories, and we have decided that, plausibly, we will 
not find any extra evidence that either theory will fail to account for, we can choose 
between either thinking that there is, or is not, some fact of the matter that these 
theories are attempting to account for. In what follows, I shall show that there is a 
parallel to this kind of choice in the case of asking whether consciousness is 
continuous, or consciousness is merely dense. 
§3.3: Rejecting the 'Strict' Continuity of Consciousness 
What evidence is there for thinking that consciousness is continuous, as opposed to 
thinking that consciousness is merely dense? The data that these two hypotheses are 
attempting to account for is the phenomenology of experience - how experience 
seems to the subject to be. The claim being made by James, Dennett, Flanagan, and 
Neumann is that the 'streamlikeness' of consciousness consists in it seeming to the 
67 Ibid. 
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subject that there are no gaps in her consciousness, where this is an importantly 
different claim from it not seeming to the subject that there are gaps. 
If these philosophers are right that the 'no gaps' claim captures the 'streamlikeness' 
of consciousness, then presumably the phenomenology of experience ought to rule 
out it being the case that consciousness is merely dense. This is because if 
subjectively viewed consciousness is dense, then, while it may very well seem to the 
subject that between any two instants at which consciousness obtains there will be 
another instant at which she is consciously experiencing. there will nevertheless be 
'gaps' in between those two instants. 
The argument analogous to that of Newton-Smith I want to propose is the following: 
1. In order to rule out one of 'consciousness is dense' or 'consciousness is 
continuous', we need some reason for believing in the truth of one theory 
rather than the other. 
2. Whatever constitutes a reason for believing in the truth of theories that 
treat consciousness as continuous will constitute equally a reason for 
believing in the truth of counterpart theories that treat consciousness as 
merely dense. 
3. We cannot rule out either 'consciousness is dense' or 'consciousness is 
continuous'. 
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What evidence is there for thinking that consciousness is continuous, as opposed to 
thinking that consciousness is merely dense? The evidence that these two hypotheses 
are attempting to account for is the phenomenology of experience - how experience 
seems to the subject to be. It seems to me that there is no way for us to decide which 
of 'consciousness is continuous' or 'consciousness is dense' best characterises our 
experience. 
When we introspect upon our experience in ord~r to adjudicate whether 
consciousness seems continuous, or merely dense, we are being asked the following: 
does it seem to us as if there are an infinite number of instants between any two 
instants at which we are consciously experiencing, but that there are nevertheless 
gaps, or that there are an infinite number of instants between any two instants at 
which we are consciously experiencing, but that there are no gaps? It seems to me 
that we are simply incapable of deciding between these two options on the basis of 
the phenomenology of temporal experience. 
I hope that it is clear that there is a parallel with Newton-Smith's argument here: in 
his argument, the evidence did not provide us with any way to choose between 
saying 'time is continuous' and 'time is dense'. In this argument about the continuity 
of consciousness, the phenomenology of experience does not provide us with any 
way to choose between saying 'consciousness is continuous' and 'consciousness is 
dense'. If this is the case, then it doesn't seem right to think that the claim that 
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'consciousness is continuous' captures the' streamlikeness' of consciousness - as it is 
not clear why we should think that the claim is true. 
If the evidence does not provide us with a way of ruling out one of the claims, then 
we are faced with a parallel choice between Arrogance and Ignorance. We can decide 
to ascribe the lack of deciding evidence to our Ignorance, holding that there is a fact 
of the matter about whether or not consciousness seems continuous, but that we are 
somehow limited in our ability to know about this kind of phenomenological matter. 
Alternatively, we can decide to be Arrogant, and claim that because we cannot form 
a conception of what the evidence might be that would rule in favour of either claim; 
there simply is no fact of the matter about whether or not consciousness seems 
continuous. Either way, we are certainly not entitled to claim that, from the 
subjective perspective, consciousness is strictly continuous. 
The idea that we cannot know whether or not consciousness is continuous from the 
subjective point of view might seem to amount to a denial that consciousness is 
'streamlike'. However, I think that we can find alternative ways to capture the notion 
of 'streamlikeness' by looking at other ways to capture what might be meant by 
'consciousness is continuous'. Th~~e alternatives do not involve claiming that the 
stream of consciousness is somehow 'illusory' like Dennett, James, Neumann, and 
Flanagan. 
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One alternative suggestion for capturing the 'streamlikeness' of consciousness, given 
the above argument that it is not to be captured in terms of strict continuity, is that 
consciousness is merely dense. Against this proposal, I would suggest that the moral 
of the discussion of denseness versus strict continuity is that it is a mistake to attempt 
to characterise the phenomenology of temporal experience in terms of instants. The 
reason that the answer to the question' does consciousness seem strictly continuous, 
or merely dense?' is impossible to determine on the basis of the phenomenology is 
that instants only feature in the phenomenology in a very limited way. 
Plausibly, the only plausible candidates for strictly instantaneous items featuring in 
temporal experience are the boundaries marking the beginnings and endings of 
temporally extended happenings. However, in order for us to have perceptual 
experience as of such beginnings and endings, we need to experience an interval 
encompassing those beginnings and endings. Given that we are capable of having 
experiences that are not of beginnings and endings - experiences thus not featuring 
instants - during which consciousness nevertheless seems continuous, instants are 
not the right things to appeal to when attempting to characterise the sense in which 
consciousness is 'continuous'. 
So, as long as we disagree with how Dennett, James, Flanagan, and Neumann 
characterise the streamlikeness of consciousness - and we should disagree with them 
about this - there is no reason for us to think that there is anything suspicious or 
illusory about streams of consciousness. The challenge now is to find the correct 
characterisation of a stream of consciousness. 
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Strict continuity is not the right candidate when we look for an interpretation of 
'consciousness is continuous' that will describe the streamlikeness of consciousness. 
If this is not the right way to think about continuity, then what is? I propose that we 
should think of the continuity of consciousness in terms of the temporal limits of 
experience not being manifest in the phenomenology of experience. We can clarify 
what it means to say this by reflecting upon the analogies and disanalogies between 
certain spatial and temporal features of different types of experience. The conception 
of continuity that I shall develop in this way I shall call extreme continuity. 
§4. Different Senses of 'Continuity' Part Two: Extreme Continuity 
In the previous chapter we discovered that one important aspect of the 
phenomenology of temporal experience was that it involves Time-Windows. This 
claim was set out as follows: 
Time-Windows: To characterise a subject's experience at a time we need to 
appeal to some interval that is equal to or shorter than the period of time for 
which the subject has been experiencing. 
If the Time-Windows claim is correct, then there are, as a matter of fact, temporal 
boundaries involved in temporal experience. These boundaries are the boundaries of 
Time-Windows, and mark the period in time within which items are relevant to 
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characterising the subject's experience at a time. Beyond the relevant temporal 
boundaries, nothing is relevant to the characterisation of the subject's experience at 
the time in question. It is in this sense that there is a 'temporal field' - a bounded 
interval of time, within which items are relevant to characterising the 
phenomenology of experience at a time, and outside of which, they are not. 
However, for all that there may be temporal boundaries involved in temporal 
experience as a matter of fact, there is a question as to whether these boundaries are 
manifest in the phenomenology. It is certainly difficult to locate the boundaries of the 
Time-Window relevant to characterising experience at a time. However, the claim I 
want to make about the boundaries of Time-Windows is not just that it is difficult to 
discern their location: rather, I think it is plausible that the boundaries of Time-
Windows are simply not manifest in the phenomenology. 
This claim, that the boundaries of Time-Windows are not manifest in the 
phenomenology, is what is being picked out by the claim that consciousness exhibits 
extreme continuity. In order to demonstrate this lack of manifestation, I want to 
examine the similarities and differences between Time-Windows and the spatial 
visual field, as far as the phenomenology of experience is concerned. 
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§4.1: Spatial and Temporal Boundaries 
Visual experience normally presents us with a region of space: a region of space that 
is delimited by the boundaries of the visual field. The visual field, as I am talking 
about it here, picks out a phenomenological feature of visual experience. While it is 
true that we are as a matter of fact limited as regards the region of space that features 
in visual experience at any time, talk about the 'visual field' picks out the 
phenomenological manifestation of the spatial limits of vision. This sense of 'visual 
field' is at work in both Mike Martin's and Louise Richardson's discussions of the 
visual field.68 
The visual field delimits a cone shaped region of space that is relevant in 
characterising the phenomenology of visual experience. The visual field is not a 
region of physical space - as a phenomenological manifestation of the spatial limits of 
vision, the field remains the same no matter what objects and locations are 
experienced as falling within it. The important feature of the spatial visual field for 
our purposes is that we are aware of its boundaries. As Richardson puts it: 
[To say that there is a visual field is] ... to say that the boundaries or limitations of the 
cone, the apex of which is the point of origin for visual experience, are present in 
visual experience.69 
68 See: M. G. F. Martin, "Sight and touch," The contents of experience (1992): 196-215; L. Richardson, 
"Seeing Empty Space," European Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2010): 227-243. 
69 Richardson, "Seeing Empty Space," 233. 
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Is there a temporal field in this sense? Are the boundaries or limitations of the 
temporal extent of which we are aware at a time present in visual experience? My 
claim is that they are not - but before discussing this claim in more detail, I want to 
note a couple of parallels between the visual field and the temporal region 
constituting a 'Time-Window'. 
One response that might be made to the .claim that the boundaries of Time-Windows 
are not manifest in experience is that it isn't that the boundaries are not manifest -
rather it is just difficult to specify their precise location. In the case of the visual field, 
it is not as if we have a precise grasp of where the boundaries of the field lie. This can 
be illustrated by considering the example of an item that lies a great distance away in 
the direction of the base of the cone-shaped visual field. 
Consider looking up at the clouds as they float by overhead. One thing we can note 
about the kind of visual experience we have in such a situation is that it doesn't tell 
us with great specificity the spatial location of the clouds. Such a visual experience 
allows for the clouds' occupation of a variety of spatial locations: perhaps they are 
half a mile away, perhaps a mile away - our visual experience doesn't appear 
capable of determining which. This.is clearly in contrast to visual experience of items 
located in closer proximity, where the range of spatial locations allowed by visual 
experience appears restricted to a much greater degree. 
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The base of the cone-shaped visual field, like the clouds in the example above, is 
something that lies a great distance away from the field's point of origin. Again, as 
Richardson puts it: 
To the left, right, up and down are diverging boundaries which are joined by a 
boundary that forms the base of the cone. We can see things that are very large and 
bright, such as stars, at extraordinary distances. Though we are poor at judging how 
far away from us, and from other things such things are, we nevertheless see them. 
So, at least on the face of it, the base of the cone is, or can be, extremely far away.70 
The proposed explanation being discussed here for why it is that we are poor at 
judging how far away from us distant objects lie is that visual experience doesn't 
represent the locations of those objects with any great specificity. We can now note 
that, just as it is difficult to determine the precise location of objects that lie towards 
the base of the cone of the visual field, so it is difficult to determine the precise 
location of the boundaries of the visual field. 
It is difficult to determine the precise location of the boundaries of the visual field, 
and because of this it is correspondingly difficult to provide a precise description of 
the spatial extent of the visual field. We are certainly not capable of giving a 
measurement in terms of metres or feet, either as regards the volume of the field, or 
as regards the distance of the base of the cone from its point of origin. It is this kind 
of analogy that might be pursued by the defender of the claim that the boundaries of 
70 Ibid., 232. 
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the temporal field are manifest in temporal experience: their claim being that it isn't 
that the boundaries of the field are not manifest, it is just that it is difficult to specify 
their location. 
Just as it is difficult to give a specification of the visual field's spatial extent in terms 
of metres or feet, so it is difficult to give a specification of a Time-Window's duration 
in terms of seconds. One thing to note at this point is that the difficulty in discerning 
the temporal extent of Time-Windows is discussed by Dainton - and in his 
discussion the difficulty is attributed fo the continuity of consciousness. Dainton 
refers to what I have called 'Time-Windows' as 'the specious present' - for Dainton, 
the 'specious present' is the interval of time over which experience is unified: 
// experience is '" unified over time, at least over fairly brief intervals, of the duration 
of the so-called specious present.//71 
As for the duration of the specious present itself, this is notoriously difficult to 
estimate with any precision, and it is not difficult to see why ... Since the question 
concerns the character of our experience, we are obliged to employ introspection, and 
the continuity of consciousness can easily confuse here. If I listen to a sequence of 
notes, and try to gauge whether a given pair of notes X and Yare directly 
experienced together, even if several notes occur between X and Y, I will experience 
Y at the end of a continuous period of awareness; I will have been continuously 
71 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 3. 
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experiencing from the moment X starts through to the moment Y ends. This fact can, I 
suspect, easily lead to overestimations of the span of immediate experience.72 
Dainton here suggests that the difficulty in determining the extent of Time-Windows 
is to be explained by the continuity of consciousness. What does Dainton have in 
mind by 'continuity' at this point? It doesn't look like he can mean strict continuity -
for it isn't at all clear why an appeal to strict continuity would explain the difficulty 
in estimating the duration of Time-Windows. Nor, if the argument of the previous 
section is correct, does it look as though he ought to mean strict continuity, given that 
strict continuity proved an unsuitable tool for a characterization of the 
streamlikeness of consciousness. 
I think that we ought to agree with Dainton that the difficulty in determining the 
extent of Time-Windows is to be attributed to the continuity of consciousness. 
Implicit in Dainton's suggestion is the thought that there is some other non-strict 
sense of 'continuity' that may explain this difficulty. My proposal is that this sense of 
'continuity' is to be best thought of as the boundaries of Time-Windows not being 
manifest in the phenomenology of temporal experience. 
On this proposal, while there is an analogy between the spatial visual field and 
Time-Windows insofar as it is difficult to discern their precise extent, there is a 
crucial disanalogy. The disanalogy is that the boundaries of Time-Windows are 
simply not manifest in the phenomenology. On my view, the explanation of the 
72 Ibid., 171. 
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difficulty in discerning the extent of Time-Windows is that their boundaries are 
simply not manifest in the phenomenology at all, rather than merely being manifest 
in a way that renders their locations difficult to discern. 
One analogy between the spatial visual field, and Time-Windows, then, is that it is 
difficult to determine the precise location of their boundaries, and to provide a 
measurement of their extent. The second analogy we can note is that in neither case 
are we aware of the boundaries of the field/window in the same way that we are 
aware of the boundaries of the objects of experience. 
Earlier, I suggested that in order to have an experience as of the starting or stopping 
of some temporally extended happening, we need to experience some temporal 
interval that includes that starting or stopping. This is analogous to the situation in 
the spatial case - in the case of vision, for instance, in order for me to have an 
experience as of the boundary of the piece of paper before me, I need to be aware not 
only of the paper, but also of the region of space surrounding the paper. In both the 
temporal and the spatial cases, then, for the boundary of an experienced object to be 
manifest in the phenomenology, it is required that the subject experience not just the 
object, but of a temporalj spatial region surrounding the object. 
However, as Richardson notes about the spatial case: 
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My awareness of the limits fixed by the visual field cannot be like this, because the 
limits fixed by the visual field, whatever else they are, are the limits beyond which 
nothing can be seen, without changing what falls within these limits by moving one's 
gaze.73 
This also holds true of the boundaries of Time-Windows: the boundaries of Time-
Windows mark the boundaries beyond which nothing can be experienced without a 
change in the temporal location of the field. Phenomenological manifestation of the 
boundaries of the visual field, or of Time-Windows, if it is to occur, must thus occur 
in some other way.74 
One way to defend the claim that the boundaries of Time-Windows are not manifest 
in the phenomenology is to give an account of what experience would be like if they 
were manifest, and then to show that experience is not like that. It looks as though 
this type of defence is going on at times in Dainton's discussion of continuity. 
The claim that 'consciousness is continuous' is, on my proposal, a claim with two 
aspects. Firstly, it is a claim about the structure of consciousness that explains 
something about the way that the objects of temporal experience are experienced. It 
is also the claim that this structural feature of consciousness is not itseifmanifested in 
73 Richardson, "Seeing Empty Space," .234. 
74 In the case of the visual field, Richardson's proposal is that the manifestation of the boundaries of the 
visual field is reflected in the subject's awareness of empty space. 
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the phenomenology. The claim about the structure of consciousness concerns the 
temporal organization of Time-Windows. 
§4.2: What is 'Extreme Continuity'? 
As discussed in the first chapter, one proposal about how Time-Windows might be 
organised is that they occur one after the other. The problem with this proposal -
again, as noted in the first chapter - is that it precludes items from being heard as 
succeeding other items that they plainly are heard as succeeding. The example I 
appealed to in order to illustrate this problem was that of hearing an A-minor scale-
as shown in the diagram below:75 
t1 t2 t3 t4 15 t6 
Time-Wind 0\0\' 1 Time-Window 2 Time 
A B c D E F G 
11 t2 t3 t4 t5 16 
.' 75 This kind of example is also appealed to by Dainton, though he uses it only as on objection to what he 
calls the 'pulse theory' of temporal experience, and not to illustrate what is meant by 'the continuity of 
consciousness'. While Dainton appeals to notions of 'continuity' multiple times in his discussion, as far 
as I am aware, he doesn't distinguish between strict continuity and other forms of continuity. My 
attempt here is to try and specify the notion of continuity implicit in Dainton's discussion. 
Page 108 
As noted previously, it is plausible that in order for a particular note to be 
experienced as a temporal part of some sequence of notes, the particular note and the 
other notes comprising the sequence need to be experienced together. However, as 
the above diagram illustrates, note 'D' is not experienced together with any of the 
notes in Time-Window 1. Accordingly, '0' cannot be experienced as a temporal part 
of any sequence of notes involving notes featuring in Time-Window 1. 
The problem this poses for the proposal that Time-Windows occur one after the 
other is that this result - that'D' cannot be experienced as a temporal part of any 
sequence of notes that involves notes featuring in Time-Window 1 - clashes with the 
phenomenology. Tone '0' is directly experienced as following on from tone 'e' - and 
this goes for all of the notes in the A-minor scale: all of the tones constituting the 
scale are experienced as following on from the tone that came before. 
It is this feature of temporal experience, I suggest, that is being picked out by the 
claim that 'consciousness is continuous': the feature being that any temporally 
extended item featuring in experience will be directly experienced as following on 
from the item experienced before it. This feature of temporal experience may be what 
Oainton has in mind when he describes the following experience: 
When listening to an extended sound, such as a long note played on a cello, is it not 
the case that throughout this experience we are continually aware of the continuity of 
our experience? We are constantly aware (though not necessarily paying attention to) 
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a flow of sound: the tone goes on and on, and we are constantly aware of this 
continuity.76 
On my proposal, what Dainton is drawing attention to in the above passage is the 
feature of experience that any temporally extended item we experience will be 
experienced as following on from what was experienced immediately before it. For 
any portion of the tone we are aware of, that tone-portion will be directly 
experienced as following on from the tone-portion preceding it. 
What the above phenomenon demonstrates is that temporal experience doesn't seem 
to the subject to consist of a series of Time-Windows that occur one after the other, at 
least as far as the objects of temporal experience are concerned. Reflection upon the 
way that the A-major scale (the object of experience) is experienced reveals that the 
A-major scale isn't experienced in 'temporal chunks' that occur one after the other. If 
temporal experience were such that items were experienced in 'temporal chunks', 
this would provide the means for the boundaries of Time-Windows to be discernable 
in temporal experience. By reflecting upon the phenomenology of the experience of 
the A-major scale a subject would encounter 'temporal chunks' with a limited 
temporal extent, and by being aware of the limited temporal extent of these temporal 
chunks, there is a sense in which the boundaries of Temporal Windows would be 
manifest to the subject - the subject would be aware of where the boundaries of 
Temporal Windows lie. 
76 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 133. 
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This, then, provides another example of the way in which the boundaries of Time-
Windows are not manifest in the phenomenology of temporal experience. We have 
noted that the boundaries cannot be manifest in the same fashion as the boundaries 
of the objects of experience, and neither are they manifest in the form of temporal 
experience seeming to present us with a series of 'temporal chunks' of temporally 
extended items. 
The boundaries of Time-Windows are not manifest in the phenomenology of 
temporal experience in either of the t~o ways discussed above. This provides one 
aspect of the claim that 'consciousness is continuous'. However, I also want to 
propose that consciousness is continuous in the sense that the boundaries of Time-
Windows are not manifest in the phenomenology in any fashion. Whereas in the case 
of the spatial visual field, awareness of the objects of vision can reflect the 
boundaries of the visual field, in the case of Time-Windows, awareness of what falls 
within Time-Windows doesn't reflect the boundaries of Time-Windows. 
It is the appeal of this strategy in demonstrating the continuity of consciousness that 
might provide a more sympathetic explanation for why it is that Dainton and Tye 
both move between talk about the continuity of what is represented by experience 
and the continuity of the stream of experience - the strategy being to show that the 
continuity of consciousness is reflected in the way that the objects of temporal 
experience are experienced (i.e. they are not experienced in 'temporal chunks'). 
Dainton and Tye may be slipping between talk about continuity of the stream of 
experience and talk about the continuity of what is represented by experience, due to 
the fact that they are talking about the way that the objects represented by temporal 
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experience are represented, and they are talking about this in order to illustrate that 
the boundaries of Time-Windows are not manifest in the phenomenology of 
temporal experience. On this more sympathetic explanation of Dainton and Tye's 
oscillation between bearers of continuity, they are not driven entirely by theoretical 
commitment. Their oscillation is at least partially to be explained in terms of their 
attempting to demonstrate something about the way the objects of experience are 
represented. 
I shall discuss both Tye's and Dainton's accounts of continuity in more detail in later 
chapters. As noted previously, Tye attempts to provide an account of continuity by 
claiming that the subject only has one experience per period of unbroken 
consciousness. Dainton, upon the other hand, supplies an account according to 
which Time-Windows not only overlap, but also share common parts. 
I now want to conclude by noting a reason why we ought not to expect the 
boundaries of Time-Windows to be manifest in the phenomenology. The reason I 
have in mind is that there is a fundamental disanalogy between the phenomenology 
of temporal experience and the phenomenology of visual experience. This 
disanalogy is between the structure of temporal experience and the aspect of visual 
experience that appears to be crucial to its manifesting the relevant boundaries. 
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§5: A Fundamental Disanalogy Between the Structure of Temporal Experience and 
Spatial Visual Experience 
In the case of visual experience, we can note, it is possible to draw a distinction 
between the location of the perceiver, and the location of the object of experience just 
by reflection upon the phenomenology. In vision, there is a distinction between the 
location of whatever it is that I am aware of, and the location from which I am aware 
of that something - and this distinction is something we can discover, given a certain 
degree of sophistication on the part of the subject, via reflection upon the 
phenomenology. In the visual variety of spatial perception, there is a distinction to be 
drawn between the location of the object of experience, and the location from which 
those objects are experienced. The distinct location from which objects are 
experienced, we can call a 'perspective'. 
When we corne to examine temporal experience, we find no analogous distinction: 
we find ourselves unable to draw a distinction between the temporal location of the 
perceiver, and the temporal location of the object of experience, on the basis of the 
phenomenology. Over a period of time in which I perceptually experience some 
temporally extended event, my temporal location seems to be numerically identical 
to the apparent temporal location of the event: we are unable to discern any 
difference in the temporal locations of the two. 
This feature of temporal experience is related to, but distinct from, the ppc, which 
was mentioned in chapter one. Recall that the PPC was defined as follows: 
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The PPC: It seems as if the duration of experience in which X is represented is 
concurrent with the duration that X is represented as occupying. 
This feature of the phenomenology concerns the relationship between the temporal 
locations of experience and the object of experience. The feature discussed above, 
however, concerns the relationship between the temporal location from which an 
event is experienced, and the apparent temporal location of the event itself. 
Combined, these features of the phenomenology reveal the following picture of 
temporal experience: that the temporal location from which an event is experienced, 
the temporal location of the experience of that event, and the apparent temporal 
location of the event, all seem concurrent. This provides us with another source of 
disanalogy between the spatial and the temporal cases. We have already noted that 
there is a difference as regards the location from which an object is experienced: but 
there is also a difference in what we want to say about experience itself. 
In the temporal case, we have noted, experience is temporally extended - it seems 
concurrent with the apparent temporal location of the object of experience. In the 
spatial case we have examined (vi~ion), however, we are not tempted, at least, on the 
basis of the phenomenology, to ascribe a spatial location to the visual experiences 
themselves. The region from which an item is perceived has a spatial location, as 
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does the perceived item, but we ought not ascribe spatial locations, so far as the 
phenomenology is concerned, to visual experience.77 
This double disanalogy between the spatial case of vision, and the case of temporal 
experience, comprises the collection of phenomenological features that render 
temporal experience 'rectangular'. Why say that temporal experience is 
'rectangular'? Well, as the diagram below shows, the relationship manifest in the 
phenomenology between the temporal locations of the subject, experience, and object 
of experience, is best depicted with a rectangle! 
t ------------------------------------~~ tn 
Temporal Location of Subject 
TemporalLocationofExpe~ 
Apparent Temporal Location of Object of Experience 
Now, in the case of the visual field, the boundaries of the visual field are manifest via 
the subject's awareness of a region given as distinct from her own location. Given 
that temporal experience, so far as the phenomenology is concerned, doesn't allow 
77 Even if we were inclined to attribute spatial locations to visual and auditory experience, presumably 
not for any reason motivated by phenomenological considerations, it looks unlikely that their locations 
will be numerically identical to either the apparent location of any object of visual or auditory 
experience, or the location from which those objects is perceived. 
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for such a distinction between the location of the subject, and the location of the 
region of which the subject is aware, we ought not to expect the boundaries of Time-
Windows to be manifest in the phenomenology via awareness of some region given 
as distinct from the subject's own location. 
The thought that the manifestation of the boundaries of the visual field depends 
upon the subject's awareness of some region distinct from her own location is 
expressed by Richardson in the following passage: 
First, vision having a field is not just a matter of visual experience seeming to be 
'from somewhere'. Visual experience is 'egocentric' in that we seem to see the things 
we see from where we are. In virtue of the apex of the cone of space delimited by the 
visual field being where our eyes are, we seem to see the things we see roughly in 
relation to where our eyes are. And if there were no such point of origin for visual 
experience, there would not be a visual field. But to say that vision has a field is not to say 
that there is a point of origin present in visual experience. It's to say that the 
boundaries or limitations of the cone, the apex of which is the point of origin for 
visual experience, are present in visual experience.78 
So, the visu.al field provides an example of one way that the boundaries of 
experience can be manifest in the phenomenology - and a condition upon such 
manifestation is that the relevant form of experience manifests a perspective. The fact 
that temporal experience fails to manifest such a perspective may thus provide a 
78 Richardson, "Seeing Empty Space," 232-3. 
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reason for us not to expect boundaries to be manifest in the case of temporal 
experience - at least in the same way that they are in vision. 
§6. Conclusion 
I want to conclude by suggesting the following picture of the relationship between 
consciousness and continuity. I hope to have shown that the stream of experience 
doesn't seem strictly continuous or dense - rather, it doesn't seem to be strictly 
discontinuous. Its not seeming strictly discontinuous, I have suggested, is due to our 
not being able to experience any gaps in our stream of experience while those gaps 
take place. 
While the stream of experience doesn't appear strictly continuous, I have claimed 
that the State of Consciousness can obtain strictly continuously over an interval of 
time, in virtue of the occurrence of various events in the brain that may not be strictly 
continuous. The subject's stream of experience, while not exhibiting strict continuity, 
manifests extreme continuity, where' extreme continuity' consists in the boundaries of 
Time-Windows not being manifest in the phenomenology. I demonstrated two ways 
in which the boundaries of Time-Windows could be manifest in experience, but, in 
the case of our experience, are not. 
The claim that' consciousness is continuous', on my proposal, is a claim about both 
the way that the objects of experience are experienced (any object of experience is 
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experienced as continuing on from what occurred immediately before it), and about 
the nature of the stream of experience itself (the boundaries of Time-Windows are 
not manifest in the phenomenology in any other way). It is this dual aspect of 
continuity, I suggested, that may partially explain why both Dainton and Tye 
oscillate between talk about the continuity of the stream of experience, and the 
continuity of the objects represented by experience. Having provided an account of 
the sense in which consciousness is continuous, I now want to discuss in more detail 
another aspect of the phenomenology: the 'Time-Windows' claim. 
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Chapter Three: The Phenomenology of Temporal Experience Part Two: Four 
Varieties of 'Presence' 
§1. Introduction: Varieties of 'Presence' 
In the previous chapter, we noted that while Time-Windows are phenomenally 
manifest in experience in the sense that experience at an instant requires 
characterisation in terms of some interval, the boundaries of Time-Windows are not 
phenomenally manifest. Having concentrated upon the extremes of Time-Windows, 
in this chapter I want to focus upon the issue of the manner in which the objects of 
experience that feature within Time-Windows are experienced. 
I shall distinguish between four different ways in which temporally extended items 
can be present in temporal experience. As in the previous chapter, the purpose of 
doing this is to a) get clear upon the phenomenology that needs to be accounted for 
and b) make it easier to spot where the inadequacies of rival accounts lie. 
All the different features of experience that I shall discuss in this chapter have the 
same structure: they all involve some temporal extent being present to the subject at a 
time. However, in attempting to get clear on what the phenomenology of temporal 
experience is, I shall distinguish between four different varieties of presence: 
'phenomenal', 'sensorial'; 'memorial'; and 'temporal'. I shall then argue that there are 
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four corresponding different versions of the Time-Windows claim, all of which 
describe features of temporal awareness. 
The first variety of presence that I shall discuss is phenomenal presence. This variety 
of presence encompasses the others - the other varieties of presence can all be 
thought of as ways of being phenomenally present. 'Phenomenal Presence' is defined 
as follows: 
'Phenomenal Presence': Something is phenomenally present in a portion of 
experience just in case a characterisation of the phenomenal character of the 
relevant portion of experience requires mention of that something. 
This variety of presence corresponds to the following version of the Time-Windows 
claim: 
'The Phenomenal Time-Windows claim': To characterise experience at a time 
we need to appeal to something temporally extended: temporally extended 
happenings are Phenomenally Present at a time. The temporal extent in 
question will be equal to or shorter than the period of time for which the 
subject has been experienc'ing. 
The Phenomenal Time-Windows claim is the same as what I called the plain 'Time-
Windows claim' in the first and second chapters - from now on I shall refer to it only 
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as the Phenomenal Time-Windows claim. Talking only about the Phenomenal Time-
Windows claim was adequate for our purposes in setting up the problem of 
temporal experience 'and discussing continuity. However, as already mentioned, in 
order to get a better grasp of the phenomenology, we now need to introduce some 
distinctions between ways in which items can be phenomenally present. 
§2: Sensorial Presence 
~ 
The second way of being phenomenally present that I shall discuss is Sensorial 
Presence. We can give an example of what is meant by 'Sensorial Presence' as follows: 
'Sensorial Presence': When I look at an opaque, three-dimensional object, it 
can seem to me that I am experiencing a three-dimensional object, but 
normally the facing side/ s of the object will be present in experience in a way 
that the rest of the object is not - the facing side/ s of the object is/are 
sensorially present. 
Before proceeding, I should note that this discussion of 'sensorial presence' takes as 
its starting-point Foster's observation that: 
Duration and change seem to be presented to us with the same phenomenal 
immediacy as homogeneity and variation of colour through space ... When I listen to 
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a tune, the duration and succession of notes seem to be as much an auditory datum -
part of the content of my auditory experience - as their pitch and loudness.79 
When presented with claims about the 'directness' or 'immediacy' with which some 
element features in experience, the appropriate reaction is always to try and work 
out what is meant by 'direct' or 'immediate'. The distinction between 'phenomenal' 
and 'sensorial' presence in what follows is an attempt to get clearer on the sense in 
which not only homogeneity and variation of colour through space, but also 
duration and succession, are wnat Foster calls 'phenomenally immediate'. 
The first example I shall discuss is one in which the subject visually experiences an 
armchair that is facing him. This example helps us to bring out the distinction 
between sensorial presence, and phenomenal presence. What is it like for me to have 
a visual experience of an armchair that is facing me? The first thing that we should 
note is that the armchair is experienced as a three-dimensional item. 
However, the way in which the front, top, bottom, etc. of the armchair are present in 
my experience plainly differs. If the armchair is sitting on the floor, and I am 
standing in front of it, and there aren't any conveniently located mirrors, then the 
front, top, and possibly sides of the armchair will be present in my experience in a 
way quite different from the rest of the armchair. 
79]. Foster, The case for idealism (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 255. 
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While it is the armchair that is phenomenally present, only parts of the armchair are 
sensorially present. I should note at this point that I am thinking of sensorial presence 
as a variety of phenomenal presence - so things that are present will also be 
phenomenally present. Temporal presence, which I discuss later, is also to be thought 
of as a variety of phenomenal presence. Something is phenomenally present to the 
subject just in case we need to appeal to that thing in characterising the subject's 
experience. 
One objection that may arise to the sensorial/ phenomenal presence distinction at 
this point is the thought that the non-facing parts of the armchair can't be present in 
visual experience - after all, I can't see the non-facing parts of the armchair. How, the 
objection goes, can anything that I can't actually see contribute to the 
phenomenology of visual experience? 
My response to this objection is just to note that the sensorial/phenomenal presence 
distinction offers a way to account for the intuition driving the objection. It is 
certainly true that I can't see the non-facing parts of the armchair in the above 
situation, but this doesn't preclude the non-facing parts of the armchair from 
featuring in my visual experience. Here are a couple of reasons for thinking that the 
non-facing parts of the armchair do feature in visual experience: 
My first reason for thinking this is phenomenological. I take it that in visual 
experience it seems to us that we are often confronted with a world of familiar three-
dimensional objects. My second reason for thinking this is that some of my 
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behaviour - how I navigate an unfamiliar assault course, for example - is responsive 
to what my visual experience presents me with. 
When I reach for a rope or rung that I have just looked at for the first time, I reach as 
if the rope or rung has parts that are not sensorially present, even though there is a 
sense in which I cannot see those parts of the rope or rung. That I reach in the way 
that I do is plausibly to be explained by appeal to the nature of the visual experience 
I have. Given that I reach for the object as if the object has parts that are not 
sensorially present, it is plausible that my visual experience of the object is a visual 
experience as of an object with parts that are not sensorially present. 
One way to respond to these two arguments in support of the claim that more than 
the facing sides of opaque objects can be present in that subject's visual experience is 
to claim that we can account for the phenomenology and the relevant actions by 
appealing to there being some cognitive contribution to visual experience. Perhaps, 
for example, such an account would appeal to belief as playing a role in perceptual 
experience. 
When I have a visual experience of the armchair in the above situation, the advocate 
of such an account will claim, all that is really going on is that I visually experience 
,. 
the front, top, and sides of the armchair, and believe the rest of it to be a certain way. 
Likewise, on the assault course, I visually experience the front of the rung, and 
believe that the rest of it is a certain way - it is the combination of visual experience 
and belief that explains' my reaching as I do. 
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This response disagrees with my description of the phenomenology by denying that 
we can have visual experiences that feature the non-facing sides of objects. However, 
I think that we can begin to respond to this objection by noting that we are not 
consciously aware of forming such beliefs. 
Presumably, on the proposed view, I am constantly non-consciously forming a great 
number of such beliefs - because I nearly always behave (unless I discover 
otherwise) as if the objects I encounter have parts that are not currently visible. Once 
belief has been given this role - where the subject is not conscious of forming such 
beliefs, and they are made in nearly all encounters with objects - we have arrived at 
a position that is not very far away from where we originally started. 
The question that now arises for the 'seeing plus belief position is the question of 
whether or not beliefs about the non facing sides of objects can affect the 
phenomenology of visual experience. If beliefs can affect the phenomenology, then 
this is a position I have no quarrel with in drawing the phenomenal/ sensorial 
distinction, as in drawing the distinction I remain neutral about what it is that is 
responsible for something's being phenomenally present. The claim that the non-
facing sides of the armchair's phenomenal presence in experience is the result of 
some belief that I am not consciolls of forming is not inconsistent with the claim that 
the non facing sides of the armchair are phenomenally present. 
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If the position is that such non-consciously formed beliefs don't affect the 
phenomenology, even despite the two arguments against this position given above, 
then I suggest that we can appeal to the sensorial/ phenomenal distinction as offering 
a diagnosis of the thought driving this position, namely that there is a clear 
difference between the way that the facing and non-facing sides of the armchair 
feature in visual experience. 
This response to the theorist who picks out belief as the cognitive aspect of 
consciousness that plays a role in perceptual experience can also be made to views 
that appeal to some other cognitive aspect of consciousness to play the same role. 
Either the cognitive factor, whatever it is, does affect the phenomenology, in which 
case I have no quarrel with the view, or it does not, in which case I offer the 
phenomenal/ sensorial distinction as a diagnosis of the intuition behind the view. 
I thus propose that we persist with my approach of taking the non-facing sides of the 
armchair to be present in visual experience, albeit in a different way to the front of 
the armchair. The front of the armchair, unlike the non-facing sides, is 'sensorially 
present' in visual experience. I now want to propose that we can illustrate the 
distinction in terms of the Gibsonian visual field. 
,-
Before doing this, I should briefly note that there is an issue closely related to 
distinguishing between sensorial and phenomenal presence in the philosophy of 
perception - the issue of whether or not we only see objects in virtue of seeing their 
surfaces. In my discussion of sensorial versus phenomenal presence I am not taking a 
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stand on this issue - I am merely noting that there are two different ways in which 
the objects of visual experience can feature in visual experience.80 
§2.1 The Gibsonian Visual Field 
The Gibsonian vis\1al field is to be distinguished from the visual field discussed in 
the previous chapter. One crucial difference between the two is that the Gibsonian 
visual field is two-dimensional, unlike the three-dimensional visual field of the 
previous chapter. These two different conceptions of the visual field are non-
rivalrous: they are attempts to describe different properties of visual experience. 
Gibsonian visual field properties are properties of the visual field conceived of in the 
way suggested by Gibson in the following passage: 
First look around the room and note that you see a perfectly stable scene of floor and 
walls, with an array of familiar objects at definite locations and distances ... If you 
look out the window, there beyond is an extended environment of ground' and 
buildings or, if you are lucky, "scenery". This is what we shall call the visual world ... 
Next look at the room not as a room but, insofar as you can, as if it consisted of areas 
or patches of colored surface, divided up by contours ... The attitude you should take 
" ' 
80 For discussion of the 'in virtue of' issue see: M. Martin, "Perception," in The Oxford Handbook of 
Contemporary Philosophy (Ed. F. Jackson & M. Smith) (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008); F. Jackson, 
Perception: A representative theory (CUP Archive, 1977); T. Clarke, "Seeing surfaces and physical objects," 
Philosophy in America (1965): 98-114. 
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is that of the perspective draftsman ... If you persist, the scene comes to approximate 
the appearance of a picture. You may observe that it has characteristics somewhat 
different from the former scene. This is what will here be called the visual field. 81 
Peacocke has discussed the distinctive characteristics of the visual field, and provides 
the following examples of what he calls' visual field properties': 
Examples are: being an experience that we intuitively classify as one in which the 
area of the visual field in which the dinner plate is ~resented is oval in shape; or as 
one in which that area is changing in shape as one walks closer to the dinner plate; or 
as one in which the area has a property of a sort that is instantiated when a white 
surface is presented in a region of the subject's visual field.82 
When we are presented in perception with a round dinner plate tilted at a certain 
angle, despite the tilt, it nevertheless will normally seem to us that we are being 
presented with a round object. As Peacocke claims, it is not the dinner plate that 
appears oval as a result of the tilt - rather, the area of the visual field in which the 
dinner plate is presented is, as a matter of fact, oval. 
81 J. J Gibson and L. Carmichael, "The perception of the visual world" (1950): 26-7. 
82 C. Peacocke, "Sensational properties: theses to accept and theses to reject," Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 62, no. 243 (2008): 2. 
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We can also note that it in this situation, it will normally seem to us that we are being 
perceptually presented with a whole dinner plate - as opposed to, say, just the front 
of a dinner plate (the part of the dinner plate that is facing us). Gibson also makes 
this distinction, calling the dinner plate's shape its 'depth shape', and distinguishing 
that from its 'projected shape' - which he discusses as follows: 
... the shape which an object possesses when projected on a plane. This is its shape as 
a silhouette, or the shape which is defined by the outlines or contour. This is its 
"projected shape". That shape of an object which remains constant from whatever 
direction it is viewed is its depth shape. That shape which changes with the angle of 
view - the "aspect" of the object as we say - is its projected shape ... The visual world 
contains depth shapes, whereas the visual field contains projected shapes. As you 
walk about in a room you can, first of all, observe that objects do not change shape in 
the first sense of the term, and secondly, you may be able to note that the projected 
shapes do change, especially if you fixate an object as you walk.83 
We can think of sensorial presence as a species of phenomenal presence. In the case 
of the tilted dinner plate, the whole dinner plate is phenomenally present, but only 
part of the dinner plate is sensorially present. Corresponding to the part of the 
dinner plate that is sensorially present is the region of the visual field in which the 
dinner plate is perceptually presented. 
83 Gibson and Carmichael, "The perception of the visual world," 34.-5 
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The part of the dinner plate that is not sensorially present, but nevertheless features 
in the phenomenology - it is phenomenally present, without being sensorially 
present - lacks such a corresponding region in the visual field. Only the facing side of 
the plate is relevant in explaining the oval shape in the visual field - thus only the 
facing side of the plate is sensorially present. 
The notion of 'sensorial presence' I have developed has been introduced in order to· 
provide a constraint upon any account of temporal experience that purports to be 
applicable to visual experience. I think we can show that temporally extended 
happenings can be sensorially present in visual experience - the constraint will thus be 
that accounts of temporal experience must be able to account for the sensorial 
presence of temporally extended happenings in visual experience.84 
84 Given that I am attempting to make claims about how the phenomenology normally strikes us, it 
might look somewhat curious that I am attempting to illustrate our 'everyday' or 'natural' 
phenomenology in terms of a somewhat unnatural attitude that we can take towards experience - the 
attitude, as Gibson puts it, of the perspective draftsman. However, there are a number of things to note 
about how the appeal to sensorial presence is supposed to work. Firstly, we can note that taking this 
unnatural attitude towards experience can be helpful in revealing features of experience that are present 
even when the unnatural attitude is absent. Secondly, I want to stress that I am not proposing that we 
are usually aware of coloured patches ~hen we have visual experiences - I am not proposing that it 
seems to us that we are usually aware of coloured patches, nor am I proposing that visual experience 
only gives us access to coloured patches. In fact, we can note that it takes deliberate effort for us to take 
the 'perspective draftsman attitude' towards experience. Rather, I want to claim that it is parts of objects 
that are sensorially present in visual experience - and the appeal to the coloured patches of the 
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On my proposal, temporally extended happenings are sensorially present in Time-
Windows: allowing us to formulate a second version of the Time-Windows claim: 
'The Sensorial Time-Windows claim': To characterise what is sensorially 
present in experience at a time we need to appeal to something temporally 
extended: temporally extended happenings are Sensorially Present at a time. 
The temporal extent in question will be equal to or shorter than the period of 
time for which the subject has been experiencing. 
Hopefully, the Sensorial Time-Windows claim seems like an obvious claim for 
anyone who chooses to introspect the phenomenology of temporal experience. Even 
if it does appear obvious, it is nevertheless worth making, as some theorists (Le 
Poidevin and Zahavi's Husser!) have denied it - and it is this that explains what is 
unsatisfactory about their accounts. On their views, temporally extended happenings 
are never sensorially present in experience. 
Gibsonian visual field merely provides us with a useful way of drawing the distinction between those 
things that are sensorially present, and those things that are merely phenomenally present. 
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§2.2: Le Poidevin and Zahavi 
On my reading of both Le Poidevin and Zahavi's Husserl, both are committed to the 
view that what is sensorially present to the subject in perceptual experience at a time 
is a snapshot.85 When we perceive some temporally extended happening, both claim, 
we are not sensorially presented with something temporally extended, but rather with 
a series of 'snapshots' that don't have discernable earlier and later temporal parts. 
This series of snapshots is supplemented by some additional features (a 'horizon' on 
Zahavi's picture, and the sensation of 'pure succession' on Le Poidevin's) about 
which I shall say more in chapter five, but despite this supplementation, their 
accounts of what is sensorially present in perceptually experience are very sparse. 
Is it possible to show that Le Poidevin and Zahavi are incorrect to characterise the 
phenomenology of this kind of experience as they do? I believe that it is, and that we 
can illustrate the implausibility of their positions by comparing what they say about 
sensorial presence in the temporal case to a position one might take about the spatial 
case. Le Poidevin and Zahavi both hold that the movement of an object between 
distinct locations cannot be sensorially present in perception - all that gets to be 
sensorially present is a series of 'snapshots'. This is what they have to say about the 
temporal case of sensorial presence. 
85 I shall discuss their views in more detail in chapter five, but the views in queston can be found in R. 
Le Poi devin, The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation (Oxford University Press, USA, 
2007). And D. Zahavi, Husserl's phenomenology (Stanford University Press, 2003). 
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The analogous position as regards sensorial presence in the spatial case is to claim 
that the sensorial presence of some spatially extended item in perceptual experience 
in fact consists of a awareness of a multitude of items that are not spatially extended 
- or at least don't have discernable spatial extension. This position about the spatial 
case looks implausible - implausible because we cannot discern such items in 
experience. 
To give an example: the facing part of the page before your eyes is currently 
sensorially present in your perceptual experience. The position analogous to that of 
Le Poidevin and Zahavi in the temporal case is that what is in fact sensorially present 
in perceptual experience in this case are a multitude of regions without discernable 
spatial extension. 
Notice, however, that it isn't possible to attend to these regions - we are only capable 
of focussing our attention upon parts of the page that have discernable spatial 
extension. Given that we are incapable of attending to such items in perceptual 
experience, there is no phenomenological motivation for positing that we are, in fact, 
experiencing such items whenever something with spatial extent is sensorially 
present in perceptual experience . 
. ' 
To return to the temporal case, the analogous thing that we ought to say about Le 
Poidevin and Zahavi's views is that there appears to be no phenomenological 
motivation for positing 'snapshots'. Just as we can't attend to the spatial equivalent 
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of snapshots (regions of space without discernable spatial extent), we can't attend to 
the temporal snapshots Le Poidevin and Zahavi posit. 
Clearly there is something motivating Le Poidevin and Zahavi to adopt this 
revisionary view about the phenomenology. This motivation was discussed in 
chapter one: the motivation being the thought that we need to account for 
'experienced togetherness' in terms of the Thin-PSA. Le Poidevin and Zahavi are 
both providing versions of what I called 'Memory Theory' - a view that attempts to 
supplement the unmodified naive theory's snapshots with an additional component 
(Le Poidevin's pure motion and Zahavi's horizon). Again, I shall talk about their views 
in more detail in chapter five. 
§3: Memorial Presence 
I now want to discuss the second variety of presence: Memorial Presence. 'Memorial 
Presence' can be defined as follows: 
'Memorial Presence': - When I experience a temporally extended happening, 
various features of that temporally extended happening can linger in my 
short-term memory. 
If we move a hand across our field of vision, taking about a second or so to do it, we 
can note that the movement of the hand is sensorially present in experience. We can 
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also note that by the time the hand has completed its movement, the whole 
movement of the hand lingers in our short-term memory. When the movement of the 
hand is sensorially present, I am aware of each phase of the movement successively -
I am aware of the hand moving from pl-p2-p3-p4, but I also retain in my short-term 
memory a grasp of the route traversed by the object. 
Russell draws attention to this feature of temporal experience in the following 
passage: 
[We can note] our awareness of the immediate past, the short period during which the 
warmth of sensation gradually dies out of receding objects, as if we saw them under 
a fading light. The sound we heard a few seconds ago, but are not hearing now, may 
still be an object of acquaintance, but is given in a different way from that in which it 
was given when it was a sense-datum.86 
Note that Russell's talk of objects featuring 'as if under a fading light' doesn't seem 
accurate if we interpret it literally - it isn't as if the difference between perception of 
an item and short term memory of an item can be captured in terms of how well 
illuminated those items appear to be. However, we can interpret 'as if we saw them 
under a fading light' charitably, as Russell gesturing at something he makes more 
precise in the next sentence - namely that the objects of short-term memory are 
'given in a different way' from the objects of perception. 
86 B. Russell, Theory o/knowledge (Routledge, 1992), 72. 
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On this interpretation, we ought to agree with Russell. The lesson we should take 
from Russell's remarks here is that there is a clear distinction to be drawn between 
being sensorially presented with a given temporally extended happening in visual 
experience, and being aware of that same temporally extended happening via short-
term memory. Of course, in order for this claim to be plausible, 1 need to specify 
what is meant by 'short term memory' in this context. 
There are at least three different things we might meq,n when we talk about short-
term memory. Firstly, we might mean that some information from recent past 
experience has been retained. This extremely general sense of short-term memory we 
can call 'Retention'. Secondly, we might mean that some recent item is experienced as 
past. Depending on one's view about temporal experience (I shall discuss some 
different options in more detail shortly), one or both of these senses of 'short term 
memory' could playa role in temporal experience. 
The third sense of 'short-term memory' we can distinguish picks out a faculty distinct 
from perception. It is this sense of 'short-term memory' that Russell is picking out 
when he talks of items being' given in a different way', and also the sense distinctive 
of memorial presence. We can describe the phenomenon that Russell is picking out for 
us as the Memorial Time-Window,$ claim: 
The Memorial Time-Windows claim: At a time, the subject can retain a grasp 
of some temporally extended happening, of duration equal to or shorter than 
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the period of time for which the subject has been experiencing, via a faculty 
distinct from perception: the subject's short-term memory. 
While the MSP is undoubtedly an important way in which we can be acquainted 
with temporally extended happenings, it is also something that we can distinguish 
from the way in which we are acquainted with temporally extended happenings 
when they are sensorially present to us in perception. 
One crucial phenomenological difference between the~ sensorial presence of certain 
very short temporally extended happenings, and the memorial presence of the same 
items is that when they are sensorially present they do not linger - the time in which 
they are represented as occurring is the same as the time for which they are 
represented. When the same items are memorially present, however, they are 
typically represented for a period greater than that of their own duration.87 
This contrast between memorial and sensorial presence reveals an important feature 
of the PPC: namely that the PPC does not characterise memorial presence. I can remain 
aware, via short-term memory, of the brief sound that I heard a few seconds ago, for 
a period of at least a few seconds. In contrast to this, I cannot remain sensorially aware 
87 We can put cases such as blurs or after images - in which, arguably, items remain sensorially present 
for a period greater than their own duration - to one side for the purposes of this part of the discussion. 
We are focussing here on the experience of very short temporally extended happenings that are not 
experienced as blurry and that leave no after-images. 
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of an item in perception for a period of time greater than the period that item is 
represented as occupying.88 
Duration of Awareness of Event X 
/1 
Event X 
The above diagram represents a situation in which a short temporally extended 
happening 'lingers' in experience. It is phenomenologically accurate to give an 
account of our short-term-memory of temporally extended happenings on which our 
awareness of the temporally extended happening is of greater duration than the 
happening in question, but items sensorially present in perception do not linger in 
this way. 
88 It is this feature of temporal experience that is what renders the uncharitable interpretation of 
Russell's remarks above uncharitable. The uncharitable interpretation of Russell takes him to mean that 
items linger sensorially in perceptual experience - and this is not the case. 
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I have drawn attention to the Memorial Time-Windows claim because I think that 
some accounts of temporal experience we shall examine in the next chapter look 
more like accounts of the Memorial Time-Windows claim than accounts of the 
sensorial presence of temporally extended happenings. I shall argue later that any 
account that results in temporally extended happenings 'lingering' in experience is 
best thought of as an account of the Memorial Time-Windows claim - and not of our 
'direct awareness' (i.e. the sensorial presence) of temporally extended happenings. 
In fact, an account of the Memorial Time-Windows claim will also be an account of a 
feature of temporal experience that Miller proposes that we need to account for. In 
his discussion of Husser!, Miller introduces the following features that he claims an 
account of temporal experience needs to deal with: 
An adequate account of our perceptual awareness of a process, or an event, must -
according to Husser! - deal with three main features of such an awareness: The first 
is the very fact that in perceiving a process we are aware, at any given instant of the 
duration of that awareness, of a temporally extended part of that process or the whole of 
that process, and not merely of one of its instantaneous tone-phases. The second is 
the fact that our perceptual awareness of a process involves a continual awareness of 
the continuity of that very awareness. The third feature is our continual awareness, 
during our perception of 11. process, of our changing temporal-perspective of that 
process.89 
89 Miller, Husserl, perception, and temporal awareness, 160. 
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The 'Sensorial Time-Windows' claim corresponds to the first feature, and the claim 
that consciousness exhibits extreme continuity corresponds to the second. Miller 
goes on to describe the third feature - awareness of our changing 'temporal 
perspective' on a temporally extended happening in more detail. When I am aware 
of a piece of music playing, he suggests, I am aware of some parts of the music as 
playing now, and some parts of the music as 'having just played'. It is this kind of 
awareness that Miller has in mind when he talks of our 'changing temporal-
perspective' on a process.90 This feature of our temporal experience - awareness of 
some things as happening now, and some things as having just happened - clearly can 
be accounted for by a combination of perception (of things happening now), and 
short-term memory (of things having just happened). 
The idea that there might be two different things to be accounted for here - our 
perception of temporally extended happenings, and our short-term memory of 
recently-perceived temporally extended happenings - looks to be implicit in other 
literature on temporal experience. Sean Kelly, for instance, in The Puzzle of Temporal 
Experience, characterises the difference in approach between what he calls 'Specious 
present theory' and 'Retention theory' as follows: 
The first approach centers on ~hat has been called the theory of the Specious Present. 
According to this theory, we are wrong to think of our experience as providing us with 
static snapshots of the world. Rather, we are in direct perceptual contact with an ordered, 
90 cf. Ibid., 146-9. 
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temporally extended window on the world.91 
According to the Retention Theorist our experience is fundamentally a presentation of 
the world at a time. The Retention Theorist, in other words, accepts the presupposition 
that experience presents us with a snapshot of the world ... in experience the snapshot that 
we get of the world is always supplemented with memories or "retentions" from the past and 
anticipations or "protentions" ofthefuture ... 92 
At first, then, it looks as though the'specious present theorist' and the 'retention 
theorist' are in competition with one another, with Kelly's talk of memory not 
picking out a faculty distinct from perception - rather, 'memory' appears to be being 
used in the sense of 'retention' mentioned earlier. However, later on, Kelly says the 
following about the memory theorist: 
Even on the Specious Present Theory ... we must keep track of the earlier phases of long 
movements in some way other than by perceiving them directly. That we have some 
relation to the past and the future other than direct perception of it, however, is the 
main point of the Retention Theory.93 
At this point, then, it looks as though Kelly's remarks lends themselves to the idea 
91 S. D Kelly, "The puzzle of temporal experience," Cognition and the brain: The philosophy and neuroscience 
movement (2005): 3. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 13. 
Page 141 
that the theorists he calls the 'specious present theorist' and the 'memory theorist' are 
just accounting for two different things. The specious present theorist is attempting 
to explain our perception of temporally extended happenings, and the memory 
theorist is attempting to explain our nonperceptual awareness of past and future 
happenings (our awareness of items via a faculty distinct from perception). 
Kelly's way of drawing the distinction between the Specious Present Theory and 
Memory Theory thus looks as though it has the unfortunate consequence that the 
accounts turn out to be non-rivalrous. I now want to turn to an alternative way of 
drawing the distinction he has in mind. This distinction is drawn in terms of what is 
experienced 'as present'. The distinction is thus drawn in terms of what I shall call 
'temporal presence'. 
§4: Temporal Presence 
The final way items can be present in experience that I shall discuss is Temporal 
Presence. This variety of presence is noted by Russell in Theory of Knowledge: 
Whatever I experience is, in one sense, 'present' to me at the time when I experience 
it, but in the temporal sense.it need not be present - for example - if it is something 
remembered, or something abstract which is not in time at al1.94 
94 Russell, Theory a/knowledge, 38. 
Page 142 
Russell here draws our attention to what I shall call 'temporal presence'. Recall that 
something is phenomenally present just in case it features in the phenomenology -
something is phenomenally present just in case we need to appeal to that something 
in order to characterise the experience. 
To characterise the experience of the armchair discussed earlier, we needed to appeal 
to both the facing parts of the armchair (which are sensorially present) and non-
facing parts (which are not sensorially present). Just as sensorial presence is a way of 
being phenomenally present, temporal presence is also a way of being phenomenally 
present. 
We can bring out the distinction between phenomenal presence and temporal 
presence by noting a difference between episodic memory and perception. Things 
are phenomenally present in both memory and perception - in order to characterise 
the phenomenology of episodic recollection of visually experiencing an armchair, 
and of simply visually experiencing an armchair, we need to appeal to the armchair 
that the memory and perception are of. One crucial difference between the two cases, 
however, is that only the perceptual case seems to present me with the armchair' as 
present' or 'now'. 
§4.1: Episodic Recollection 
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In the case of episodic recollection, it doesn't seem to me as if the armchair is 
presented 'as present' or 'now'. In fact, when I remember the armchair, I remember 
encountering the armchair at some point in the past. I am keeping the 
characterisation of the difference between the two cases deliberately rough at this 
stage, precisely because the question this difference between the two cases raises is 
'how are we to cash out the way in which perception presents us with 'armchair 
now' or' armchair present'? 
Firstly, we need to say more about the difference between episodic recollection and 
perception. We can note that there are certainly phenomenological differences 
between perception and episodic recollection - differences about which I shall talk 
more later. There is also a difference between perception and episodic recollection 
that concerns how they lead us to act. Perceptual experience of an enraged mother 
bear charging at me can lead to me taking evasive action - dropping to the floor and 
playing dead, for example. Episodic recollection of the enraged mother bear charging 
at me, however, doesn't lead me to me taking any kind of evasive action. 
This difference in effect upon action is what ought to convince us that, while the 
objects of perception are temporally present - they are in some sense experienced as 
'now' or 'present' - the objects of.memory are not. What we are looking for, then, is 
some way of capturing the content of perception that explains why it leads to courses 
of action that episodic recollection does not. 
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The phenomenon of 'temporal presence' raises a question about exactly what 
'temporal presence' is - how ought we to think about the content of an experience in 
which something is temporally present? What is it for something to be temporally, as 
opposed to merely phenomenally, present in experience? In drawing attention to the 
phenomenon, I have attempted to remain neutral about how this notion of 'temporal 
presence' is to be cashed out. 
Prima facie, it looks as though we need to characterise 'temporal presence' in terms 
of things being experienced as 'now' or 'present' (as opposed to past or future). This 
is a reasonable first attempt to mark the relevant distinction between memory and 
perception, in order to explain my acting as I do on the basis of experience. 
Perception of something dangerous (such as in the enraged mother bear situation) 
typically leads to very different course of action than episodic recollection of 
something dangerous - and this difference in course of action is plausibly best 
explained by perception presenting us with things 'as now' or 'as present'. Given 
this, we now face the problem of cashing out how it is that 'now' or 'present' is 
manifest in the content of experience. 
Sometimes, the debate about temporal experience is set up as a debate, not about 
how it is that we can experience' temporally extended happenings, but about what 
we can experience 'as present'.95 We have already got the result, discussed in the first 
95 See Le Poidevin, The Images afTime. for an example of this kind of approach. 
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chapter, that what is relevant to characterising the subject's experience at a time is an 
interval with duration less than or equal to the duration for which the subject has 
been experiencing - the Phenomenal Time-Windows claim. 
The debate about temporal experience, set up in this way, concerns what portion of 
Phenomenal Time-Windows gets experienced as present. This debate enables us to 
capture the distinction between Specious Present Theory and Memory Theory. On 
my proposal for drawing the distinction, both are committed to the Thin-PSA: they 
both commit to the idea that the Phenomenal Time-Windows claim reveals 
'experienced togetherness', and claim that this is to be cashed out in terms of Thin-
PSA. The idea that temporally extended happenings can be Temporally present in 
experience at a time we can formulate as the Temporal Time-Windows claim: 
'The Temporal Time-Windows claim': To characterise what is temporally 
present in experience at a time we need to appeal to something temporally 
extended: temporally extended happenings are Temporally Present at a time. 
The temporal extent in question will be equal to or shorter than the period of 
time for which the subject has been experiencing. 
The dispute between these Thin-PSA accounts concerns how we ought to capture the 
'temporal presence' of items in th'e Phenomenal Time-Windows claim. On one type 
of Thin-PSA account - Memory Theory - 'temporal presence' is best captured in 
terms of a snapshot, and on the rival account - Specious Present Theory - 'temporal 
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presence' is best captured in terms of an interval with discernable earlier and later 
temporal parts. 
§4.2: Specious Present Theory Versus Memory Theory 
Specious Present Theory and Memory Theory are accounts that are best 
distinguished in terms of what they take to be temporally present in experience at a 
time. Memory Theorists take this to be a snapshot, whereas Specious Present 
Theorists take it to be something with discernable earlier and later temporal parts. 
On the side of the Specious Present Theorists we have Broad and Tye: 
I shall assume that what a person prehends at any moment is of finite duration .. .I 
take it that our prehension of the contents of each specious present as having 
presentedness is the experiential basis of our notion of presentness in the strict sense.96 
Presentness is part of the content of perceptual experiences in all modalities ... the 
present is... experienced when one experiences something changing ... this 
experienced present...has a brief but finite duration.97 
96 C. D Broad, Examination of McTaggart's philosophy (University Press, 1927), 288. 
97 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 86-87. 
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Husserl and Le Poidevin, on the other hand, claim that the only things we can 
experience as present are things without discernable earlier and later temporal parts: 
Each tone becomes constituted in a continuity of tone-data; and at any given time, 
only one punctual phase is present as now, while the others are attached as a 
retentional tail... to the opposition between perception and primary memory there 
corresponds on the side of the object the opposition between 'now present' and 
'past' .98 
The experienced present may not be durationless, but it is certainly very short 
indeed ... we could hardly both perceive two events as present and perceive one as 
occurring before the other. What we experience as present is not divisible in this 
way.99 
Husserl and Le Poidevin both suggest that, while we can perceive some things as 
present, we cannot perceive things with discern able earlier and later temporal parts 
as present. This is explicitly committed to by Le Poidevin above, and I also take it 
that Husserl's talk of only 'punctual phases' being represented as now involves 
commitment to the notion that, at an instant, nothing with discernable earlier and 
later temporal parts can be represented as 'now'. I take it that which is 'punctual' 
doesn't have earlier and later temporal parts. 
98 E. Husserl, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), trans. ]. B Brough 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991),40-1. 
99 Le Poidevin, The Images of Time, 80-1. 
Page 148 
On my interpretation, while Husserl and Le Poidevin both take only a snapshot to be 
temporally present, they differ over the issue of Sensorial Presence, with Husserl's 
view being that there is a sensorial, as well as a temporal, Time-Window. Le 
Poidevin, however, as discussed earlier, denies the existence of a Sensorial Time-
Window, and holds that only a snapshot can ever be sensorially or temporally 
present in experience.100 
How should we think of the debate between the MeIl\ory Theorists and the Specious 
Present Theorists? What is it that is motivating these two quite different pictures? 
One thought might be that the Memory Theorist is motivated by concerns about the 
'strict' present. The' strict' present - the present as it is in reality, and not merely as it 
features in experience - must be an instant, for if it was temporally extended, it 
would have parts that were earlier and later - and thus past or future. 
Perhaps, then, the Memory Theorist is motivated by the thought that the 'strict' 
notion of the present is the only coherent notion of 'the present' - so when we talk 
about 'the experienced present', the only thing we can have in mind is something 
instantaneous. This would require commitment to an instantaneous, rather than a 'no 
discernable earlier and later temporal parts', conception of snapshots. 
100 Both views are discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
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As we have seen, both in the first chapter, and in the Le Poidevin's remarks above, 
the Memory Theorist's conception of experience is such that it is divisible into 
snapshots, but these snapshots are not necessarily to be thought of as instantaneous -
as Le Poidevin puts it, 'the experienced present may not be durationless, but it is 
certainly very short indeed'. What is it, then, that motivates the Memory Theorist to 
claim that the present, as it features in experience, is something that, while not 
necessarily instantaneous, nevertheless doesn't possess discernable earlier and later 
temporal parts? 
One way to think of this debate is that it is about the 'token-reflexivity' of temporal 
presence. We can distinguish between two different ways that utterances that concern 
what is going on 'now' or 'at present' can function as regards their token-reflexivity, 
and use this distinction to set up the dispute between the Specious Present Theorist 
and the Memory Theorist. 
§4.3: Token-Reflexivity 
The truth-maker for an utterance that concerns what is going on 'now' or 'at present' 
involves the time occupied by the utterance. It looks plausible that the same goes for 
experience - namely that the truth-makers for the experience of something 
'experienced 'now' or 'as present' involve the time at which the experience occurs. It 
is this feature of utterances and experience that is being picked out when we call 
both token-reflexive. 
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We can distinguish two different forms of token-reflexivity: concurrent token-
reflexivity, and weak token-reflexivity. An item is concurrently token-reflexive if the 
time-period occupied by the truth maker of that item is concurrent with the time-
period occupied by the item itself. An item is weakly token-reflexive if the time-
period occupied by the truth maker of that item overlaps with and exceeds in duration 
the time-period occupied by the item itself. 
Returning to the case of utterances, it is easy to find an example of a weakly token-
reflexive utterance: consider, for instance, an utterance of 'it is raining today'. 'It is 
raining today' is an utterance that, if spoken at normal speed, has a truth-maker (a 
whole day) that occupies an interval greatly outstrips the time it takes to perform the 
utterance. While the truth-maker has duration greater than that of the utterance in 
question, the relevant truth-maker is picked out by the time of the utterance: the day 
in question is the day in which the utterance falls. The truth maker thus overlaps and 
exceeds in duration the time-period occupied by the utterance itself. 
It is more difficult to find examples of utterances that are concurrently token reflexive 
- perhaps the most plausible cases are those in which an utterance of a word such as 
'now' is used to designate the precise time of occurrence of the item in question. 
When I utter the sentence 'I am turning on the lights ... now!' I am using my utterance 
of 'now!' to indicate the precise time at which I am turning on the lights. Likewise, 
when I utter the sentence 'Usain is crossing the finishing line ... now!' the utterance of 
'now!' picks out the precise time at which Usain is crossing the finishing line. 
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In this kind of case, the utterances of 'now!' are taken to pick out some event that 
occurs concurrently with them. The truth-maker of the utterance of'I am turning on 
the lights ... now!' is an event that occurs concurrently with an utterance that is a 
temporal part of the whole utterance: the utterance of 'now!' The utterance of 'now!' 
in such sentences is the only temporal part of the overall utterance of the sentence 
that is relevant to the business of determining a truth maker. In this way, then, we 
can have utterances that have truth makers that are concurrent with them, but that 
do not occupy a period of time greater than that occupied by the utterances 
themselves. 
With this distinction between varieties of token-reflexivity in mind, we can return to 
the issue of the dispute between the Specious Present Theorist and the Memory 
Theorist. The proposal is that we can understand their dispute as a dispute about 
token-reflexivity. This requires us to interpret both Memory Theorists and Specious 
Present Theorists as committing to views on which the truth-makers of experiences 
are given by looking not only at the content of experience, or of a portion of 
experience, but by looking at the time at which the experience occurred as well. As 
far as I can tell from looking at the views of such theorists, there doesn't appear to be 
any reason not to interpret them in this way. 
As we have seen, Memory Theorists commit to the view that only a snapshot can be 
temporally present in perception at a time, whereas Specious Present Theorists hold 
that items with discernable earlier and later temporal parts can be so present. Given 
that both types of theorist are providing accounts of how experience is at an instant, 
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we can take the Specious Present Theorist to be seeing temporal presence as weakly 
token-reflexive, while the Memory Theorist sees it as concurrently token-reflexive. 
The Memory Theorist's commitment to concurrent token-reflexivity is perhaps to be 
explained by the way that the Memory Theorist responds to the deficiencies of the 
Unmodified NaIve Theory. One thought that motivates the Unmodified NaIve 
Theorist is that perceptual experience, unlike other forms of experience, keeps us 'up 
to date' with the state of the world. As the world changes or remains the same from 
instant to instant, so perceptual experience, from instant to instant (or snapshot to 
snapshot), keeps us up to date with this changing or remaining the same. 
On the Unmodified NaIve Theory, what is experienced 'as present' or 'now' at a time 
is some instantaneous snapshot, with the instantaneous snapshot delivering 
information about how the world currently is. The Memory Theorist's proposal is 
that this picture needs to be supplemented with some contribution from short-term 
memory if it is to avoid the accusation that we never experience temporally extended 
happenings. 
If we start out from a position on which a snapshot is experienced as present, with 
each snapshot being superceded by a subsequent more up-to-date snapshot, then 
when we look to supplement'that picture with some memorial ingredient that 
furnishes awareness of items given as occurring before the relevant snapshot, it might 
not look plausible that those items given as occurring before the snapshot can also be 
as present. If the snapshot is what furnishes us with the most recent picture of how 
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things are with the world, and the memorial component furnishes us with how the 
world was before this snapshot, then, the Memory Theorist argues, the memorial 
component cannot present us with items as present. 
The Memory Theorist, then, already has a picture of what is experienced 'now' or 'as 
present' that is imported from the Unmodified NaIve Theory. The Memory 
Theorist's unwillingness to extend Temporal Presence to items with duration greater 
than a snapshot is perhaps to be explained by the following intuition, described by 
Richard Sorabji: 
The central idea is that if the present were an extended stretch of time, it would 
overlap with the past and future. No doubt the common intuition that the present is 
distinct from the past and future would have to be abandoned if it could be shown to 
be unsatisfiable.101 
Sorabji is, in the above passage, not talking about the present as it features in 
experienced, but about the present in general, and the question he is concerned with 
is that how specifying exactly what 'the present' is. The intuition he is picking out is 
that whatever it is that we identify as being 'the present', that thing ought to be 
'distinct' from the past and the future. The thought then is that when the 
consequences of this intuition are drawn out, the only possible candidate for being 
'the present' will be an instant. This kind of consequence-drawing-out argument is 
101 R. Sorabji, Time, creation and the continuum: theories in antiquity and the early Middle Ages (Gerald 
Duckworth & Co Ltd, 1983), 9. 
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generally attributed to Augustine, and has been formulated by Robert Le Poidevin as 
follows: 
Suppose the present to last for a non-zero interval. It would then have to be divisible 
into earlier and later parts. But if it is so divisible, then its parts cannot all be present. 
If some earlier part is present, then some later part is future. Or, if some later part is 
present, then some earlier part is past. Therefore, it must be durationless.102 
The Memory Theorist is driven by tile intuition that we can only intelligibly talk 
about the present as something that doesn't admit earlier and later temporal parts: 
not admitting earlier and later temporal parts is what is precisely what is distinctive 
about the present, as opposed to the past and the future. So in response to the 
Specious Present Theorist's suggestion that temporally extended happenings can be 
temporally present in experience at a time, Memory Theorists make the following 
kind of response: 
This cannot be true literally. We could not experience an entire spoken 
sentence as present: it would just be a confusing jumble of sounds if we did ... 
James says that we distinguish earlier and later parts in the specious present. 
But we could hardly perceive two events as present and perceive one as 
102 Le Poidevin, The Images afTime, 79. 
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occurring before the other. What we experience as present is not divisible in 
this way,103 
The thought here is that the Specious Present Theorist's suggestion that temporally 
extended happenings can be experienced as temporally present is somehow 
incoherent. The problem with suggesting that we perceive things with earlier and 
later parts as present is the Augustinian thought that the present cannot be an 
interval, because if it is it will have earlier and later parts - that is, it will have parts 
that are past and future - parts that are not present. Of course - this is precisely the 
kind of observation that the specious present theorist wants to make: that the present 
as it is experienced is importantly different from the way that the present is often 
taken to be objectively - hence the name 'the specious present'. 
According to Memory Theory, an item cannot be experienced as occurring earlier 
than the time that the portion of experience in question occurred, and be experienced 
as temporally present. According to the Specious Present Theorist, however, 
temporally extended happenings can be experienced as temporally present. The 
Memory Theorist's objection to the Specious Present Theorist concerns the Specious 
Present Theorist's conception of the present as admitting earlier and later temporal 
parts. The Specious Present Theorist, however, rejects memory theory because of its 
insistence that snapshots feature in perceptual experience. The Specious Present 
holds that we simply don't find snapshots when we introspect, and so it is a mistake 
103 Ibid., 80-1. 
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to think that we ought to give an account of experience that appeals to such things 
(as the Memory Theorist does). 
Given that we don't find any snapshots in the phenomenology, the Specious Present 
Theorist argues, we ought not to claim that only a 'snapshot' can be experienced as 
temporally present. If we don't find snapshots in experience, and we think that items 
can be experienced as temporally present, then it looks as though the only remaining 
candidates for what is experienced as temporally present are temporally extended 
happenings. Of course, in adopting this position, the Specious Present Theorist needs 
to provide some account of the present according to which items with discernable 
earlier and later parts can be experienced as present. In the next chapter I provide a 
discussion of Broad, who is a good example of a theorist who attempts to provide an 
account of how items with discernable earlier and later temporal parts can be 
experienced as temporally present. 
The debate between the Memory Theorist and the Specious Present Theorist 
generates two serious problems with both views. The Memory Theorist's account 
involves a concurrent token-reflexive picture of temporal presence, and the problem 
facing it is that we don't find snapshots in experience. The Specious Present 
Theorist's account involves a weak token-reflexive picture of temporal presence, and 
the problem facing it concerns how something with earlier and later temporal parts 
can be experienced as present. 
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Due to these problems with both views, I propose, we ought to attempt to see if an 
account of Temporal Presence can be provided that avoids both of these problems. I 
shall attempt to provide such a position in chapter seven, where I provide a positive 
account of temporal experience. On the view I shall propose, the temporal presence 
of temporally extended happenings in perception is to be captured via appeal to the 
ppc. I shall argue that, if we drop Thin-PSA, and instead advocate an account that 
involves only Pat-PSA, we can provide an account of the temporal presence of 
temporally extended happenings that breaks the stalemate between the Specious 
Present Theorist and the Memory Theorist. 
§4. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that there are four different Time-Windows claims that 
a theorist giving an account of temporal experience could be committed to: the 
Phenomenal Time-Windows Claim, the Sensorial Time-Windows Claim, the 
Memorial Time-Windows Claim, and finally the Temporal Time-Windows Claim. 
All theorists apart from the Unmodified NaIve Theorist accept the Phenomenal 
Time-Windows Claim: 
'The Phenomenal Time-Windows claim': To characterise experience at a time 
we need to appeal to something temporally extended: temporally extended 
happenings are Phenomenally Present at a time. The temporal extent in 
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question will be equal to or shorter than the period of time for which the 
subject has been experiencing. 
Le Poidevin and Zahavi's Hussed, as we shall see in chapter five, appear to be the 
only theorists who reject the Sensorial Time-Windows Claim: 
'The Sensorial Time-Windows claim': To characterise what is sensorially 
present in experience at a time we need to appeal to something temporally 
extended: temporally extended happenings are Sensorially Present at a time. 
The temporal extent in question will be equal to or shorter than the period of 
time for which the subject has been experiencing. 
I suggested earlier that both accounts, when we examine the phenomenology, look 
implausible - and in chapter five we shall examine the theoretical motivation that 
drives them to make such prima facie implausible claims. 
The Memorial Time-Windows claim is something that, I have suggested, needs 
accounting for, though an account of it will be an account of some faculty distinct 
from perception. The reason I have introduced the claim is that it looks as though a 
number of Thin-PSA accounts look more like accounts of Memorial Time-Windows 
than accounts of perception: 
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The Memorial Time-Windows claim: At a time, the subject can retain a grasp 
of some temporally extended happening, of duration equal to or shorter than 
the period of time for which the subject has been experiencing, via a faculty 
distinct from perception: the subject's short-term memory. 
The final claim - the Temporal Time-Windows claim - I suggested as the best way of 
distinguishing between the Specious Present Theorist and the Memory Theorist. The 
Specious Present Theorist accepts the Temporal Time-Windows Claim, whereas the 
Memory Theorist denies it: 
'The Temporal Time-Windows claim': To characterise what is temporally 
present in experience at a time we need to appeal to something temporally 
extended: temporally extended happenings are Temporally Present at a time. 
The temporal extent in question will be equal to or shorter than the period of 
time for which the subject has been experiencing. 
The theoretical commitment that drives the Memory Theorist to deny this claim 
concerns, as we have seen, the nature of the present - the present being conceived of 
as something that doesn't admit earlier and later temporal parts. Later, I shall 
suggest that the Memory Theorist gets something about the structure of experience 
right - namely, a commitment" to concurrent token-reflexivity - but the Specious 
Present Theorist gets something about the content of experience right - namely a 
commitment to temporally extended happenings being experienced as present. I 
shall attempt to reconcile these features of both views in my own position. 
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Having distinguished between these four different Time-Windows claims, I want to 
propose that an ideal account of temporal experience will provide an account of all 
four claims, rather than rejecting them. Over the course of the next three chapters, I 
shall use the distinctions between the four claims as part of a discussion of rival 
accounts, where the distinctions can be used to demonstrate the inadequacies of such 
accounts. In chapter seven, I shall attempt to show that it is possible to provide an 
account of temporal experience that allows us to accept all four Time-Windows 
claims. 
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Chapter Four: Thin-PSA Accounts Part One: Broad 
§1. Introduction 
I now want to discuss in detail the Thin-PSA accounts. In doing this, I shall treat 
Broad's efforts in some depth - I shall devote this chapter exclusively to them. A 
reasonably large number of objections have been levelled at Broad, and nearly all of 
these objections can be shown to fail. My project in this chapter is to demonstrate 
precisely where it is that we ought to locate these objections. 
It will turn out that these objections are precisely the objections we ought to level at 
the other Thin-PSA accounts discussed in the next chapter as well. One thing to bear 
in mind during this discussion is that Broad's picture of temporal experience -
especially his early account -looks very similar to that of Tye. 
I talk about Broad's early position because Broad has two positions - an early one 
developed in Scientific Thought, and a later one developed in An Examination of 
McTaggart's Philosophy. Broad's later theory is intended "to supersede what [was] 
said on former occasions", but it is useful to discuss both, so better to understand the 
later account.104 Using the terminology introduced in the last chapter, Broad agrees 
that there are Sensorial Time-Windows and Temporal Time-Windows. As regards 
Memorial Time-Windows, he is rather ambiguous, as we shall see. 
104 C. D Broad, The philosophy of CD Broad (Open Court Pub Co, 1959), 765. 
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§2. Early Broad 
Broad is a Specious Present Theorist - he is also a sense-datum theorist. His 
formulation of the 'sense-data' component of his account involves a threefold 
distinction between awareness, sensa, and sensible fields. Broad introduces the 
notion of awareness of a sensum with the following: 
When I look at a penny from the side I am certainly aware of something; and it is 
certainly plausible to hold that this something is elliptical... Assuming that when I 
look at a penny from the side I am directly aware of something which is in fact 
elliptical, it is clear that this something cannot be identified with the 
penny ... sensa ... cannot in generally be identified with the physical objects of which 
they are the appearances.10S 
Recall that, in the previous chapter, I discussed the Gibsonian Visual Field, and 
suggested that I didn't want to commit to the coloured patches in that visual field 
being the only items we are' directly' aware of in perception. Broad, however, does 
want to say this, He suggests that we should think of these sensa as having spatial 
locations within a 'sensible field' constituted by those same sensa: 
105 C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought (Routledge & K. Paul, 1923), 240. 
Page 163 
The fundamental meaning of 'place' for visual sensa is their place in the visual field 
of the observer who senses them ... We shall also find it convenient to say that such 
and such a coloured patch is sensibly present at a certain place in a visual field. 
Sensible presence is (a) directly experienced by sight; (b) is literal and 
unanalysable ... ; and (c) is private to a single observer, in the sense that it only applies 
to the sensa of his field. It is a relation between a sensum, which is part of a field, and 
the rest of the field ... the same man has different fields at different times.106 
The claim Broad is making here is that when I am having a normal visual experience 
of a scene before my eyes, I am aware of a collection pf sensa, each with a different 
location in the spatial visual field that they compose. This is plainly reminiscent of 
the earlier discussion of 'Sensorial Presence' - but supplemented with the claim that 
the coloured patches are the direct objects of awareness. Despite this difference in 
how Sensorial Presence is being conceived of, Broad is in agreement that there are 
Sensorial Time-Windows. 
Broad begins his account of temporal experience by rejecting the notion that sensible 
fields could be merely momentary: 
On this assumption that sensible fields are literally momentary, it follows that sensa 
are also literally momentary. But this assumption must now be dropped, and we 
must come closer to the actual facts of sensible experience.107 
106 Ibid., 303. 
107 Ibid., 348. 
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Broad's thought here is that, given that sensible fields are constituted by their sensa, 
if we think that sensible fields are momentary, so their constituents (sensa) must also 
be momentary. This suggestion, however, must be rejected, given that it seems to us 
that we can perceive temporally extended happenings. 
While Broad thinks that this feature of experience shows us that we ought not to 
think of the direct objects of experience as momentary, he doesn't think - at least 
initially - that it shows us that we .should take this. same attitude to awareness. 
Rather, Broad's methodology is the following: 
I shall begin by assuming literally momentary acts of sensing and shall then correct 
this abstraction. lOB 
One important point to note about what Broad is saying here is that it is not initially 
obvious how it bears on what he thinks about the PSA. At this point it looks as 
though he is advocating the Thin-PSA - but what will become of this commitment 
once he 'corrects the abstraction' of literally momentary acts? Will he drop the Thin-
PSA, or perhaps even the weaker version of the PSA - Fat-PSA - altogether? In fact, I 
shall suggest that he will retain the Thin-PSA and merely claim that there can't be 
literally instantaneous acts of awareness. This interpretation of Broad has the 
108 Ibid. 
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consequence that Broad remains untroubled by Dainton's 'ballooning contents' 
objection - an objection that I shall discuss later on. 
/ 
/ 
El 
I 
/ 
I 
I 
Broad's initial account, then, involves commitment to the notion that there are 
literally momentary acts of sensing. Broad makes use of the above diagram in 
explaining the details of the account. Broad's account runs as follows: 
Let us represent the history of a's acts by a directed line 00. Let us represent the 
history of his sensible fields by a parallel line ee. Let 01, on the upper line, represent a 
momentary act of sensing done by a at a moment 1'1. I take it to be a fact that this act 
grasps an event. of finite duration which stretches back from the moment t'l to a 
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moment tI, which is earlier by an account n. This duration n is the length of a's 
specious Present. I call this event e1e'l, and I represent the act of sensing which 
grasps it as a whole by the right-angled triangle e1o1e'l, with e1e'l as base and 01 as 
vertex.109 
Broad's suggestion is that at an instant, I am aware of one particular interval - where 
this is cashed out in terms of momentary acts of awareness grasping events. The 
interval encompassed by the momentary act is experienced 'as present' or 'now' -
for Broad takes himself to be accounting not just for Sensorial Time-Windows, but 
also Temporal Time-Windows. 
Broad also notes that we can also experience things with duration longer than that of 
the 'specious present', and so provides the following account of this phenomenon: 
109 Ibid. 
Let us now suppose that, at a slightly later date (separated by less than the length of 
the Specious Present), a performs another act of sensing. We will represent this by 
the dotted triangle e202e'2, which is similar to e101e'l. This grasps an event of 
duration n, stretching back from the moment whim the act happens. The event is 
represented by e2e'2. Now it is evident that there is a part e2e'l, which is common to 
the two events e1e'l and e2e'2. This part is sensed by both the acts 01 and 02. On the 
other hand, there is a part e1e2 of the first event which is not sensed by the second 
act, and a part e1e2 of the second event which is not sensed by the first act.110 
110 Ibid., 349. 
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Broad's suggestion here is that the same sensa can be sensed in different acts of 
awareness. Having set up his position in terms of instantaneous acts of awareness, 
Broad then suggests: 
We are now able to remove the supposition of literally momentary acts ... If 
we imagine a continuous series of momentary acts between 01 and 02 we 
can regard them as momentary sections of an act or process of finite duration, 
and can say that the finite event e2e'1 is presel)t throughout the whole of this 
process of sensing.111 
So, on Broad's account, even though we can think of a subject's acts of sensing as 
being temporally extended, we can still talk about how things are with the subject at 
an instant. He is thus clearly committed to the Thin-P5A. Over the course of a 
temporally extended act of sensing, there will sometimes be events that I am aware 
of throughout the whole of that act. 
Over the course of the temporally extended act 0102, the event e2e'1 will remain 
phenomenally present. Other temporally extended events will only be present for 
part of the temporally extended act - e1e2 and e'1e'2. On Broad's account, the longer 
.. 
an act of sensing (up to the duration of the specious present), the shorter the duration 
of an event that I will be aware of as a whole. 
111 Ibid., 349-50. 
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I now want to discuss some of the objections that have been levelled at this account. 
Dainton suggests that Broad's account has a number of difficulties facing it. The first 
objection he formulates is the 'ballooning content' objection: 
When I perceive a continuous process, the extent of the process that I am directly 
aware of does not seem to change. It does not seem that over very short intervals I am 
aware of longer stretches of the process than I am over a longer period. If Broad's 
theory is correct, we surely ought to be able to notice this 'ballooning' of content over 
short intervals.112 
It seems to me that Dainton's objection here is slightly misleading, and that he may 
be talking past Broad somewhat. Broad, I suggest, would want to agree with Dainton 
that there is a sense in which' over very short intervals I am aware of longer stretches 
of the process than I am over a longer period'. Say I am aware of a man walking up a 
hill (see the diagram below). 
Someone sympathetic to the notion of Time-Windows overlapping will want to 
claim that I am aware of the man walking from location Ll to location L9 in virtue of 
my being aware of his walking from location L1 to LS, and from L4 to L9, as 
'phenomenal wholes'. They will also want to say that there is a sense in which my 
112 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 140. 
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perceiving the man walk from L1 to L9 will be something that takes time - the whole 
of the man's walking cannot be encompassed by a single act of awareness. 
SP1 1bp s.Pz I I I ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~. ~ ~I 
Lt II l3 4 l5 l6 l7 La 19 
However, an interesting thing to note at this point is that the overlap theorist looks to 
be committed to the claim that the man's walking from L4 to L5 will be speciously 
present throughout the whole time that I am aware of the man walking from L1 to 
L9. One way of putting this is to say that, the longer I am aware of the man walking 
for, the shorter the stretch of process I will be aware of as a whole over that period. 
Broad is merely observing that if Time-Windows overlap, then parts of what is 
represented in those Time-W~.ndows will remain phenomenally present for the 
duration of certain temporally extended experiences. Given that Dainton is an 
overlap theorist himself (albeit an overlap theqrist who rejects the Thin-PSA), it is 
hard to see what he could find undesirable about this picture. 
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Dainton's objection here looks to be founded on the notion that when Broad suggests 
that the "assumption [that there are momentary acts] must now be dropped ... "113, he 
is committed to the denial of the Thin-PSA ('There are instants at which experience 
represents intervals') as well. If Broad is so committed, then Dainton's objection 
looks to be correct - that is, it looks as though that the longer that an act of awareness 
goes on for, the shorter the content represented by that act will be. However, it is not 
clear that this is the correct interpretation of Broad. 
When Broad drops the assumption that there are momentary acts, I suggest that he is 
best thought of as remaining committed to the notion that there are instants at which 
experience represents intervals, and that a temporally extended act of awareness 
consists of a series of interval-representing instants. It seems to me that the earlier 
quoted passage ... 
If we imagine a continuous series of momentary acts between 01 and 02 we can 
regard them as momentary sections of an act or process of finite duration.114 
... provides good evidence for this interpretation. At any instant of an act of 
awareness with temporal extension, Broad claims, I will be aware of something with 
the duration of a Time-Window. Over the course of a temporally extended act of 
113 Broad, Scientific Thought, 348. 
114 Ibid., 350. 
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awareness, my experience represents happenings with the same duration at every 
instant, but the particular stretch of happening that remains sensorially present 
throughout the course of that act will decrease the longer the act goes on. 
The second objection Dainton raises to Broad's theory is taken from Mabbott, and 
runs as follows: 
If my dentist hurts me, he has always stopped hurting me before I begin to feel the 
hurt. And this has nothing to do with the time taKen by nerve transmission; it is a 
direct corollary of the specious present theory.ll5 
Dainton's mentioning this criticism in connection with Broad's early account (the 
account in Scientific Thought) is a slight curiosity, as it looks as though Mabbott 
himself aims this criticism at Broad's late account (the account in An Examination of 
McTaggart's Philosophy).116 What Broad actually says in McTaggart is the following: 
There is one important consequence of this theory which I want to make quite 
explicit because many people would regard it as highly paradoxical. It is this. The 
period during which any phase, short enough to be prehended as a temporal whole, 
115 J. D. Mabbott, "I.-OUi' Direct Experience of Time," Mind 60, no. 238 (1951): 159. 
116 In the sentence before the one quoted above, Mabbott quotes from An Examination of McTaggart's 
Philosophy. 
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is so prehended never coincides with the period occupied by this phase. The periods 
do not even overlap. Their relation is that of adjunction. ll7 
Mabbott clearly agrees with Broad that many people would regard this part of the 
theory as highly paradoxical. However, the way Mabbott phrases the objection is 
importantly different to the way Broad phrases the purported worry. Broad is 
pointing out that, in order for a whole event to be experienced, the whole event must 
have occurred - and then observing that some people may find this paradoxical. 
Mabbott, on the other hand, doesn't appear to make the distinction between 
experience of event X as a whole, and an experience of event X. Mabbott thus takes 
Broad to be committed to the view that in order for a subject to experience anything 
temporally extended at all, the whole temporally extended event must have 
occurred. 
Broad doesn't commit to this, either in his early or his late account, and so Mabbott's 
objection doesn't present a problem for him. Broad would respond to this objection 
by saying' of course I can feel the hurt before the dentist stops hurting me - I just 
can't feel the whole hurt until it has stopped hurting me'. 
117 Broad, Examination of McTaggart's philosophy, 287. 
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So, it is not clear that these two objections pose any real problem for Broad's early 
account. The final objection that I shall discuss, however, does look to be problematic 
- the 'repeated contents' objection. Recall the earlier quote from Broad: 
If we imagine a continuous series of momentary acts between 01 and 02 we can 
regard them as momentary sections of an act or process of finite duration.118 
If we think of temporally extended acts of awareness as being constituted by a series 
of momentary acts. with overlappIng contents, tl'l.en it appears that different 
momentary sections of the temporally extended act will represent the same thing. 
The same click that is heard in one Time-Window will also be heard in a later Time-
Window. Dainton responds to this consequence of Broad's theory as follows: 
This is a disastrous result, since by hypothesis there is only a single click that is 
experienced by the subject... Broad's account has the consequence that we cannot 
hear a single sound just once!119 
One important question at this point is whether or not this consequence is really as 
problematic as Dainton seems to suggest - and where the weight of this objection 
comes from. Is the objection that the I double-hearing' of the sound ought to show up 
118 Broad, Scientific Thought, 350. 
119 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 141. 
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in the phenomenology and doesn't, or is the objection just pointing to the inelegance 
of the theory? 
I shall discuss the 'repeated contents' objection in more detail in conjunction with 
Broad's late account, proposed in An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy. As part 
of this discussion, I shall argue that the primary point of departure between Broad's 
early and late accounts lies in his attempt to respond to the memory theorist's 
worries about how temporally extended things can be experienced 'as present', by 
introd ucing the notion of 'presentedness' . 
§3: Late Broad 
On Broad's early account, the contents of what he calls 'the Specious Present' are 
both sensorially and temporally present. In his late account, we see Broad develop 
his account of temporal presence in more detail, in response to some of the concerns 
driving the Memory Theorist's objections to Specious Present Theory. 
One concern the Memory Theorist raises is that, if something is experienced as 
present at an instant, then the item represented as present cannot be temporally 
extended. Broad phrases this concern in terms of the present, unlike the future and 
the past, not admitting of degrees: 
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Now the two following propositions are commonly taken to be self-evident. (i) 
Neither persistence nor qualitative change can be ascribed to a subject which is 
literally instantaneous. Both involve duration. (ii) Anything which a person 
prehends at any moment must be present. If we combine these two propositions with 
the fact that presentness, in the strict sense in which it is on a level with a perfectly 
determinate degree of pastness or futurity can belong only to what is instantaneous, 
difficulties at once arise. If anything which a person prehends at any moment must 
be present, it must be instantaneous. If it is instantaneous, it can neither persist 
without qualitative change nor suffer qualitative change. Yet prehended objects are 
prehended as persisting unchanged or as changing.12o 
Broad's answer to this problem is to claim that, at an instant, I am aware of 
something temporally extended. His first move is to attempt to give a satisfactory 
account of what it is that we are talking about when we talk about the 'specious 
present'. He suggests that the way the specious present is often talked about ... 
.. . Seems to be a verbal trick for evading these difficulties. It is asserted that what is 
prehended at any moment must have 'presentness', in some sense which does not 
entail instantaneousness and exclude duration, as presentness in the proper sense 
does.121 
Broad's response to this worry is'to attempt to provide an alternative account of how 
it is that the doctrine of the specious present might help to solve the 
120 Broad, Examination of McTaggart's philosophy, 282. 
121 Ibid. 
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phenomenological problem of temporal experience. Broad's strategy for doing this 
proceeds as follows: 
I propose to begin by substituting for the phrase 'specious presentness' the word 
'presentedness'. This is meant to denote a psychological characteristic, which is 
capable of various degrees from zero up to a maximum. Next, I propose to reject the 
proposition that anything which a person prehends at any moment must then be 
present ... I shall assume that what a person prehends at any moment is of finite 
duration, and therefore that only a single instantaneous cross-section of this total 
object can be present at that mOIl1ent. I think that ,this is what the supporters of the 
Specious Present theory do in fact mean, though they do not say it very distinctly.I22 
Part of Broad's thought here is that a solution to the phenomenological problem of 
temporal experience involving appeal to the Specious Present can't just be the claim 
that 'the present, as it features in experience, is not an instant'. If there is a different 
sense of 'present' at work in 'the doctrine of the Specious Present, then some positive 
account of this sense of 'presentness' is required: otherwise the position will face the 
following dilemma. Either a) the solution is a mere 'verbal trick', or b) the present is 
an instant, and so temporally extended happenings just cannot be perceived as 
present. 
Broad has the following to say about the relationship between strict presentness and 
the property of 'presentedness': 
122 Ibid., 282-3. 
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I take it that our prehension of the contents of each Specious Present as having 
presentedness is the experiential basis of our notion of presentness in the strict sense)23 
Here, then, it looks as though Broad claims that the strict present features in 
experience only insofar as there is some instant that possesses maximal presentedness. I 
am assuming here that Broad's idea of something being the 'sensible basis' for 
something else involves those two somethings not simply being identical. It isn't the 
case, then, that something's possession of the maximu?, degree of presentness just is 
its being perceived as strictly present. 
However, the worry now is that it isn't clear what 'presentedness' is supposed to be. 
Dainton has attempted to develop this line of thought into an objection to Broad's 
account. Before discussing this objection, I shall discuss a little more precisely how it 
is that 'presentedness' figures in Broad's account. Broad makes the following claims: 
Consider any process of finite duration which a person P prehends at any moment, 
e.g., a whistling noise. Imagine this to be divided up into shorter and shorter 
adjoined successive phases, so that in the end it is regarded as a compact series of 
successive event-particles. Let us make the following assumptions: (i) That a certain 
one of these instantaneous tross-sections is present, in the strict sense. (ii) That this 
has the maximum degree of presentedness. (iii) That the degree of presentedness 
possessed by cross-sections which are earlier than this one tails off to zero at the 
123 Ibid., 288. 
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cross-section which forms the boundary between what P is just ceasing to sense and 
just beginning to retrospect.124 
The first claim Broad makes looks like it isn't a phenomenological claim - rather, he 
is claiming that one of the cross-sections of what is perceived at a moment will, in 
fact, be present. Broad's second claim we should interpret as the claim that the cross 
section that is, as a matter of fact, present possesses the maximum degree of 
presentedness. The third claim is that whatever it is that I sense at a moment will 
possess some degree of presented ness - and the earlier the cross section, the lesser 
the degree of presentedness. 
This is Broad's account of experience of temporally extended happenings with the 
duration of the specious present - he also provides an account of temporally 
extended happenings with duration greater than that of the specious present. This 
part of Broad's account is represented by the diagram below: 
lJ 
124 Broad, Scientific Thought, 283. 
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Explaining the diagram, Broad says: 
On our assumptions, any Specious Present can be represented by a right-angled 
triangle such as A1B1Cl, with its base A1Bl on the line AB. Here the position of Al 
on AB represents the date of the earlier boundary of this Specious Present, and the 
position of Bl represents the date of its later boundary ... The perpendicular B1Cl 
represents the maximum degree of presentedness. The perpendicular to A1Bl from 
any point in AB, such as A2, which is intermediate between Al and Bl, will cut the 
line A1Clat a certain point which we will label a2l. The length A2a21, thus 
intercepted, will represent the degree of presentedness of an instantaneous cross-
section of the content of the Specious Present A1B1Clat the date represented by A2.125 
So far, Broad has just explained the way that the diagram succeeds in representing 
his account. However, he then goes on to say the following: 
Since there is continuity in our experience in respect of degree of presentedness, there 
can be no question of any Specious Present having an immediate successor, as, e.g. the 
integer "has for its immediate successor the integer 3, The series of successive 
Specious Presents must be compact, like the series of rational fractions; i.e. between 
any two Specious Presents, such as A1B1Cland A3B3C3, there will always be an 
intermediate one, such as A2B2C2. Naturally this fact cannot be represented in the 
diagram. We must therefore remember that, between any two Specious Presents 
125 Broad, Examination of McTaggart's philosophy, 285. 
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represented in the diagram, there will always be an infinite number of others not 
represented. Now the contents of any two Specious Presents which are near enough 
to each other in time will partially, but only partially overlap.126 
At this point, some of the issues raised in the previous two chapters become 
important. Broad is looking here to account for the 'continuity' of consciousness by 
suggesting that Specious Presents overlap one another. Recall that the sense in which 
, consciousness is continuous' is in the sense of 'extreme continuity', rather than 
'strict continuity'. In chapter two I suggested that 'extreme continuity' consisted of 
two claims: a) any object of experienc~ is experienced 'as following on from what 'was 
experienced immediately before .it, and b) the boundaries of Time-Windows are not 
manifest in the phenomenology of experience in any way. 
Here, Broad is proposing that we account for this' extreme continuity' by positing a 
strictly continuous series of overlapping Time-Windows. By making this suggestion, 
Broad is able to account for the way that any object of experience is experienced as 
following on from what came before it. Unfortunately for Broad, it is this suggestion 
that gives rise to various problems with his account - the 'problem of repeated 
contents' and 'the problem of lingering contents' - problems that I shall discuss in 
the next section. 
126 Ibid. 
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§3: Early versus Late Broad 
Over the course of presenting Broad's late account, a worry about what 
'presentedness' is appears to have arisen. Given that Broad's commitment to 
'presentedness' looks to be the main point of departure from his early account, we 
might question the extent to which Broad's late account can really be seen as an 
improvement upon that early account. Broad's early and late views differ in how 
they capture the phenomenology of temporal experience - with late Broad 
attempting to provide a more convincing response to the memory theorist's 
objection. My approach to the distinction between the views is thus slightly different 
to that of Dainton, who claims: 
There are two main differences [between early and late Broad]. Broad no longer 
believes momentary acts are mere fictions; he now takes the view that an extended 
stream of consciousness consists of a compact series of momentary acts. Then there is 
the property of presentedness which all contents are alleged to possess to a greater or 
lesser degree.127 
Having argued that Broad's early account takes momentary acts to be 'mere fictions' 
in a sense that doesn't conflict with him also claiming that 'there are instants at 
which we experience intervals', J am not sure that this is the best way to draw the 
distinction between late and early Broad. 
127 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 145. 
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The claim Dainton attributes to the late Broad - 'an extended stream of consciousness 
consists of a compact series of momentary acts' - doesn't look all that different from 
the claim made by the early Broad that "If we imagine a continuous series of 
momentary acts between 01 and 02 we can regard them as momentary sections of 
an act or process of finite duration."128 As mentioned above, however, I am in 
agreement with Dainton that 'presentedness' marks an important distinction 
between Broad's early and late accounts. 
Taking up a worry raised earlier, we can ask, 'does the introduction of 
'presentedness' provide a genuine improvement in Broad's early account? Dainton 
has provided the following objection to Broad's talk of 'presentedness': 
Since Broad doesn't elaborate on what presentedness is, we must consider the 
various possibilities. One option is simply to equate presentedness with ... 'force and 
vivacity' ... The difficulty here is that contents of the same type but of different 
intensity are often experienced together, simultaneously... If differences in 
presentedness consisted in differences in 'force and vivacity', we would often be 
mistaken - or at least seriously confused - as to the temporal order of perceived 
happenings. But we are not.129 
128 Broad, Scientific Thought, 349-50. 
129 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 149-50. 
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Of course, this objection isn't going to trouble Broad, as nowhere does he equate 
'presentedness' with 'force and vivacity', nor give any hint that this is what he has in 
mind,130 Dainton acknowledges this, and discusses an alternative proposal: 
We seem obliged to conclude that presentedness is a sui generis phenomenal 
property ... But this proposal also seems flawed ... when we hear a sound while seeing 
a colour, we are aware of the auditory and visual characteristics of these contents, but 
we are not aware of any additional phenomenal characteristic that is common to 
both. So the problem is that there just does not seem to be any such property. In 
response, it could be argued that there must be sucn a property, or else we would not 
be aware of contents fading into the past. Against this it could be responded that this 
'fading into the past' is a postulate of Broad's theory rather than anything we find in 
experience itself.131 
Now, I am not sure that Broad would want to claim that the property of 
'presentedness' is needed to explain how it is that we get to be aware of contents 
fading into the past - especially given his commitment to a view on which events 
experienced in the specious present are experienced as present. Rather, Broad would 
claim that the property of 'presentedness' is needed to explain how it is that we get 
to be aware of the earlier parts of temporally extended happenings as present. 
130 This hasn't stopped other philosophers from suggesting that 'presentedness' could be thought of as 
'force and vivacity' - e.g. Mabbott, "I.-Our Direct Experience of Time," 162. and Le Poidevin, The Images 
of Time, 91. 
131 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 149-50. 
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If this is the right interpretation of Broad, it makes Dainton's next move ('a postulate 
of the theory rather than anything we find in experience') unconvincing - after all, 
the postulate of Broad's theory, on my interpretation, is the following: we experience 
temporally extended happenings as present. This looks, unless one buys the 'memory 
theorist' arguments about the present, like a perfectly acceptable postulate of Broad's 
theory. 
Perhaps there are other problems facing the notion of 'presentedness'. Dainton has 
suggested the following: on Broad's late account, the tone Mi will have different 
characteristics when it occurs in different specious presents: specifically, it will 
possess different amounts of the 'psychological characteristic' of presentedness. 
However, Dainton observes: 
In supposing that when we apprehend Mi as possessing different degrees of 
presentedness we are apprehending one and the same tone-content, we are 
supposing that this content possesses different and incompatible intrinsic properties 
at the same time. This is impossible.132 
We can think of Dainton's objection in the following way: what I am aware of, on 
Broad's late account, can't both be genuinely temporally extended, and possess 
different degrees of presentedn~ss. Consider the diagram below. In the first specious 
present (SP1), Mi possesses a greater average degree of presentedness (represented 
132 Ibid., 147. 
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by the dark shade of grey) that it does in the later specious present (SP2) - the lesser 
average degree of presentedness is represented by the lighter shade of grey. 
If what I am aware of in both specious presents is the same temporally extended Mi, 
then it looks as though Broad's account requires that the same temporally extended 
happening possess different average degrees of presentedness at the same time. This 
is problematic given that degree of presentedness is supposed to vary depending 
upon the temporal position in the specious present that an event occupies - if Mi 
possesses two different degrees of presentedness at the same time, then presumably 
it will occur in both specious presents as possessing these two degrees of 
presentedness. This, Dainton thinks, cannot be right. 
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If Dainton's objection holds, then it doesn't look as though Broad can claim that the 
objects of experience can both be genuinely temporally extended, and possess 
different degrees of presentedness. Of course, Broad could make his account work by 
dropping the claim that the objects of experience are genuinely temporally extended 
abandoning his sense-datum theory in favour of an intentionalist account. This is 
what Dainton suggests that Broad should do. On this alternative view, at any 
moment, I am in a state that represents temporally extended happenings. Each instant 
of the temporally extended happening is represented as possessing a different degree 
of 'presentedness'. 
Dainton suggests that the only way for Broad to avoid this objection is if his account 
drops the 'sense-data' approach, and plumps instead for the 'intentionalist' approach 
(like that of Michael Tye, which I discuss later). Dainton claims: 
This does not mean his theory is false, it just means it is not the kind of theory one 
might initially take it to be.133 
In fact, when we look more closely at Dainton's objection, we will note that it is the 
objection that is not what one might initially take it to be. That is, we can note that 
Dainton's objection only holds given certain assumptions about the metaphysics of 
time: namely, that an A-theorist account on which we are to think of time being 'two-
133 Ibid. 
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dimensional' is to be rejected. In his book, Time and Space, Dainton discusses the two-
dimensionalist model: 
Our problem is that, while one and the same object can have incompatible intrinsic 
properties by having them at different times, it seems incoherent to suppose that a 
single time (or events at that time) can have incompatible intrinsic properties at that 
very time. Posing the problem in this way suggests a solution: why not say that a 
single time can possess incompatible properties in just the same way as an enduring 
object; that is, by possessing them at different times? For this to be the case there must 
exist an additional dimension- of time, meta-time, which is such that ordinary 
moments of time endure along this extra dimension.134 
This approach is precisely what Broad has in mind when developing his account. In 
The Philosophy o/CD. Broad he suggests that: 
[The account] becomes considerably clearer when stated in terms of 2-dimensional 
time.135 
Broad thus looks to resolve issues about the same event-particle, at a time, 
possessing incompatible degrees of presentedness by appealing to the two-
dimensional theory of time. Ndw, we might have reason to reject this account of the 
metaphysics of time as unsatisfactory (though I shall not go into these issues here), 
134 B. Dainton, Time and space (McGill Queens University Press, 2001), 21. 
135 Broad, The philosophy of CD Broad, 772-3. 
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but in committing to this, Broad provides at least a satisfactory first response to 
Dainton's objection. 
This 'two-dimensional' part of Broad's account isn't stated in An Examination of 
McTaggart's Philosophy, which may explain Dainton's 'intentionalist' reading. 
However, bearing the 'The Philosophy of CD. Broad' remarks in mind, it looks as 
though Broad is certainly best interpreted as a sense-data specious present theorist -
it is the kind of account it initially appears to beP36 
We can now return to the problem of repeated contents mentioned earlier in 
conjunction with Broad's earlier account. The problem of repeated contents is a 
consequence of the attempt to render a 'triangular' account as close to 'rectangular' 
as it can get. Recall that a 'triangular' account is an account that advocates the kind of 
model represented in the diagram below: 
136 Even though we might not find Dainton's objections persuasive, one reason that Broad's introduction 
of 'presentedness' might strike us as unsatisfactory is that it looks like a label for the problem: having 
rejected Memory Theory, and claimed that other Specious Present Theories are mere 'verbal tricks', 
Broad is forced to provide some positive account of how something temporally extended can be 
perceived as present. The worry about the sui generis feature 'presentedness' is thus that it is a mere 
label for the problem that Memory and Specious Present Theories are grappling with. 
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Apparent tcmporallocation of the object/s of experience 
This feature of the problem will become apparent in what follows. Dainton suggests 
that Broad's introduction of 'presentedness' enables him to respond to the problem 
of repeated contents: 
Now recall the problem of repeated contents: successive acts apprehending numerically 
the same content, with the result that every content is experienced many times over. 
This problem is also solved, for according to the current theory, although a particular 
content such as Mi is apprehended by a succession of distinct acts, each act 
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apprehends Mi as possessing a different, and gradually diminishing, degree of 
presentedness.137 
Why, we might wonder, does each act apprehending Mi as possessing a different 
degree of presentedness solve the problem of repeated contents? After all, we are still 
apprehending the note Mi repeatedly. Dainton appears to take it that the problem 
concerns our repeatedly apprehending, not the same object in the world, but the 
same 'phenomenal object'. 
It is true that the majority138 of formulations of the problem of repeated contents 
phrase the problem in terms of awareness of 'presentations', 'phenomenal items', or 
'experiences', but this may owe more to their being formulated by philosophers who 
adhere to views on which we are directly aware of experiential, as opposed to 
physical, items. Foster and Sprigge both phrase the problem of repeated contents in 
this way: 
If the temporal patterns of successive total presentations overlap, we seem forced to 
say that their common component is twice presented, first as the object of one 
presentation, and then as the object of another ... Granted that phenomena are 
universals, this consequerlce is logically unobjectionable, but the fact is that it is not 
true to the character of my experience. Although I directly see the ball successively 
137 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 146. 
138 Dainton's, Foster's, and Sprigge's. 
Page 191 
occupy adjacent positions, so long as the ball keeps moving I only once see it at any 
given position.139 
Consider a stretch of experience which is more than instantaneous but shorter than 
the specious present. It seems that it must be experienced an infinity of times ... as the 
consciousness-water flows on, it will be experienced within an infinite series of different 
positions within the specious present until at last some of it has passed out of it ... What is 
objectionable here is not primarily the idea that each experience falling within the 
specious present is repeated an infinite number of times, but that there is any such 
repetition at all It would remain discordant with introspection ... to say that I have 
.. 
every experience falling within a specious present several times ... even if one 
somehow managed only to allow a finite number of these.140 
Mabbott, however, doesn't seem to commit to the problem of repeated contents 
being a problem about the same phenomenal items being experienced numerous 
times: 
Every brief sound I hear I shall hear not once but repeatedly. Nothing in my direct 
experience confirms this repetition. If it occurred it would obviously make listening 
to music or to continuous sentences a matter of the greatest complexity and 
difficulty.141 
139 Foster, The case for idealism, 176. 
140 T. L.S Sprigge, James and Bradley: American truth and British reality (Open Court, 1993), 203-4. 
141 MabboU, "I.-Our Direct Experience of Time," 161. 
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The problem of repeated contents must be faced by any view that proposes that 
specious presents overlap. How is the problem supposed to work? The initial 
problem, I take it, is to something like the following: On a particular occasion it can 
seem to me that I experience a clicking sound once; however, Broad's theories both 
suggest that I experience that clicking sound more than once - how can this be 
reconciled with the initial seeming? 
In response to this worry, I presume that Broad will draw attention to the fact that he 
has I abandoned the fiction' of there really existing a series of individual momentary 
acts that represent intervals. Rather than there being a series of experiences of the 
same thing, then, he will rather want to say that we remain in experiential contact 
with the event. While we remain in contact with the item, its temporal position 
relative to the subject will appear to change - it will appear to possess less and less 
'presentedness' . 
This strategy for responding to the 'repeated contents' objection can be found in 
Tye's account of temporal experience - which I shall discuss in the next chapter. 
Unfortunately, for both Tye and Broad, this response to the objection merely defers 
the problem - as is shown by a related objection: the lingering contents objection. 
On Broad's early account, it lo~k as though he is committed to the idea that we can 
perceive certain events for periods of time longer than the periods of time those 
events occupy. In the case of an event of short duration, X, I am still aware, via 
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perception, of that event for a period of time considerably longer than the event 
itself, as the diagram below shows. 
This kind of consideration provides us with a worry in the same mould as the 
'repeated contents' problem - namely the clash between the way the experience 
seems to the subject (it seems as if we are aware of X for as long as X goes on for) and 
what the theory says about the situation (the subject is aware of X for longer than X 
goes on for). Dainton has called this problem the 'lingering contents' problem,142 
142 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 156. 
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This problem, like the 'repeated contents' objection, is a consequence of Broad's 
attempt to account for extreme continuity while simultaneously advocating Thin-
PSA. The attempt to do this results in the contents of different Specious Presents 
overlapping - and it is concern about this overlap that motivates both objections. 
It initially looks as though the introduction of 'presentedness' as a property that 
admits of degree could possibly be used to provide a response to the 'lingering 
contents' problem. This is what Dainton has in mind when he talks of Broad giving 
an account on which events are experienced as 'fading into the past': 
It is natural to describe Mi in successive specious presents as one and the same tone 
sinking into the past, for it will seem to us as though we are apprehending 
numerically the same to from a succession of slightly different temporal perspectives 
- or at least this is what Broad's theory posits to be the case.143 
As mentioned earlier, it isn't clear that Broad would want to say that we experience 
things as 'fading into the past' - 'presentedness' is introduced to explain how it is 
that we get to experience things as present. However, remarks such as the following 
from Broad ... 
The ... sound as a whole continues to be presented, but with steadily diminishing 
degree of presentedness. [At one point] ... the ... sound is just on the point of ceasing 
143 Ibid., 147. 
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to be presented and being at most remembered. [Later] ... nothing is any longer 
presented of the sound ... except the ghost of the [last part of the sound] in the act of 
vanishing.144 
... make the kind of interpretation suggested by Dainton tempting. My diagnosis of 
what Broad is up to in making this kind of remark is that he is being pulled in two 
different directions: there is a tension between two different data to be accounted for 
in his account. On the one hand, Broad is attempting to account for the Sensorial 
Presence of temporally extended happenings in perception. On the other, when faced 
with concerns about overlap, he retreats to the claim that he is attempting to account 
for the Memorial Presence of temporally extended happenings. 
The worry that the 'lingering contents' objection raises for Broad's account (and will 
also raise for Husserl and Tye's accounts) is that his account begins to look as though 
it is an attempt to account for Sensorial Time-Windows and Memorial Time-
Windows simultaneously. The problem with this is that only the first of these 
features is perceptual. That is, the reason that the 'lingering contents' problem is a 
problem for Broad is that it doesn't seem to us that our perceptual experience of event 
X goes for longer than event X itself. 
It looks as though it is certainly true that, normally, I will remain aware of event X 
for a period of time longer than that taken up by event X. However, as discussed in 
chapter three, it doesn't look right to say that this awareness is perceptual. When 
144 Broad, The philosophy oj CD Broad, 773. 
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Dainton suggests that we can think of Broad as responding to this problem by giving 
an account of our awareness of events as 'fading into the past', then, we can interpret 
Dainton as suggesting that Broad's account might be better thought of as capturing 
the kind of non-perceptual awareness of events picked out by the Memorial Time-
Windows claim. 
I take it that the clash between the phenomenology of our perception of temporally 
extended happenings and Broad's account of this phenomenology (a clash brought 
out by the 'lingering contents' objection) gives us reason to reject the account, at least 
as an attempt to explain Sensorial Time-Windows. Might Broad's account prove 
successful in accounting for Memorial Time-Windows? Things don't look promising 
- the feature to be accounted for is that of our being aware of events as just past - on 
Broad's account, however, any event-particle that possesses any amount of 
'presentedness' is experienced 'as present'. 
§5.Conclusion: 
It looks as though Broad doesn't provide us with an adequate account of our 
perception of temporally extended happenings. I have suggested that we ought to 
draw a distinction between two phenomena, one of which is perceptual (experience 
of temporally extended happenings), and one of which is not (keeping track of 
recently experienced temporally extended happenings via a faculty distinct from 
perception). 
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I have suggested that Broad's account fails as an account of the first of these 
phenomena, and doesn't look promising as an account of the second. One reason for 
thinking that the second of these is not perceptual is because of its possession of a 
feature that clashes with the phenomenology of our perception of temporally 
extended happenings - our perception of something doesn't seem to last for longer 
than the something perceived. 
The problems facing Broad can be expressed in the form of a dilemma: either a) he 
claims that Specious Presents overlap, in which case he faces the 'lingering contents' 
objection, or b) he denies that Specious Presents overlap, in which case he fails to 
account for 'extreme continuity'. This dilemma, I suggest, is one that we ought to 
attempt to pose for any account that commits to the Thin-PSA. In the next chapter, I 
shall do precisely this. I shall discuss the views of Husser!, Tye, and Le Poidevin, and 
see if they are able to successfully avoid 'Broad's dilemma'. 
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Chapter Five: Thin-PSA Accounts Part Two: Le Poidevin, Husserl, and Tye 
§1. Introduction 
In this chapter I provide discussion of three other accounts of temporal experience 
that commit to the Thin-PSA: the accounts of Le Poidevin, Husserl, and Tye. I discuss 
in more detail the exact nature of Le Poidevin's account - an account that makes 
revisionary claims about the phenomenology, and claim that the account's 
revisionism renders it an inadequate account of the phenomenology of temporal 
experience. 
In my discussions of Husserl and Tye, I argue that the problems facing their accounts 
are the same as those facing Broad in the previous chapter - namely the problem of 
'lingering contents', and the accusation that their accounts look more like accounts of 
the Memorial Time-Windows claim than accounts of Sensorial Time-Windows. 
In the case of Husserl, I suggest that, despite this problem, we ought to retain his 
account precisely as an account of Memorial Time-Windows, but that we need to 
account for Sensorial Time-Windows without commitment to the Thin-PSA. In the 
case of Tye, I suggest that hiS', account doesn't look as though it can be used in this 
way, and that it should be rejected. 
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§2. Le Poidevin 
I have already provided, in chapter three, a very brief discussion of Le Poidevin's 
account. Le Poidevin is a Memory Theorist, who claims that only a 'snapshot' is 
every temporally present to the subject. Unlike another Memory Theorist, Husserl, 
who - as we saw - on one interpretation, thinks that more than a mere snapshot can 
be sensorially present, Le Poidevin claims that all that can be sensorially present to the 
subject at a time is a snapshot. 
Le Poidevin sets up the problem of temporal experience in the form of what he calls 
a 'phenomenological paradox' constituted by three pieces of phenomenological data. 
The first datum is the claim that we experience things as present: 
What we experience, we experience as present. If we have a single experience of two 
items as being present, then, surely, we experience them as simultaneous.145 
The first sentence in the above draws attention to the feature of experience that I 
have described as 'Temporal Presence'. The second sentence is the claim that if two 
items are temporally present in the same experience, then they will be experienced as 
simultaneous. This conception,of what can be admitted as 'Temporally Present' is 
what marks Le Poidevin out as a Memory Theorist. 
145 Le Poidevin, The Images afTime, 87. 
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The second datum Le Poidevin draws to our attention is that we can perceive 
motion, where we are to think of motion as involving something occupying 
successive positions: 
There is nothing inferential, it seems, about the perception of ... motion: it is simply 
given in experience .. .in motion perception ... we See an object occupying successive 
positions.146 
Note that, at this point, the datum to be accounted for is that we see an object 
occupying successive positions - this will become important in what follows, as Le 
Poidevin will attempt to isolate two purportedly distinct features of such an 
experience. He will attempt to isolate an experience of 'pure motion' from experience 
of an item occupying successive positions. 
The third and final datum he notes is that we must perceive the successive positions 
occupied by an object in motion as non-simultaneous, otherwise we will fail to 
perceive motion - we will just see a blur: 
We must see these [successive positions] as non-simultaneous, for otherwise we 
would just see a blur.147 
146 Ibid., 88. 
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Le Poidevin now notes that we cannot accept both the first and the second data at 
face value. If motion is to be thought of as involving an object non-simultaneously 
occupying a series of different positions, then we cannot perceive those different 
positions as present - for, by the first datum, to perceive those items as present, is to 
perceive them as simultaneous. 
How should we respond to this paradox? Le Poidevin suggests two ways to respond 
- neither of which" seems at all comfortable"148. ThE;, first is to drop the first claim -
that what we perceptually experience, we experience as present. The second is to drop 
the second claim - that in motion perception, we see an object occupying successive 
positions. Despite its lack of comfort, the second option is what Le Poidevin plumps 
for: 
147J:bid. 
148 Ibid. 
What we have here are two neural mechanisms in play. One system registers what 
we might call 'pure' motion, i.e. gives rise to the impression of motion without any 
associated sense of change of relative position. It is this system that is responsible for 
the sense of perceiving motion as happening now. Another system, the one that 
employs short-term memory, takes a series of snapshots of an object's relative 
position and compares them. That system gives rise to the sense of change of relative 
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position, but it cannot unproblematically be said to give rise to the sense of change of 
relative position happening now.149 
Le Poidevin's proposal, it appears, is to divide his second datum into two parts, and 
account for each part independently. The second datum was that: 
There is nothing inferential, it seems, about the perception of... motion: it is simply 
given in experience .. .in motion perception ... we see an object occupying successive 
positions,150 
The two purportedly separable parts of this datum are a) the 'pure' experience of 
motion, and b) the experience of an object occupying successive positions over time. 
Ordinarily, when we reflect upon experience, it doesn't seem as if an object's moving 
is something that can be separated from an object's occupying different positions 
over a temporal interval. 
However, Le Poidevin's suggestion is that such an experience involves two 
components: the experience of 'pure motion', and the subject's grasp of the different 
positions occupied by the object. Of these two components, only 'pure motion' can 
be experienced as present. 
149 Ibid., 89. 
150 Ibid., 88. 
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Why should we agree with Le Poidevin that the experience of an object moving 
through space is separable into these two components? How is this separation 
justifiable on the basis of the phenomenology? In support of his position, Le 
Poidevin turns to the treatment of certain illusions - he cites the 'waterfall' illusion, a 
case in which these two components - 'change of position' and 'pure motion' - come 
apart: 
If, while keeping one's eyes as still as possible, one looks for a long time a continuous 
movement in a particular direction - as when, for instance, we watch a waterfall, or 
railway tracks flying past when we are looking o~t of the carriage - and then turns 
one's gaze to a stationary object, it will seem for a while to move in the opposite 
direction.151 
Le Poidevin suggests that we ought to agree with Richard Gregory's characterisation 
of what is going on in these scenarios: 
151 Ibid. 
Gregory's suggestion is that two neural mechanisms are involved here, one for 
detecting motion, and the other for detecting change of position... One system 
registers what we might call 'pure' motion, i.e. gives rise to the impression of motion 
without any associated sense of change of relative position ... Another system, the one 
that employs short-term memory, takes a series of snapshots of an object's relative 
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position and compares them. That system gives rise to the sense of change of relative 
position.lS2 
There are two obvious stages at which we could object to Le Poidevin's suggestion. 
Firstly, we could object to the claim that the phenomenology of the experience is best 
characterised by the involvement of 'pure motion' as well as 'change of position'. We 
might want to stress that the reason that the waterfall illusion is paradoxical is 
precisely because the object appears to be changing position without changing 
position, not that it appears to be moving (in the sense of 'pure motion') without 
changing position. 
The second objection we might want to make is that establishing that distinct neural 
mechanisms are sensitive to different features of the environment ('motion' and 
'change of position' respectively) doesn't straightforwardly tell us anything about 
the content of an experience that involves those mechanisms. Prima jacie, it is just as 
plausible that both mechanisms could generate experience of a change of position, as 
it is that one could generate experience of' pure motion'. 
We thus have two reasons to be concerned about Le Poi devin's suggestion that we 
can divide his second datum in two: we have a concern about whether his suggestion 
best captures the phenomenology, and a concern about whether the involvement of 
distinct neural mechanisms makes his proposal any more convincing than it would 
be without the appeal to their involvement. 
152 Ibid., 89. 
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In fact, Le Poidevin acknowledges that his account is II speculative" - presumably for 
these kinds of reason.153 However, worries about the speculative nature of the 
account can be put to one side if it can be shown that the distinction between 'pure 
motion' and 'change of position' solves the problem of temporal experience, at least 
in the case of motion. 
The proposal, as we noted in conjunction with the first datum Le Poidevin put 
forward, is a proposal about experience at a time ... It can thus be assessed as an 
attempt to solve the problem of temporal experience set out in chapter one: 'how are 
we to characterise a subject's experience at a time?' Consider a subject experiencing 
something moving at t. Le Poidevin's proposal for how we ought to attempt this 
characterisation is that, at t, the subject is sensorially aware of a snapshot, retains 
awareness of the past positions of an object in short term memory, and is aware of 
the sensation of 'pure motion'. 
As discussed in chapter three, the problem with Le Poi devin' s account is that we 
cannot discern 'snapshots' in temporal experience. Neither, we can also note, can we 
straightforwardly discern the sensation of 'pure motion' Le Poidevin appeals to (as 
suggested above, in the 'waterfall' cases, it isn't clear that 'pure motion' is genuinely 
involved). 
153 Ibid., 90. 
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These worries about Le Poidevin's account of the phenomenology suffice to give us 
reason to reject Le Poi devin' s account, especially if it can be shown that an account 
can be provided that gives a more satisfactory account of the phenomenology, while 
simultaneously explaining away the intuitions motivating Le Poidevin's proposal. I 
shall attempt to provide just such an account in chapter seven. 
Now I want to briefly discuss the generalized version of Le Poidevin's account, as he 
doesn't just want to account for the experience of motion - he also wants to account 
for the experience of change more generally: 
[the account of motion perception] ... needs to be generalizable if it is to resolve the 
paradox. For we are also aware, in an apparently non-inferential way, of change in 
pitch when we are listening to a piece of music, or of the passage of thoughts when 
we are doing nothing more than daydreaming. Are there two mechanisms 
underlying change detection in these cases toO?l54 
The question Le Poidevin is interested in here is whether or not a similar response to 
that given in the case of motion can solve the problem of change perception more 
generally. Recall that Le Poidevin's solution to the motion case was the following: 
when we perceive motion, at an instant, a psychological mechanism produces a 
sensation of 'pure motion - sO,at that instant, we have a "sense of perceiving motion 
as happening nowf/155. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid., 89. 
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How does this solution work in a non-motion case? The case Le Poidevin discusses is 
that of our hearing two notes successively - first we hear a C, then we hear an E: 
What I want to suggest is that the conjunction of the very recent memory of C with 
the perception of E gives rise to an experience of 'pure succession'. That there should 
be such a sense is not at all implausible when we reflect on the existence of the 
primitive mechanism that Gregory appealed to for pure motion detection, which is 
distinct from the mechanism for detection of change of position. 
The proposal in this case, then, is the same as in the case of motion, only with 'pure 
succession' replacing 'pure motion'. Le Poidevin seems to suggest that it is plausibl~ 
that 'pure succession' exists because 'pure motion' purportedly exists in the case of 
movement. It isn't entirely clear what we ought to make of this suggestion - why 
should the existence of one type of sensation make it plausible that another type of 
sensation exists? One answer (though not very convincing) might be the existence of 
some neural mechanism. However, Le Poidevin claims that he isn't suggesting there 
is any such mechanism: 
I am not suggesting that a similar mechanism exists for sounds (though it may). I am 
simply putting forward t\':le phenomenological thesis that we perceive succession of 
notes in a way that can be distinguished from perceiving C being followed by E. The 
latter, though not the former, involves a relation, and since such a relation could not 
be perceived independently of the relata, the suggestion that we perceive E's 
following C inclines us to suppose that C and E have somehow to be perceived 
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together. What gives rise to the experience of pure succession, in contrast, is the 
conjunction of the perception of E with the very recent memory of C.156 
So, the reason we ought to accept that there is such a thing as 'pure motion' is not 
that there is some neural mechanism identified as giving rise to such a sensation. 
Rather, the reason we ought to accept 'pure motion' is in order to provide an account 
of the difference between two distinguishable scenarios. 
The two scenarios in question are described in the first half of the quotation above: 
'we perceive succession of notes in a way that can be distinguished from perceiving 
C being followed by E'. I am not sure exactly what Le Poidevin means here, but want 
to suggest that he may have something like the following in mind. If we return again 
to the example of the concert, we can suppose that there is a passage in the concert 
that features a transition in which one instrument plays C, followed by E, which it 
then sustains for a long period of time. This scenario is represented in the diagram 
below: 
b) 
I 
156 Ibid., 91-92. 
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A characterisation of the subject's experience at a) will be importantly different from 
a characterisation of the subject's experience at b). In both cases, the subject will 
perceive the E, and may have retained contact with the C via short-term memory. 
There will be one crucial difference however, for in the case of a), it looks as though 
the subject's perceptual experience will be correctly characterised in terms of both 
the C and the E, whereas in the second case, it looks as though a correct 
characterisation of perceptual experience will only require reference to the E. 
In both cases, E is sensorially present, and C is memorially present. The crucial 
difference between the two cases is that it looks tempting to say that, in the case of a), 
note C is sensorially present along with E. At a), the subject is experiencing the 
transition between C and E - experiencing E succeeding C, but at b), the subject is 
not. It is this distinction, I think, that Le Poidevin introduces 'pure succession' to 
account for. Rather than adopting the Specious Present Theorist's position, and 
agreeing that C and E are both sensorially present together at a), Le Poidevin claims 
that in both the cases of a) and b), E is sensorially present, and C memorially present, 
and that the first case is to be distinguished from the second via appeal to 'pure 
succession' . 
Le Poidevin's methodology - of providing two different cases, and then providing 
an account of the difference between them - is clearly going to be vulnerable to any 
alternative account that can also provide an account of the difference. My strategy 
for setting out an alternative to Le Poidevin's view is thus going to exploit this 
vulnerability. In chapter seven, when I set out my account of temporal experience, I 
shall provide an account of the difference that Le Poidevin has in mind by giving an 
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account of how the subject's phenomenal state at a time depends upon a temporally 
limited portion of experience encompassing the time in question. The account that I 
shall propose has the advantage of not positing the mysterious sui generis sensation 
of 'pure succession' that Le Poidevin appeals to. 
§3. Husserl 
I now want to turn to a discussion of Husserl's account. I shall suggest that Husserl's 
account faces the same problems as Broad's - namely, the problem of lingering 
contents. However, unlike Broad's, I shall argue that Husserl's account is salvageable 
as an account of the Memorial Time-Windows claim, even if it ultimately fails as an 
account of Sensorial Time-Windows. 
Husserl's starting point is his acknowledgement that experiences of temporally 
extended happenings are themselves temporally extended: 
It is certainly evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporality, 
that the perception of a duration itself presupposes the duration of perception, that 
the perception of any temporal form itself has temporal form.157 
157 Husserl, On the phenomenology of the consciousness ofinternal time (1893-1917),24. 
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From here, Husserl sets up what he takes to be the problem of temporal experience. 
Beginning with the thought that experiences of temporally extended happenings are 
themselves temporally extended happenings, he provides an argument to show that 
more than appeal to the temporally extended nature of experiences is required if we 
are to explain how it is that we can experience temporally extended happenings. 
While the general structure of how Husserl arrives at his memory theorist position is 
similar to the account of the genesis of memory theories set out chapter one, there are 
some important differences. While Husserl's account certainly is a response to the 
unmodified naIve theory, it is also intended as a response to what we can call the 
modified naIve theory. Both the modified, and the unmodified, naIve theory are 
motivated by the following two claims: 
1) It seems as if we can experience temporally extended happenings. 
2) The PPC: It seems as if the duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying. 
Both types of account attempt to explain those two claims in terms of commitment to 
the Metaphysical PPC: 
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3) Metaphysical PPC: The duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying. 
Commitment to Metaphysical PPC is what is distinctive of both forms of naIve 
theory. The crucial difference between the two types of naIve theory is that the 
unmodified naIve theorist commits to temporally extended stretches of experience 
consisting of a series of 'snapshots'. As discussed in chapter two, by committing to 
'snapshots', the unmodified naIve theorist is attempting to capture the way that 
experience keeps us 'up to date' with the way the world is from instant to instant. 
The modified naIve theory, in contrast, is an account on which experiences are 
temporally extended, but not to be thought of as composed of a series of 'snapshots'. 
Daintonand Foster both provide different versions of the modified naIve theory. My 
positive account will also be a version of modified naIve theory. One thought 
motivating modified naIve theory accounts is that commitment to the 'snapshots' 
view (the unmodified naIve theory) appears to have the consequence that all that is 
ever relevant to characterising the subject's phenomenal state at a time is a 
'snapshot'. Given that we don't appear to find such 'snapshots' in the 
phenomenology, the modified naIve theorist proposes that the unmodified naIve 
theory has to be abandoned. 
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Something like a modified naIve theory account looks to be the view Husser! ascribes 
to Sterne, and then attempts to reject.158 Husser! has the following to say about 
Sterne: 
Wherever a consciousness is directed towards a whole whose parts are successive, 
there can be an intuitive consciousness of this whole only if the parts, in the form of 
representants, come together in the unity of the momentary intuition. W. Sterne has 
objected to this' dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness' (as he calls 
it). There are cases in which the apprehension is extended over a stretch of time (the 
so-called "presence-time").159 
On Sterne's account, then, experiences are temporally extended - and it is this that 
explains how it is that we can experience temporally extended happenings. Husser!, 
however, doesn't think that this suffices as an explanation. 
Husser! begins his argument by describing what is involved in our experience of a 
melody: the type of melody Husser! has in mind is composed of a series of tones, 
each of which ceases as the next one begins - so at any point during the melody, only 
one tone is sounding. Husser!' s description of our awareness of this melody is the 
following: 
158 Note that in what follows, the discussion of Sterne is a discussion of his views as they feature in 
Husserl's account, and neutral as to what Sterne's actual position may be. 
159 Husserl, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), 22. 
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The first tone sounds, then comes the second tone, then the third, and so on. Must we 
not say: When the second tone sounds, I hear it, but I no longer hear the first tone, 
etc.160 
David Smith has illustrated the problem that this example is supposed to raise for a 
naIve theory of temporal experience as follows: 
If, as I am hearing a certain note in the middle of the melody, the previous note, 
which I have just heard, had altogether droppeq out of my consciousness, so that 
now it is as if it had never been heard, I should not now be experiencing the present 
note as following on from the previous one, and so should have no overall awareness 
of the melody as something extended in time.161 
Husserl's argument here against Sterne is supposed to undermine the notion that 
temporally extended experiences really do encompass temporally extended 
happenings such as melodies in a way that can explain the unity of a melody-
experience. Husser!, as a Memory Theorist, is determined to retain the insight of the 
unmodified naIve theory - that experience unfolds moment by moment. 
Husserl's worry is the same as that discussed in the first chapter: what account can 
be given of why an interval £5 relevant to characterising experience at a time? If I 
160 P24-25, Husserl, Time 
161 A. D Smith, Routledge philosophy guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian meditations (Routledge, 2003), 87. 
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hear one note, and no longer hear the previous one, Husserl claims, then it cannot be 
my hearing both notes that explains my hearing them as a phenomenological whole. 
If I no longer hear the first tone - if it has indeed 'dropped out of my consciousness' 
- then how can that tone contribute to the phenomenal character of my experience? 
Husserl's answer is the following: 
That the elapsed part of the melody is something objective for me, lowe - or so one 
will be inclined to say - to memory.162 
Husserl also notes that the same argument concerning the melody can be applied to 
our awareness of the tones that compose it, where the form of this argument is the 
following: When I hear a particular part of the temporal object, I am not hearing the 
parts of the temporal object that occurred before it. How, then, can those earlier parts 
contribute to the character of my experience? 
Each tone has a temporal extension itself. When it begins to sound, I hear it as now 
but while it continues to sound it has an ever new now, and the now that 
immediately precedes it changes into a past. Therefore at any given time I hear only 
the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectively of the whole enduring tone 
is constihlted in an act-continuum that is part memory, in smallest punctual part 
perception, and in further part expectation.163 
162 Husser!, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), 25. 
163 Ibid. 
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Husserl's concern about how it is that perception of the earlier phases of a 
temporally extended happening can contribute to the character of experience thus 
lead him to claim that, at a time, I only ever perceive an instantaneous state of affairs. 
Just as in the case of perception of the notes composing a melody, successive 
perceptions of the tone-phases composing the tone fail to suffice for an explanation 
for my perception of the tone. That, then, is Husserl's argument for why we ought to 
involve memory in an account of how it is that we are able to experience temporally 
extended happenings. 
Husserl takes it to be a result of his argument against Sterne that to account for 
temporal experience, we should say the following: at an instant, a subject perceives 
an instantaneous state of affairs, remembers previously experienced states of affairs, 
and anticipates future states of affairs. It is worth noting at this point that Husserl 
distinguishes two difference senses of perception - perception as "the act that 
originally constitutes the now", and perception as "the act that constitutes 
originally" .164 
The first sense of perception is perception considered as that aspect of consciousness 
responsible for presenting a snapshot as present (we can call this 'Snapshot 
Perception'). The second sense is perception considered more generally - considered 
as the aspect of consciousness that puts us in a particular kind of' direct' contact with 
the world without any such constraint about things being represented as strictly 
present (we can call this 'General Perception'). 
164 Ibid., 43. 
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Husserl's claim about temporal experience is that, in the first sense of perception 
('Snapshot Perception'), we only perceive an instantaneous state of affairs, but in the 
second sense ('General Perception'), we perceive temporally extended happenings. 
Husserl's view is that Snapshot Perception 'blends' with other ways of getting in 
contact with the world, to furnish us with General Perception of temporally extended 
happenings: 
In the consciousness that belongs to the directly in.!uitive grasp of a temporal object -
of a melody, for example - the measure or tone or part of a tone now being heard is 
perceived, and what is momentarily intuited as past is not perceived. The 
apprehensions continuously blend into one another here; they terminate in an 
apprehension that constitutes the now, but which is only an ideallimit.165 
At an instant, then, I am aware via General Perception of something temporally 
extended as a result of this 'blending' of Snapshot Perception, memory, and 
apprehension. Husserl's claim about memory is not that memory as we normally 
think of it - i.e. as something related to, though both functionally and 
phenomenologically distinct from General Perception - is involved in General 
Perception. Rather, Husserl takes himself to be uncovering a new form of cognitive 
contact with the world that is necessarily involved in any General Perception of 
temporally extended happenings. The same goes for his claims about apprehension-
165 Ibid., 41. 
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with these distinctive modes of getting into contact with reality called 'retention' and 
'protention' . 
At this point, we have a picture of the general shape of Husserl's account: at an 
instant, I am simultaneously in contact with the world in three different ways: I 
represent an instantaneous state of affairs as 'now' (Snapshot Perception), I represent 
previously perceived states of affairs as past (retention), and I represent not-yet-
perceived states of affairs as future (protention). It is at this point that we may start 
to get concerned about Husserl's account. 
One concern we might have is Dainton's worry about Memory Theory mentioned 
previously: that it looks like Husserl is going to have trouble explaining how it is that 
we get can get awareness of temporally extended happenings out of a collection of 
awarenesses of instants. Husserl claims that at an instant I perceive an instantaneous 
state of affairs (Husserl sometimes calls this perception the awareness of a 'primal 
impression'), and I remember and anticipate past and future instantaneous states of 
affairs. How, out of these awarenesses of instants, do we get to become aware of 
items with temporal extension? 
To attempt to provide an answer to this question, I shall turn to Izchak Miller's 
discussion of HusserL Husserl's answer appears to be that we should think of a 
subject's perception, retentions, and protentions as all 'components' of a subject's 
overall experience at an instant. On Miller's interpretation, Husserl accounts for the 
temporal extension of the object of perception as follows: 
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My experience of the temporal spread of the tone is accounted for by the fact that in 
perceptually individuating the tone, it is constituted by me through a continuous 
manifold of instantaneous tone-phase 'intentions' which exhaustively 'intend' the 
phases of that tone ... these tone-phase 'intentions' ... are not discrete intentions. 
However, they do play an intentional role in individuating the tone. But they play 
this role only insofar as the continuous manifold of tone-phase "intentions" of which 
they are constituents does, that role being to locate or "spread" the tone, qua intended, 
throughout a given interval of time ... These tone-phase "intentions'" are, indeed, 
none other than the aforementioned retentions, primal-impressions and 
protentions.166 
At an instant, then, I am having one experience (or, as Miller sometimes puts it, 
performing one 'perceptual act'), which involves primal impressions, retentions, and 
protentions as "intentional features ... responsible for the temporal constitution of 
the ... objects of acts."167 This, then, is one reason why Husser! considers his view an 
improvement on Sterne's - as there is no question of 'intentional features' of an 
experience 'dropping out of consciousness' in the way he thinks earlier parts of 
temporally extended experiences can. 
So, at a time, the subject is aware of a temporally extended happening, with the 
subject's awareness consisting .of a Primal Impression, Protentions, and Retentions. 
One question for Husser! at this point concerns how we are to think of the difference 
166 Miller, Husserl, perception, and temporal awareness, 141-2. 
167 Ibid., 142. 
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between these three different types of thing (Primal Impression, Protention, and 
Retention). One debate here concerns whether or not we are to think of the Primal 
Impression as some kind of sense-datum.168 
More important than this issue for our purposes, however, is the issue of what gets 
experienced as sensorially present. We have already seen that Husser! commits to a 
view on which only a snapshot can be temporally present, but what of sensorial 
presence? There are two different ways we can interpret Husser! on this issue - on 
one interpretation, more than a snapshot is sensorially present, and on the other, only 
a snapshot is sensorially present. Unfortunately for Husser!, both of these 
interpretations land his account in trouble. 
Just like Broad, Husser! takes himself to be providing an account of the structure of a 
temporally extended experience at a time. The temporally extended experience 
consists of a gapless series of such structures that in turn consist of a primal 
impression, retentions, and protentions: 
The "source-point" with which the "production" of the enduring object begins is a 
primal impression. This consciousness is in a state of constant change: the tone-now 
present "in person" continuously changes .. .into something that has been: an always 
168 For discussion of this issue, and an argument against the 'Primal Impresssion' being conceived of as 
a sense-datum, see: Smith, Routledge philosophy guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian meditations, 84-5. 
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new tone-now continuously relieves the one that has passed over into 
modifica tion.169 
The contents of the different structures will thus overlap, just as they did in both of 
Broad's accounts. This means that Husserl will face the problem of 'lingering 
contents': he will face the dilemma of whether we ought to consider his theory a 
theory of the sensorial, or the memorial, presence of temporally extended 
happenings. 
This issue directly relates to the question we raised about the difference between the 
primal impression, and retentions and protentions. While primal impressions 
certainly sensorially present us with a snapshot, the dilemma facing Husserl is that 
protentions and retentions can either sensorially present items, in which case his 
account faces the lingering contents objection, or they do not sensorially present 
items, in which case we do not have an account of the sensorial presence of 
temporally extended happenings in perception - just an account of the sensorial 
presence of a 'snapshot'. 
Dan Zahavi provides an interpretation of Husserl according to which all that is 
sensorially present to the subject at a time is a snapshot. Here is Zahavi's 
interpretation of what Husserl has to say about the distinction between phenomenal 
and sensorial presence noted in chapter two: 
169 Husserl, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), 30-1. 
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When I perceive an object, sayan armchair, the object is never given in its totality but 
always incompletely, in a certain restricted profile .. .It is never the entire armchair, 
including its front, backside, underside, and inside, which is given 
intuitively ... Despite this, the object of my perception is exactly the appearing object 
and not ... the perceptually given surface ... According to Husserl, the reason why we 
perceive the armchair itself, although it is actually only a single profile which is 
intuitively present, is because of the contribution of what he terms horizonal 
intentionalityPO 
In the case of the armchair, Zahavi notes, we can draw a distinction between the 
intuitively present parts of the armchair, and those parts of the armchair that are not 
intuitively present. The parts that are not 'intuitively present' feature in experience 
due to the involvement of 'horizonal intentionality'. 
Translated into the terminology of chapter three, there are parts of the armchair that 
are sensorially present, and parts of the armchair that are merely phenomenally 
present, without being sensorially present. The parts that are phenomenally present, 
without being sensorially present, feature in experience due to 'horizonal 
intentionality' . 
170 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, The phenomenological mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science (Routledge, 2008), 96. 
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The additional claim that Zahavi makes here, that goes beyond what was said in 
chapter two, is that the horizonal elements contribute not only awareness of the back 
and sides of the armchair, but that without those elements, the side of the armchair 
that is sensorially present wouldn't be sensorially present as the side of the armchair. 
This is the claim that Zahavi makes use of in his interpretation of Husserl's account 
of temporal experience. 
We are already familiar with the general shape of Husserl's account: at an instant, I 
am simultaneously in contact with the world in three different ways: I represent an 
instantaneous state of affairs as 'now' (sensorial perception), I represent previously 
perceived states of affairs as past (retention), and I represent not-yet-perceived states 
of affairs as future (protention). Zahavi has suggested that we think of Husserl's 
tripartite experiential structure in a way that parallels our awareness of the armchair: 
The protentions and retentions are dependent parts of an occurrent experience. They 
do not provide us with new intentional objects but with a consciousness of the 
temporal horizon of the present object... Every actual phase of consciousness 
contains the structure Primal Impression (A), retention (B), and protention (C). The 
correlates of this ... structure are the now phase (02), the past phase (01), and the 
future phase (03) of the object. The now-phase of the object has a horizon, but it is not 
made up of the retentions and protentions, but of the past and future phases of the 
object. l7l 
171 Zahavi, Husserl's phenomenology, 83-4. 
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Retentions and protentions are thus what represent the past and future phases of the 
object. However, these past and future phases are not sensorially present in 
perception. Rather, as Zahavi notes, they provide the horizon of the object. The notion 
of 'horizon' here is what provides us with our parallel between the account of how 
the underside of the armchair can feature in perception, and the account of how 
previously perceived phases of the object can feature in perception without being 
sensorially perceived. 
Just as in the case of the armchair, where the parts of the armchair that aren't 
sensorially present nevertheless make an appearance in the phenomenology, so in 
the case of temporal experience, parts of a temporally extended event that aren't 
sensorially present at an i~stant nevertheless make an appearance in the 
phenomenology due to their being represented in retention and protention. As noted 
in chapter three, this position is counterintuitive, given that it doesn't appear 
possible for us to discern such 'Sensorial Snapshots' in the phenomenology. 
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One reason that Zahavi may be inclined to draw this parallel between the case of the 
experience of the armchair and temporal experience, as regards the contribution of a 
'horizon', is that the involvement of 'horizon' in the temporal case might be thought 
to provide some account of how it is that, out of the sensorial awareness of a 
snapshot, we can get awareness of something temporally extended. 
Here are some remarks that Husserl makes about an object's 'horizon'. These are not 
remarks about the temporal case, but they can nevertheless inform our 
understanding of the temporal case: 
The improperly appearing objective determinations are co-apprehended, but they are 
not 'sensibilized', not presented through what is sensible, i.e. through the material of 
sensation. It is evident that they are co-apprehended, for otherwise we would have 
no objects at all before our eyes, not even a side, since there can indeed be a side only 
through the object,172 
Husserl's thought is that, without the presence of the 'horizon' of the object in 
perceptual experience, we wouldn't even get an experience of the front of the 
armchair. Now, it isn't obvious from these remarks what Husserl would want to say 
about an experience that lacked the appropriate horizon, or even that he would 
countenance such a possibility. What we can take from these remarks is that the 
172 Edmund Husserl, TIling and space: lectures of1907, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Springer, 1997), sec. 17. 
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horizon of the object (the object's 'improperly appearing objective determinations') 
plays a role in determining the nature of what we sensorially perceive. 
We take it that we sensorially perceive the side of the armchair, but Husserl is 
suggesting that without the involvement of the horizon, we wouldn't get a general 
perception of the armchair, and so sensorial perception as of a side of that object 
wouldn't be possible. Given that Husserl also takes horizons to be involved in our 
experience of temporally extended events, the suggestion is that we can think of 
them as playing a similar role in temporal experience. In the atemporal case, the 
-
involvement of horizons is responsible for our seeing the portion of the object that is 
as a matter of fact sensorially presented as the relevant portion of an object. In the 
temporal case, then, perhaps we can think of the involvement of protention and 
retention as responsible for our seeing the part of the temporally extended event that 
is as a matter of fact given to us in the primal impression as part of something 
temporally extended. 
Despite the ingenuity of this suggestion, the problem facing a Zahavi-style 
interpretation of Husserl is clearly going to be that it fails to account for the sensorial 
presence of temporally extended happenings in experience at a time. This criticism will 
hold for any interpretation of Husserl that commits to only a snapshot being 
sensorially present - not just Zahavi's. As I have characterised the phenomenology, 
What we need to account for is the sensorial presence of something with discern able 
earlier and later temporal parts, not just the sensorial presence of a snapshot that gets 
experienced as a temporal part of some temporally extended happening. Just as Le 
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Poi devin's account fails to adequately treat the phenomenology, then, so does 
Zahavi's Husserl. 
Zahavi's interpretation of Husserl, according to which only the primal impression is 
sensorially present in experience, was only one of our two alternatives. On the other 
alternative interpretation, retentions and protentions also deliver items as sensorially 
present in experience. This kind of view is extremely similar to Broad's late view -
the crucial difference being their attitudes to what is temporally present in experience 
at a time: for Broad, something withdiscernable earlier and later temporal parts; for 
Husserl, just a snapshot.173 
As mentioned above, Husserl's conception that an interval can be sensorially present 
in experience at a time faces the same problem as Broad: the problem of lingering 
contents. Items will remain sensorially present in perceptual experience for a period 
of time greater than the period they are represented as occupying. This is a bad result 
for any account, as we do not find this 'lingering' in the phenomenology. As in the 
case of Broad, this raises the worry that there are two jobs for retentions and 
173 Interestingly, while Broad and Husser! differ on their attitudes to what is temporally present, they 
both agree that the strict or instantaneous present only features in experience as an abstraction from what 
is instantaneously presented. For Hu~serI, the instantaneous present features in experience only insofar 
as it marks the boundary between what is experienced via retention and protention. For Broad, the 
instantaneous present features only insofar as, at a time, there will be some portion of the temporally 
extended objectjs of experience that possesses maximum 'presentedness'. 
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protentions: accounting for our perception of temporally extended happenings, and 
keeping track of our changing temporal perspective on the process. 
Given the clash with the phenomenology generated by interpreting Husserl's 
account as an account of our perception of temporally extended happenings, one 
way to solve this problem is to interpret Husserl's account as an account of our 
awareness of things via a faculty distinct from perception. This was the move 
suggested in Broad's case, though whereas it looked as though Broad's notion of 
'presentedness' made it awkward to see how his account could succeed when so 
interpreted, with Husserl's account, there is no such worry. 
Interpreting Husserl's account as an account of Memorial Presence thus looks like a 
promising move - and also generates the result that his retentionalj protentional 
structure may be a complement, rather than a rival candidate, to the Modified NaIve 
Theory (the account that commits to Metaphysical PPC but rejects characterising the 
subject's experience at a time in terms of 'snapshots'). If we interpret the account in 
this way, then, assuming that some version of Modified NaIve Theory can be 
defended, we can say that, at a time, temporally extended happenings can be 
sensorially present in perception. Simultaneously with this, the subject grasps, via a 
protentional/retentional structure, the relative temporal location of future/past 
events. 
Providing this kind of story will enable a Modified NaIve Theory to account for 
Miller's first and third features described below: 
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An adequate account of our perceptual awareness of a process, or an event, must -
according to Husserl - deal with three main features of such an awareness: The first 
is the very fact that in perceiving a process we are aware, at any given instant of the 
duration of that awareness, of a temporally extended part of that process or the whole of 
that process, and not merely of one of its instantaneous tone-phases. The second is 
the fact that our perceptual awareness of a process involves a continual awareness of 
the continuity of that very awareness. The third feature is our continual awareness, 
during our perception of a process, of our changing temporal-perspective of that 
process.174 
We have seen already how Husserl attempts to deal with the first feature mentioned 
here - and discussed some possible concerns with the account. I have also suggested 
that, to avoid these problems, his account should be used to account for the third 
feature, by giving an account of Memorial Time-Windows, but not the first. As 
regards the second feature - the' continuity of consciousness' described in the second 
chapter - it is worth briefly setting out Husserl's account. 
A puzzle arises for Husserl's account about how we get to become aware of the 
continuity of consciousness, for on his proposal as it stands at the moment, the 
subject is only aware via protention, retention, and primal impression of a 
temporally extended. object Cif experience. Husserl's worry, as Miller presents it, 
appears to be that some account is needed of how the subject can be aware, at a time, 
of the temporal extension of experience itself. 
174 Miller, Husserl, perception, and temporal awareness, 160. 
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Husserl's solution to this problem is the following: we have already seen that he 
claims that at an instant, an instantaneous state of affairs is sensorially present in 
Snapshot Perception, and I remember/anticipate past/future states of affairs via 
retention /prehension. In fact, this description is only half complete: Husser! also 
claims that, while prehension and retention are 'primarily' directed at future/past 
primary impressions, they are also 'secondarily' directed at future and past 'act-
phases': 
Each later memory is not only continual modification that has arisen from primal 
sensation but also continual modification of all earlier continuous modifications of 
the same initial point.175 
Miller provides a helpful explanation of Husserl's slightly mysterious account as 
follows: 
What I "secondarily" retain through a retention, according to Husser!, is not just a 
past primal-impression, but also that past primal-impression's co-temporal retentions 
and protentions. In other words, what I "secondarily" retain through a retention is a 
complete past act-phase. 176 
175 Husserl, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), 340. 
176 Miller, Husserl, perception, and temporal awareness, 152. 
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That, then, is Husserl's account of how it is that I am aware of the continuous nature 
of my awareness over time: at a time, I retain (and prehend) past (and future) phases 
of my act of awareness. 
Husserl takes this structure to be required, because of his commitment to thinking of 
temporally extended experience as consisting of a series of instantaneous structures. 
On his view, all that is relevant to characterising 'what it is like' for the subject at a 
time is the relevant instantaneous portion of experience. In order for the subject to be 
aware, at an instant, of some temporally extended portion of experience, it is thus 
necessary for Husserl to provide some account of how the instantaneous structure 
reflects awareness of past and future instantaneous structures: hence the positing of 
'secondary retention' to play this role. 
The idea of 'double retention' is that retention and protention represent past and 
future instantaneous structures. Of course, this whole system of 'double retention' is 
only required as a response to a problem particular to thin-PSA accounts - the 
problem being that on any thin-PSA theory, only an instantaneous portion of 
experience is relevant to characterising a subject's experience at a time. 
On the type of account I want to propose (~ Fat-PSA account), this problem simply 
does not arise, for a chanicterisation of the subject's experience at a time will 
necessarily involve appeal to a temporally extended portion of experience. Given 
that, on this view, a characterisation of 'what it is like' for the subject at a time will 
necessarily involve appeal to a temporally extended portion of experience, and not a 
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mere instant, there is no need for the Pat-PSA theorist to appeal to anything like a 
'double retention' structure. Rather, the Pat-PSA theorist can claim, the subject gets 
to be aware of the continuity of consciousness at a time in virtue of the nature of her 
experience over some interval encompassing the time in question. I shall say more 
about exactly how my version of Pat-PSA theory is to work in chapter seven. 
This discussion of Husserl has hopefully shown that, while the account proves 
unsatisfactory as an account of the sensori~l presence of temporally extended 
happenings in perception, it is not necessarily to be discarded - as it looks as though 
it can be used to provide part of an account of our awareness of our changing 
temporal perspective on events. As regards the 'continuity of consciousness', it looks 
as though the Husserlian 'double retention' account is only required if we are 
committed to the Thin-PSA. If, as I hope to show in chapter seven, we can 
demonstrate that we have no need to be so committed - and that such commitment 
is a mistake - then the corresponding need to provide a 'double retention' account 
will also disappear. 
&4: Tye 
I now want to turn to a discussion of the final Thin-PSA account that I shall discuss: 
Michael Tye's 'one-experience' view. Part of the reason for providing a long 
discussion of Broad's accounts in the previous chapter was that there are very clear 
parallels between Broad's early account, and Tye's account. Just like Broad, Tye 
maintains that temporally extended experience is to be analysed in terms of a series 
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of instantaneous structures whose contents overlap. Just like Broad, Tye maintains 
that temporally extended happenings are both temporally and sensorially present in 
perception at a time. 
As far as I can tell, there are two crucial differences between their accounts. Firstly, 
Tye is a representationalist, whereas Broad is a sense-data theorist. Secondly, Tye 
claims to be 'dissolving' the problem of temporal experience, whereas Broad does 
not. In what follows, I shall argue that Tye does1J-'t succeed in dissolving the problem 
- and thus the only relevant difference between the two accounts is that Tye 
provides a representationalist 'translation' of Broad's early account. 
Tye's account of temporal experience begins conventionally enough - he notes that if 
I perceptually experience a finger moving over a period of time, then a 
characterisation of my perceptual experience at a time must involve reference to 
some interval of time. He also notes that this same interval of time will be 
experienced' as present': 
The present is also experienced when one experiences something changing - a finger 
moving, say. This experience isn't just a succession of different experiences of the 
finger in different positions. At any given moment, it is an experience of the movement 
of the fingerY7 
177 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 87. 
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Tye thus draws our attention to the phenomenon of Temporal Time-Windows. He 
notes that: 
This experienced present - the so-called specious present - has a brief but finite 
duration. It allows us to experience an extended event, such as a continuing sound or 
a word, or a sequence of events, such as a group of musical notes, all in one as a 
whole,178 
The Temporal Time-Windows claim, Tye supposes, picks out that feature of 
- ~ 
experience whereby we can experience a collection of items 'all in one as a whole'. 
The idea he is appealing to here is plainly that of 'experienced togetherness' - an idea 
we discussed in chapter one. Recall that the motivation behind 'experienced 
togetherness' was that there must be some difference between what is relevant to 
characterising experience at a time and what is not. The next natural thought is that 
there must be some interval in particular that is so relevant - an interval in which 
items are experienced together. 
Tye is clearly assuming this kind of picture - there is some interval of time in which 
items are experienced 'all in one as a whole'. As we might anticipate, he then claims 
that the only way to account for this' all in one as a whole' aspect of experience is by 
positing an instant at which ~e are aware of all the items that fall within the relevant 
interval. Tye thus endorses the Thin-PSA - he endorses, at this stage in his argument, 
178 Ibid. 
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the idea that there are momentary experiences that represent intervals, as 
represented in his diagram, reproduced below: 
Momenlary experience 
[A followed by B] 
I J 
NOW 
Figure 4.1 
The experience of A followed by B in the present showll here as .9ccurring 
after the specious present. 
Tye notes that we can be aware of items with duration greater than that ascribed to 
the 'Specious Present'. Like Broad and Husser!, he responds to the question of how it 
is that we can perceive temporally extended happenings with duration greater than 
that of the 'specious present' by claiming that specious presents overlap. Like Broad 
and Husserl, his account thus faces the problem of repeated contents - the problem 
that the same event will be represented in numerous distinct instantaneous 
experiences. 
His response to the problem of repeated contents is the same as that which can 
plausibly also be made by Broad and Husserl - to note that the fact that there are 
different times at which something is experienced doesn't show that it will seem to 
the subject that they have numerous experiences of that something: 
Page 236 
I hear a click twice in that there are two times at which an act of hearing a click 
occurs ... But the times ... have no time between them at which I experience that there 
is no click. Indeed, there is no time between these two times at which anything is 
experientially represented by hearing. So, I do not hear a click as occurring twice. It 
does not seem to me that there is a click followed by a second clickp9 
As discussed earlier, in conjunction with Broad's accounts, Tye's proposal is that we 
remain in perceptual contact with the click, rather than representing the click as 
occurring again and again. Of course, as :ve saw in Broad's case, this kind of 
response immediately raises the problem of 'lingering contents' - the problem which 
raises the dilemma: either the account is a phenomenologically flawed account of the 
sensorial presence of temporally extended happenings, or the account is an account 
of Memorial Time-Windows. 
We thus have reaSOn to be concerned about Tye's account, as it appears vulnerable to 
the problem of lingering contents. In fact, Tye himself isn't entirely happy with the 
'overlap' model, though for a different reason: 
Even if adjacent specious presents overlap in objective time, this does not suffice to 
generate the experience of continuity from one present to the next.180 
179 Ibid., 94. 
180 Ibid. 
Page 237 
Tye's worry about the overlap model is that it is a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition of our experiencing the' continuity' between specious presents. What does 
Tye have in mind by 'continuity' at this point? It appears that the worry Tye has is a 
worry about unity: 
What is needed, in the case of experiencing the musical scale, is a further experience, 
over an above the experience of do-re and the experience of re-mi, an experience that 
unifies those experiences into a phenomenal whole. Generalizing, it seems that the 
experience of continuity or succession requires that there be an overarching experience 
that unifies successive individual experiences, each of the specious present and its 
contents. Viewed in his way, the problem of the unity of experiences through time is 
to specify the phenomenal unity relation that connects token experiences at different 
times and binds them together into a single large experience.181 
Tye's concern is that, in order for the subject to have an experience of 'do-re-me', the 
experiences of 'do-re', and 're-me' must all be 'unified' or 'bound together' in a single 
experience. 
We have already had a brief look at Tye's account of the continuity of consciousness 
in chapter two, in which we saw that Tye attempts to provide an account of 
continuity of what is represented by experience, rather than continuity in experience 
itself. We also saw that Tye's 'one-experience' proposal is what is supposed to 
181 Ibid., 95. 
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provide an account of this continuity. Tye's suggestion about the case of continuity is 
the following: 
In the earlier example of hearing the musical scale, do-re-mi, there is an experience of 
all three notes, with each note being experienced as flowing into and being succeeded by 
the next ... With each experienced change in things and qualities, there is an 
experience of the change. But this does not necessitate that there be a new experience. 
The simplest hypothesis compatible with what is revealed by introspection is that, for 
each period of consciousness, there is only a single experience - an experience that 
represents everything experienced within the period of consciousness as a whole (the 
period, that is, between one state of unconsciousness and the next).182 
An analogy appealed to by Tye in support of this claim is the case of a long movie: 
Here is a parallel. Consider a movie depicting a complex series of events taking place 
during an extended period of time. The movie has a very rich representational 
content overall. It is a movie about war; it is a movie about peace. It is a movie about 
the fall of the Russian Aristocracy. The movie can be boring at some times and 
exciting at others; for what it depicts at different times varies. Even so, there is just 
one movie, not many movies unified together into one encompassing movie. So too, I 
claim, with experience.183 
182 Ibid., 97. 
183 Ibid., 99. 
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There are clearly some broad similarities between temporal experience and movies -
those similarities are outlined above. However, more important than these 
similarities are the differences - namely the distinctive phenomenological features of 
temporal experience that need accounting for (the Time-Windows claim, Extreme 
Continuity), and, in Tye's case, a commitment to Representationalism about 
experience. In what follows, I shall argue that the need to account for these 
distinctive phenomenological features forces Tye to either a) relinquish his 
commitment to Representationalism or b) provide an account that looks very much 
like Dainton's Representationalist interpretation of Broad. 
Bayne has provided one objection to Tye's 'one-experience' proposal: Bayne's 
objection to Tye appeals to the conception of experience defended by Tye. He notes 
that Tye conceives of experiences as PANIC states - that is, they are representations 
that are "poised, abstract, non-conceptual, intentional content."184 The important 
thing to notice here is that experiences are 'poised' - for something to be 'poised' in 
Tye's sense is for it to be available for direct input into a subject's 'reasoning system'. 
When Tye claims that there is only' one experience', he is claiming that the subject 
has one PANIC state - where all the contents of that panic state are poised for direct 
input into the reasoning system. Bayne's objection is as follows: 
Is it really plausible to suppose that the contents of an entire stream of consciousness 
- that is, the periQd of consciousness between one state of unconsciousness and the 
next - are poised for direct input into the reasoning system? I had an experience of 
184 T. Bayne, "Divided brains and unified phenomenology: a review essay on Michael Tye's 
consciousness and persons," Philosophical Psychology 18, no. 4 (2005): 498. 
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tasting coffee this morning, and this evening I am currently experiencing a Merlot ... 
Are these contents conjointly poised for direct input into my reasoning system? That 
seems extremely unlikely.185 
I think we can go further than Bayne here: it seems possible that I could easily forget 
about something I experienced this morning, even if my consciousness has remained 
unbroken. For instance, I could forget where I put my key to the office. Intuitively, 
because I did see the key this morning, my seeing the key is part of today's stream of 
consciousness. Unfortunately for me, 'seeing the key this morning' is not poised for 
direct input into my reasoning system - if it was, then I would be able to remember 
where my key was. It looks, then, as though, in this case at least, there can't be one 
experience that lasts for as long as my unbroken consciousness. 
How might Tye respond to this objection? Describing his 'one-experience' view in 
more detail, he says the following: 
Experiences, on my view, are maximal PANIC states. For each such state, there is a 
momentary phenomenal character (what it is like to undergo the experience at a 
particular moment) and an overall phenomenal character (what it is like to undergo 
the experience from beginning to end). The phenomenal character of an experience at 
any given moment is its PANIC at that moment. The overall phenomenal character of 
an experience is itg overall PANIC.186 
185 Ibid. 
186 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 99. 
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By admitting this distinction between phenomenal character at a moment, and 
phenomenal character overall, Tye is able to resist Bayne's objection that the overall 
experience must be available for input into the subject's reasoning system at a time. 
One problem facing Tye in making this move, however, concerns how we are to 
think of an experience'S relation to its content. To illustrate the problem I have in 
mind, we can turn to a pair of analogies - the cases of two different sentences spoken 
aloud. The first sentence we shall consider is a conjunction ("There is an apple in the 
fruit bowl and there is yoghurt in the fridge"): while the second is not ("There is an 
apple in the fruit bowl"). If I utter either sentence, I am expressing some proposition 
that may be true or false. In this sense, then, both sentences I have some truth-
evaluable content. One important feature of such utterances of sentences is that the 
utterances are temporally extended. 
The temporally extended utterance of a sentence is something that is truth-evaluable, 
for the utterance of the sentence expresses something truth-evaluable. However, 
while truth-evaluability is a feature of the utterance of the whole sentence, it isn't 
always a feature of the utterance's temporal parts. If we examine the utterances of 
individual words that comprise the overall utterance of a sentence, we do not find 
anything truth-evaluable that corresponds to the utterances of those individual 
words alone. 
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If we examine the utterance of the first word of both sentences: "There", it is clear 
that this word, considered in and of itself, doesn't express something truth-
evaluable. If we consider a slightly longer temporal part of the utterance: "There is" 
we don't find an expression of anything truth-evaluable either. In the case of the non-
conjunctive sentence, it looks as though this is true for the whole sentence: it looks as 
though it is the utterance of the sentence as a whole, and not the temporal parts of 
the utterance in and of themselves, that expresses something truth-evaluable. 
It isn't the case, then, that corresponding to each distinct temporal part of the 
utterance of the sentence there is a distinct tryth-evaluable content - for, as we have 
seen, it is only the sentence as a whole that expresses anything truth-evaluable. Just as 
this is the case for the reasonably short sentence "There is an apple in the fruit bowl", 
we can also imagine a much longer sentence - a sentence that takes a whole day to 
utter - where the same considerations apply. While the day-long sentence expresses 
a truth-evaluable content, it may not be the case that any shorter temporal part of the 
day-long sentence expresses some distinct truth-evaluable content. 
We can now turn to the case of the conjunctive sentence. The same considerations 
about truth-evaluability apply to the individual words of this sentence, and it is also 
true that the sentence as a whole expresses one truth-evaluable content. One crucial 
difference, however, is that it looks like the utterance of the conjunctive sentence has 
parts that correspond .to something truth-evaluable - namely the two parts of the 
sentence separated by the conjunction. In the case of this sentence, not only the 
sentence as a whole, but also the parts of the sentence separated by the conjunction, 
express some truth-evaluable content. 
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Just as we could imagine a day-long utterance of a sentence expressing a truth 
evaluable content, where the utterance didn't have any shorter truth-evaluable 
temporal parts, we can also imagine a day-long utterance of a sentence that expresses 
a temporally extended content, where the utterance does have shorter truth evaluable 
temporal parts. 
It is this pair of analogies that is of importance in the discussion of Tye's 'one-
experience' proposal. As we have already seen, Tye's suggestion is that the 'one-
experience' is something that fills the time between periods of unconsciousness, and 
has various different qualities at different times - just like the movie does. The 
problem faced by Tye's proposal is his claim that the 'one experience' is an 
'experience that represents everything experienced within the period of 
consciousness as a whole'. 
In the first case of the utterance of a sentence that lasts for a whole day - the non-
conjunctive sentence - we noted that while the whole utterance represents something 
by expressing some truth-evaluable content, it wasn't the case that the temporal 
parts of the utterance in and of themselves express anything truth-evaluable. Even if 
one thought it plausible that the utterances of the individual words comprising the 
utterance of the whole sentence do represent things in and of themselves, it is clear 
that they do not, in and of themselves, correspond to anything truth-evaluable. 
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Tye's suggestion is that, in the case of the 'one experience', we can distinguish 
between its phenomenal character at a moment, and its overall phenomenal character. 
We can now use the analogies with the two day-long sentences to set up two 
alternative positions that Tye can adopt concerning the relationship between 
momentary and overall phenomenal character. Recall again Tye's suggestion that the 
one experience 'represents everything experienced within the period of 
consciousness as a whole'. The 'one experience' thus expresses one content - the 
content concerning everything experienced within the period of consciousness. 
In the case of the day-long utterance of the nOl)-conjunctive sentence, we noted that it 
wasn't the case that corresponding to every temporal part of the sentence was some 
truth-evaluable content. In the case of this sentence, just one content was expressed, 
and the content was expressed by the utterance of the sentence as a whole. Looking at 
a smaller temporal part of the sentence in and of itself didn't give us anything truth 
evaluable. One option for Tye would be to claim that things are exactly the same in 
the case of the 'one-experience'. On this kind of view, there is the truth-evaluable 
content of the experience as a whole, but there wouldn't be any such thing as the 
truth-evaluable content expressed by some proper temporal part of the one-
experience. 
The problem with this view, of course, is that, according to Tye's 
Representationalism, if.there isn't any truth-evaluable content at a time, then there 
isn't any phenomenal character at a time, for according to Tye, "phenomenal 
character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further 
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conditions."187 Of course, given that there clearly is phenomenal character at a time, 
the only option for Tye, if he was to say that there is just one content borne by the 
one-experience, would be to abandon the representationalist proposal that truth-
evaluable content determines phenomenal character. 
The alternative option for Tye is to deny that the case of the 'one experience' is 
analogous to the case of the day-long utterance of the non-conjunctive sentence, and 
claim that, corresponding to each temporal part of the' one experience' is some truth-
evaluable content. This position would be analogous to the case of the conjunctive 
sentence: though the claim about experience lJlade by Tye is not that corresponding 
to some temporal parts of the experience is some temporally extended content (as we 
saw in the case of the utterance). Rather, the claim is that corresponding to any 
temporal part of the experience there is some truth evaluable content. 
However, if this is the case, then it looks as though we have lost sight of the thought 
that there is only 'one experience'. Rather, on this proposal, there is some distinct 
truth-evaluable content at every stage - with this truth-evaluable content borne by a 
different 'representation'. The idea that there is only one experience only has any 
weight to it if there is only one truth-evaluable content-bearing thing - not a series of 
different things. 
187 Ibid., 166. 
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I now want to suggest that Tye's view, if he wants to retain his Representationalism, 
can be read as similar to Broad's early account, with the only relevant difference 
consisting in Broad's commitment to Sense-Data Theory rather than 
Representationalism. The phenomenal character of experience at a time, Tye 
suggests, is the content of experience at that time. It looks as though the momentary 
phenomenal character will be characterised in terms of a Time-Window: 
In taking this view [the one-experience view], I am not denying that, in the example 
of my hearing the musical scale, do-re-mi, there is an experience of do-re in the first 
specious present and an experience of re-mi in the second. My point is that these are 
not different experiences: there is only one experience - an experience of do-re-mi -
that has been described in different (partial) ways, an experience with different stages 
to iU88 
We can compare this to the following from Broad: 
If we imagine a continuous series of momentary acts ... we can regard them as 
momentary sections of an act or process of finite duration.189 
Why describe Tye's account as a representationalist version of Broad's early account? 
Well, just like Broad, Tye takes experiences to be temporally extended, and just like 
188 Ibid., 99-100. 
189 Broad, Scientific Thought, 349-50. 
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Broad, he claims that we need to account for the Time-Windows claim in terms of 
some instantaneous representation of an interval. Also like Broad (in his early 
incarnation), Tye claims that everything experienced 'together' in the Specious 
Present is experienced 'as present', without providing an account of what it is for 
something to be experienced' as present' . 
Other than their differences as regards how we ought to think about perceptual 
experience (in terms of Representationalism, or Sense-Data Theory), the differences 
between the two accounts are not disagreements over issues - just the absence of 
commitment to a certain account of an issue. W,hile Tye claims that there is only 'one-
experience' per unbroken period of consciousness, Broad makes no such 
commitment over the issue of how we are to individuate experiences. While Broad 
claims that the temporally extended experiences are strictly continuous, Tye doesn't 
appear to make any such commitment over the issue of how different Specious 
Presents are temporally situated relative to one another. 
It is for this reason that I propose that we ought to think of Tye's theory as a 
representationalist rehashing of Broad's early account. This interpretation of Tye 
means that his account faces the same problems as Broad's. As noted above, Tye 
proposes that specious presents overlap. He is thus vulnerable to the 'lingering 
contents' objection that has been applied to Broad and Husserl's accounts, as on his 
view, we perceive short.temporal happenings for longer than those happenings last. 
His account thus fails to adequately treat the phenomenology. 
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Attempting to reinterpret Tye's account as an account of Miller's third feature 
(awareness of our changing temporal perspective on events) looks as though it will 
run into the same problem that faced trying to interpret Broad in this way: namely, 
that Tye commits to the idea that, at an instant, we are aware of temporally extended 
happenings as present - rather than 'fading into the past', as looks to be required by 
an account of how short-term-memory relates us to recently perceived events. Things 
are thus not promising for Tye's account, so reinterpreted. 
§s. Conclusion 
I hope to have shown that all of the Thin-PSA accounts discussed in this chapter face 
difficulties. Husser! and Tye both face the same set of objections posed to Broad in 
the previous chapter, with neither of their accounts looking as though they muster 
any additional resources that would enable them to respond any better than Broad 
did. The accounts found in Le Poidevin and Zahavi's Husser! both commit to the 
idea that only a 'snapshot' is sensorially present. These accounts thus also fail to 
adequately treat the phenomenology. One way to think about the objections raised to 
the Thin-PSA accounts discussed in this chapter is that they either commit to too 
much being sensorially present in perception by falling victim to the 'lingering 
contents' objection (Husser! and Tye), or they commit to too little being sensorially 
present in perception (Le Poidevin and Zahavi's Husser!), by claiming that only a 
'snapshot' is sensorially.present. 
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All of the Thin-PSA accounts I have examined have thus turned out to be 
problematic. In chapter seven I shall provide an account of temporal experience that 
undermines the motivation for accepting Thin-PSA in the first place, thus allowing 
us to provide an account that avoids the objections discussed in the last two chapters. 
While the Thin-PSA accounts have turned out to be undesirable, I hope to have 
shown that Husserl's account looks like a suitable account of Memorial Time-
Windows - something that plays a crucial role in our experiential relationship to 
time. 
Even though Thin-PSA accounts look ~s though they provide ultimately 
unsatisfactory pictures of temporal experience, it isn't enough for us to simply 
abandon Thin-PSA. As I shall show in the next chapter, the accounts of both Dainton 
and Foster - theorists who reject Thin-PSA - ultimately prove no more satisfactory. 
This problem - that we appear to be in trouble if we accept or if we reject Thin-PSA -
provides the motivation for the positive account that I propose in chapter seven: an 
account that examines what it is that is driving acceptance of the Thin-PSA in the 
first place. 
Chapter Six: Accounts That Reject Thin-PSA: Dainton and Foster 
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§1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss two accounts that reject Thin-PSA - the accounts of Foster 
and Dainton. Without being able to appeal to Thin-PSA, these accounts are forced to 
introduce a sui generis feature of experience - a feature they call' co-consciousness' -
to account for 'experienced togetherness'. I appealed earlier on (in chapter three) to 
Foster's claim that: 
Duration and change ~eem to be presented to us with the same phenomenal 
immediacy as homogeneity and variation of colour through space ... When I listen to 
a tune, the duration and succession of notes seem to be as much an auditory datum -
part of the content of my auditory experience - as their pitch and loudness.19o 
I suggested that the sense of 'immediacy' in this passage is to be thought of in terms 
of Sensorial Presence. Accordingly, in what follows, I take both Foster and Dainton 
to be attempting to account for the Sensorial Presence of temporally extended 
happenings in experience. When Foster and Dainton talk about the 'Specious 
Present' or 'experienced togetherness', I thus take them to have in mind Sensorial 
Time-Windows. 
One final thing to note about both Foster and Dainton is that, at first glance, neither 
of them appear to attempt to provide an account of 'Temporal Presence' - the way 
190 Foster, The case for idealism, 255. 
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that items are experienced as 'happening now' or 'as present'. However, both 
advocate the Metaphysical PPC - the claim that I shall suggest in the next chapter, 
enables us to account for Temporal Presence in a way that avoids the problems faced 
by Specious Present Theory and Memory Theory. Perhaps, then, Dainton and Foster 
have a similar project in mind - though such a project is certainly not made explicit 
in either of their accounts. 
§2: Setting up Dainton and Foster's Accounts 
Dainton and Foster don't attempt to provide an account of the Memorial Presence of 
temporally extended happenings. Dainton suggests that an account constructed 
along the lines of his or Foster's is best thought of as an account of the' elementary' 
aspects of temporal experience - these 'elementary aspects' I am reading as the 
Sensorial Presence of temporally extended happenings.191 
Dainton sets out his account of temporal experience as a development of Foster's 
account. Accordingly, the initial phases of their accounts are very similar. Both begin 
by admitting a distinction between the time in which an act of awareness occurs, and 
the time the object of awareness is experienced as occurring in. 
While admitting this distinction in principle, Dainton and Foster go on to claim that 
the two distinguished elements turn out to be concurrent - they claim that, in order to 
191 Dainton, "Time in Experience," 41. 
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account for the phenomenology of temporal experience, we must adhere to 
Metaphysical ppc. The example used to illustrate this is that of hearing a C major 
scale played with no pauses between the successive notes. As we listen to the scale 
we will ... 
... Undergo a series of total auditory experiences, the first presenting the pattern 2 
units of silence before 1 unit of C, the second the pattern 1 unit of silence before 1 unit of C 
before 1 unit of D, the third the pattern 1 unit of C before 1 unit of D before 1 unit of 
E .. . and so on.192 
Foster's talk of 'total' auditory experiences in this passage is clarified as follows: 
When I speak here of a 'total' auditory experience, I mean one which is not part of a 
larger auditory experience. A total auditory experience need not, of course, be a total 
experience simpliciter (one which is not a part of any larger experience), though, for 
convenience of exposition, I shall assume that what feature in my example are total 
auditory experiences in this stronger sense.193 
So, we have the notion of a 'total' experience being explained in terms of the 
relationship of parthood. I take it that what Foster is attempting to capture in both of 
these passages is the 5e~sorial Time-Windows claim. 
192 J. Foster, The immaterial self(Routiedge, 1991), 248. 
193 Ibid. 
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So, in Foster's example, we have a series of overlapping Sensorial Time-Windows: 
where, at this stage in Foster's account, the overlap is to be thought of as an overlap 
of the contents of experiences, without any commitment to the notion that the 
experiences themselves overlap. Foster also notes that his account involves the 
additional simplification that "the succession of experiences will exactly keep pace 
with the succession of notes in this way" and that "it may be that the whole series of 
experiences is literally continuous (or at least dense) and that the qualitative change 
in their phenomenal time-patterns is likewise continuous (or dense)."194 
Foster suggests that an account that posits a series of overlapping total experiences 
will face the 'repeated contents' objection: 
This overlap ... seems to imply that, while each total pattern is heard only once, its 
parts are heard more than once ... consider the qualitative item 1 unit of C. This item 
features .. .in each of the patterns presented by the first three total experiences. So it 
seems that I have to hear this C-period three times ... But of course, this is just not the 
case.195 
That this objection may not be as troubling as Foster gives credit has been discussed 
in chapter four. However, just as in the previous chapters, the problem of lingering 
" 
contents cannot be avoided by such an account, so we ought to agree that some 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
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move needs to be made to attempt to avoid at least this second problem. Foster's 
response to this problem is to suggest that not just the contents of experiences, but 
the experiences themselves must overlap: 
Thus let us call the first three total experiences El, E2, and E3, and let us call the three 
patterns they respectively present Pl (2 units of silence before 1 unit of C), P2 (1 unit of 
silence before 1 unit of C before 1 unit of D), and P3 (1 unit of C before 1 unit of D before 1 
unit of E). Then we should say: that El and E2 contain, as a common component, an 
experience of that smaller pattern (1 unit of silence before 1 unit of C) which is the 
common component of Pl and P2.t96 
Foster's suggestion is to claim that different 'total experiences' can share common 
parts. This move enables him to resist the charge that, if something is experienced in 
two different Sensorial Time-Windows (or 'total experiences') it will be experienced 
twice: 
There is only one hearing of 1 unit of silence before 1 unit of C, though it is a component 
of three total hearings.t97 
Foster's account is intended as a response to the repeated contents objection, though 
the real difficulty that it needs to deal with is the lingering contents objection. 
Accordingly, what we really ought to be concerned with is whether Foster's account 
196 Ibid., 249. 
197 Ibid. 
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ends up being able to deal with the lingering contents objection (this point is raised 
by Gallagher, in connection with Dainton's account, as I shall show later). 
Before discussing Gallagher's remarks, it is worth noting that in order for Foster's 
suggestion about 'sharing common parts' to work, it is necessary that experiences 
themselves be temporally extended - it is necessary that experiences have temporal 
parts that can be shared. It is here that the Metaphysical PPC is put to work -
experiences are temporally extended, and the period of time in which the content of 
that experience is represented as occurring is numerically identical with the period 
occupied by the experience: 
We have to take each experience to extend over a period of real time in a way which 
exactly matches the phenomenal period it presents.t98 
Once we have arrived at this claim - that we should think of experiences as 
temporally extended, and as concurrent with their contents - the question of how to 
account for the Sensorial Time-Window re-emerges. Why don't we, on Foster and 
Dainton's accounts, just have one long temporally extended experience in which 
everything is experienced together? 
.. 
When we experience the C-major scale mentioned earlier, we experience the scale for 
the same period of time as the period that the scale is experienced as occurring in. 
198 Ibid. 
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How, then, are we to 'carve up' this long temporally extended period of experience 
into a series of Sensorial Time-Windows? It is at this point that Foster and Dainton 
both appeal to the notion of co-consciousness. 
By allowing total experiences to be extended in real time, we are allowing the relation 
of strict co-consciousness (the relation which holds between experiences which are 
parts of a single experience) to relate experiences which occur at different times. Thus 
El will contain three successive and non-overlapping experiences -a presentation of 1 
unit of silence followed by another presentation 1 unit of silence followed by a 
presentation of 1 unit of C - and these successive experiences, being parts of El, will 
qualify as strictly co-conscious.199 
So, Foster suggests that we should think of the experience of the scale as consisting of 
a series of experiences of each individual note, where successive experiences in the 
series are related by 'co-consciousness' to form 'total experiences'. These 'total 
experiences', in which all of the elements of the 'total experience' are 'co-conscious', 
are what account for Sensorial Time-Windows. Foster also notes that this 
relationship of 'co-consciousness', while transitive within Sensorial Time-Windows, 
is not transitive between experiences with a temporal distance between them greater 
than that of Sensorial Time-Windows. 
199 Ibid., 249-50. 
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Dainton is particularly keen to emphasise the failure of transitivity of co-
consciousness between experiences separated by duration greater than that of 
Sensorial Time-Windows: 
Do-Re is a temporally extended total experience, the parts of which are all mutually 
coconscious; since the same applies to Re-Mi, both of these extended totals are 
maximally connected phenomenal wholes ... If ... [transitivity] ... were to apply in the 
diachronic case, then every part of Do-Re would be co-conscious with every part of 
Re-Mi since these two phenomenal wholes overlap. However, by hypothesis Do is not 
co-conscious with Mi.200 
The claim that co-consciousness is not transitive in the diachronic case is the first 
thing that ought to make us concerned about accounts involving' co-consciousness'. 
The reason for concern is Dainton's insistence that in the synchronic case, it is 
transitive, as well as his claim that: 
When simultaneous experiences are co-conscious, what is the nature of this 
relationship, what can be said about it from a purely experiential perspective? My 
answer to the latter question will be: nothing.201 
On Dainton's conceptipn of co-consciousness, we cannot analyse it in terms of 
anything that features in experience: in this sense, co-consciousness is a primitive 
200 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 168. 
201 Ibid., 25. 
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experiential relation. However, this doesn't stop Dainton from describing the logical 
properties of the relation. Dainton asserts that co-consciousness is transitive in the 
synchronic case, but not transitive in the diachronic case. There are two questions 
that we can ask about this: the first is 'What reason do we have for thinking that it is 
the same relation in both cases?'; the second is 'How are we to individuate 
experientially primitive relations?' 
Surely one constituent of an account of how to individuate relations will be an 
appeal to their logical properties. If we have one relation that is transitive 
(synchronic co-consciousness), and one that is not (diachronic co-consciousness), 
then, on this proposal, we just have two different relations. This objection is 
extremely important for Dainton's overall account of the unity of consciousness, 
given that his stated aim is to show that: 
The same basic relationship of co-consciousness is responsible for the unity of 
consciousness both at and over time.202 
In answer to the other question raised above (,What reason do we have for thinking 
that it is the same relation in both cases?'), Dainton says the following: 
202 Ibid., 27. 
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If we want to say that synchronic and diachronic co-consciousness are two 
manifestations of the same relationship, and there is every reason to suppose this is 
the case, then clearly co-consciousness is not, by its very nature, transitive.203 
I am not sure what the reasons Dainton has in mind here are. One of them may be his 
appeal to the idea that the contents of Sensorial Time-Windows are sensed 'together' 
in the same way as the contents of consciousness at a time. I shall discuss this claim 
shortly, in connection with the 'lingering contents' objection. 
§3: Similarities and Differences Between Dainton and Foster 
Dainton is in agreement with Foster about the way in which an account of temporal 
experience is to be developed on all the above points. They agree with the following 
claims about temporal experience: 
a) Thin-PSA should be rejected in favour of the Metaphysical ppc. 
b) The difference between experiences that occur in the same 'Sensorial Time-
Window' and experiences that do not is to be explained in terms of the 
relation of 'Co-cc1nsciousness'. 
203 Ibid., 168. 
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c) 'Co-consciousness' is transitive within Sensorial Time-Windows. 
d) 'Co-consciousness' is nontransitive over intervals greater than that of a 
Sensorial Time-Window. 
However, there are also some differences between the two accounts. The first 
difference we can note concerns the notion of 'co-consciousness'. Foster offers the 
following definition of co-consciousness: 
Simultaneous experiences qualify as co-personal if and only if they are components 
of a single complex experience - elements of a single episode of consciousness and 
accessible to the same introspective awareness. Let us speak of experiences which are 
rendered co-personal in this way as 'strictly co-conscious'.204 
We can distinguish various claims being made about co-consciousness by Foster in 
this passage - there is a claim that co-conscious experiences are' experiences that are 
components of a single complex experience.' 
There is also a claim that co-conscious experiences are 'experiences that are 
experienced 'together' (as 'elements of a single episode of consciousness') and that 
are accessible to the same introspective awareness'. In this interpretation, I am 
204 Foster, 171e immaterial self, 245-6. 
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assuming that Foster's talk about 'single episodes' of consciousness is a way of 
attempting to describe what I have called' experienced togetherness'. 
It looks as though Dainton and Foster will agree about the first claim about co-
consciousness - Dainton frequently talks of experiences as being' composed' of other 
experiences (" all the component parts of a single experience ... are co-conscious with 
each other."205). However, it isn't obvious that Dainton will agree with the second 
claim, for Dainton takes co-consciousness to be an unanalysable relation between 
experiences that captures our talk of experienced 'togetherness', whereas Foster can 
be read as claiming that co-consciousness is to be analysed in terms of introspection 
(Foster claims that co-conscious experiences are' accessible to the same introspective 
awareness'). 
How exactly are we to interpret Foster's claim about introspection? Foster could 
either be making what Dainton calls the 'strong I-thesis' claim, or the 'weak I-thesis' 
claim. 
Strong I-Thesis: fICo-consciousness is constituted by introspectibility ... A 
group of token experiences are co-conscious if and only if they are either the 
actual or potential objects of a single introspective awareness."206 
205 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 88. 
206 Ibid., 35. 
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Weak I-Thesis: "Co-consciousness is not constituted by introspectibility, but 
the two are correlated: if a group of experiences are co-conscious they are all 
actual or potential objects of a single introspective awareness."207 
So, Foster is either taking the notion of 'co-consciousness' as something susceptible 
to analysis - in particular, to analysis in terms of introspection - or he is leaving the 
notion as something unanalysable. If Foster opts for the first suggestion, then his 
conception of co-consciousness is in conflict with Dainton's, if he opts for the second, 
then his conception may not be (Dainton claims that, for a certain kind of 
introspection - 'passive' introspection - lithe ;weak I-thesis may well be largely true -
for beings whose minds are like ours."208). 
If Foster is interpreted as committing to the strong I-thesis, then his account faces the 
charge of getting the order of explanation the wrong way round - a point noted by 
both Dainton and Tye.209 The feature of experience that Dainton and Foster are both 
trying to account for are Sensorial Time-Windows - the fact that in order to 
characterise the subject's experience at a time, we need to appeal to some interval 
less than or equal to the duration for which the subject has been experiencing. 
The intuitive line of thought that objects to the strong I-thesis claims that 
introspection is best tQought of as revealing features of experience, rather than as 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid., 39. 
209 See: Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 37; Tye, Consciousness and persons, 19-20. 
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constituting them. In this case, the objection is the thought that Sensorial Time-
Windows are features of experience revealed by introspection - a feature of 
experience that exists independently of its being introspectible. In light of this 
objection, I want to suggest that Foster is most charitably interpreted as committing 
to the weak I-thesis - the thesis not in conflict with Dainton's view. 
Another difference between Foster and Dainton concerns the involvement of 'acts' of 
experience. Foster retains the idea that we should think of experiences as involving 
two components: awareness and content, thus adhering to Miller's original 
formulation of the PPC: 
The time interval occupied by a content which is before the mind is the very same 
time interval which is occupied by the act of presenting that very content before the 
mind.21o 
Dainton, however, suggests that it is a mistake to think that experience has such an 
'act-object' structure: 
Since, according to the overlap theory, acts are themselves temporally extended and 
exactly coincide with their contents in temporal extent, nothing would be lost by, as it 
210 Miller, Husserl, perception, and temporal awareness, 107. 
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were, allowing the acts to sink into their contents, integrating awareness with content 
in accord with the Simple Conception of experience.211 
Dainton's reason for abandoning this distinction appears to be that it no longer adds 
anything to an account of temporal experience once we have resolved to account for 
Sensorial Time-Windows in terms of 'co-consciousness'. 
This move, of course, raises the question of what we are to make Dainton's professed 
adherence to the PPC in this context: Gallagher has noted just this point212. In 
response to this worry, Dainton has suggested that we think of the PPC in a way akin 
to how I have formulated it in previous chapters: compare Dainton's "Our 
consciousness of temporally extended contents runs concurrently with the contents", 
with my "The duration of experience in which X is represented is concurrent with 
the duration that X is represented as occupying."213 
The worry about how to understand the PPC might not be troubling for Dainton, but 
we might wonder exactly what he has in mind when he suggests we ought not draw 
an act-content distinction. Here are some remarks Dainton makes about this position: 
211 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 166. 
212 See: S. Gallagher, "Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience," PSYCHE 9 (2003): 10. 
213 Dainton, "Time in Experience," 32. 
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Consciousness is inseparable from phenomenal contents: when a given phenomenal 
item comes into being, it comes into being as a conscious experience ... phenomenal 
contents become conscious simply by coming into existence.214 
According to this view, nothing needs to be added to a phenomenal content to turn it 
into an experience: any and all instantiations of phenomenal properties are fully-
fledged conscious experiences.215 
This assertion of the equivalence of conscious experience and phenomenal content 
Dainton calls the 'simple conception' - I am" taking it that the claim that conscious 
experience and phenomenal contents are inseparable is an assertion of their 
equivalence: they are one and the same. 
If conscious experience and phenomenal contents are indeed one and the same, then 
it must be the case that the properties of a portion of conscious experience are one 
and the same as the properties of the relevant phenomenal contents. This thought 
raises a second worry about Dainton's proposal that we 'allow acts to sink into their 
contents' - namely that the Thin-PSA theorist's attempt to account for 'experienced 
togetherness' in terms of an instantaneous act isn't the only reaSOn to admit the 
distinction between act and content. 
214 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 57. 
215 Dainton, The Phenomenal Self, 46. 
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Some evidence for interpreting Dainton as asserting the identity of the properties of 
conscious experience and content comes from his discussion of Broad. Dainton 
distinguishes between the 'Simple Conception', and the' A-theory' - on the' A-
theory', experiences are to be thought of as consisting of an act of awareness, and an 
object of awareness. Dainton has the following to say about Broad's' A-theory': 
When first considering the issue of whether the A- theory is true of all experiences, 
Broad initially favours a compromise position ... Many types of experience ("true 
sensations") are complexes comprising an objective factor (a "sensum"), and a 
subjective factor (the act ~f sensing), and Broad thinks visual perceptual experiences 
clearly fall into this camp. But there are other types of experience which do not: Broad 
sees no reason to suppose that bodily feelings, the denizens of the "somatic sense-
field", involve an act of sensing. Nonetheless, he goes on to say that if he were obliged 
to treat all kinds of experience in the same way, rather than adopting the view that no 
experiences involve a distinction of act and object, he would opt for the doctrine that all 
experiences involve such a distinction, even though this is by no means always 
obviously the case.216 
Dainton goes on to suggest that in a later passage, 'a different view is tentatively 
announced'. Rather than looking at this view, I want to look at the reason Broad 
thinks that we ought to analyse some experiences into an act-object structure (thus 
advocating an A-theory), and to think of other experiences as lacking this structure. 
216 Dainton, "Ti~e in Experience," 70. 
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It turns out that the reason Broad wants to claim that vision, say, has an act-object 
structure is that it enables us to avoid claiming that the experience of a red object is 
itself red. The reason that he wants to claim that a sensation of pain, say, lacks an act-
object structure, is that the experience of pain is itself painful: 
If we consider the various experiences called 'sensations'. We seem to be able to 
arrange them in an order, starting with those of sight, passing through those of taste 
and smell, and ending with bodily sensations, like headache[s]. Now, as regards the 
top members of the series, the analysis into act of sensing and object sensed seems 
pretty clear. A sensation of red seems clearly to mean a state of mind with a red 
object, and not to mean a red state of mind. 
If we pass to the other end of the series the opposite seems to be true. It is by no 
means obvious that a sensation of headache involves an act of sensing and a 
'headachey' object; on the contrary, it seems on the whole more plausible to describe the 
whole experience as a 'headachey' state of mind .. .it seems plausible to hold that a 
sensation of headache is an unanalysable mental fact, within which no distinction of 
act and object can be found. 217 
Given that the A-theory is what Dainton is committed to denying, and is also what 
Broad takes to allow us to avoid claiming that the properties of the content of an 
experience are one and the same as the properties of the experience itself, it looks as 
though Dainton is committed to a position whereby the properties of the content of 
an experience just are the properties of the experience itself. 
217 Broad, Scientific Thought, 254-255. (Italics mine). 
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This position will clearly raise some uncomfortable questions for Dainton - for 
example, 'is experience of red itself red?' Plausibly - as Broad notes - it is not. It also 
looks as though the position will result in Dainton having to adopt narrow 
conception of the possible contents of experience, on pain of having to answer even 
more uncomfortable questions, for example, 'is an experience of the Eiffel Tower 
itself the Elffel Tower?' 
Perhap~ there are things that Dainton can say in order to respond to these objections, 
but it looks as though Broad's discussion provides us with good reason to avoid 
advocating the Simple Conception - and it isn't clear that the Simple Conception 
adds much to Dainton's picture of temporal experience. Dainton can claim that all 
that does work in accounting for Sensorial Time-Windows on his picture is 'co-
consciousness', without needing to drop the idea of there being a distinction between 
conscious experience and phenomenal content entirely. 
Perhaps, then, this second difference between Dainton and Foster also ought - like 
the 'Strong I-thesis' interpretation of Foster - to be put to one side, and their accounts 
considered as not differing as regards the I-thesis, or the nature of perceptual 
experience. However, even if we take Dainton and Foster to be providing accounts 
that turn out to be extremely similar, Dainton nevertheless provides much more 
detail about how his account is to function than Foster does. I now want to turn to a 
discussion of some of this detail. 
As well as claiming that we ought not admit a distinction between awareness and 
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content, Dainton wants to make a claim about how this content is to be conceived of. 
His account of the content of temporal experience is given in response to the 
following question: 
In hearing Do-Re-Mi we experience Do flowing into Re, and Re flowing into Mi. 
How is this directional flow or passage in immediate experience to be 
explained ?218 
This feature of experience is .the feature that very much impresses the Unmodified 
. 
NaIve Theorist - the feature being that experience unfolds over time, with experience 
keeping us 'up to date' with the state of the world from snapshot to snapshot. The 
Unmodified NaIve theorist attempted to account for this feature of experience by 
suggesting that temporally extended experience consists of a series of 'snapshots'. 
Recall that, on the picture I am proposing, all forms of 'naIve theory' commit to the 
Metaphysical ppc. The distinction to be drawn between modified and unmodified 
naIve theory is to be drawn in terms of how each theorist characterises the subject's 
experience at a time: the unmodified naIve theorist appeals only to a snapshot, 
whereas the modified naIve theorist appeals to some interval with duration greater 
than a snapshot. 
We have already seen what is wrong with the Unmodified NaIve Theorist's view. 
218 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 175. 
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Dainton's clearly rejects the idea that we ought to account for 'unfolding' in terms of 
a series of snapshots: 
According to the overlap theory, most contents of immediate experience are not 
momentary, they possess some short duration, and consequently these contents 
possess an intrinsic temporal organization; the contents consist of a temporal pattern.219 
So, rather than appealing to 'snapshots', Dainton appeals to the content of experience 
involving 'temporal patterns': 
What is the character of these temporal patterns - is it static or dynamic? The answer is 
clear: it is dynamic, the flow or passage in experience is included in the phenomenal 
content of experience. The total experience that results from my seeing a ball move 
between PI and P2 does not consist of stationary imagers] of the ball at two different 
places ... Movement or animation is, as it were, built into the content from the start.220 
I shall return to the issue of what distinguishes Dainton and Foster's accounts from 
an Unmodified NaIve Theory shortly. It turns out, I shall suggest, that the distinction 
consists only in Dainton and Foster's introduction of 'co-consciousness'. To show 
this, we can consider Dainton and Foster's account of the continuity of 
consciousness: the claim. that experiences overlap by sharing common parts. 
219 Ibid., 175-6. 
220 Ibid., 176. 
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§4: Co-Consciousness and Continuity 
One thing Dainton and Foster's discussions of continuity draw attention to is the 
weight borne by 'co-consciousness' in both accounts - weight that it looks unable to 
support. Their discussions draw this attention in the following way. When we 
looked at the example of hearing the C-major scale, Foster and Dainton made the 
'simplifying assumption' that there were only three total experiences involved: one 
of Silence-Silence-C; then one of Silence-C-D; then one of C-D-E. 
However, both Foster and Dainton suggest that there are many more than three total 
experiences involved the C-major scale situation. From moment to moment, the 
subject experiences more and more of the events unfolding around him, and each 
new temporal part of those events that features in experience is experienced 
'together' with a limited interval of what came before. 
How ought we to think of these new temporal parts of experience that represent new 
temporal parts of events? In particular, what are their temporal dimensions - are 
they temporally extended or instantaneous? It looks as though they will certainly be 
snapshots - the smallest possible temporal unit into which experience is divisible. 
Foster and Dainton both suggest that consciousness might be dense (or possibly even 
strictly continuous): 
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It may be that the whole series of experiences is literally continuous (or at least dense) 
and that the qualitative change in their phenomenal time-patterns is likewise 
continuous (or dense).221 
Between E1 and E2 there would be many other total experiences, for example those 
occurring at intervals of one half or one quarter units. These will have their own 
particular contents, for example the experience occurring half a unit after E1 will have 
as its content [one and a half units of Do followed by one unit if Re followed by half a unit of 
silence] ... [this] ... raise[s] the question of just how many total experiences occur between 
any two total experiences which overlap. If total experiences occur in dense 
• 222 succeSSIOns ... 
In which case, as Dainton points out, the snapshots will be instantaneous: 
If total experiences were densely ordered... the single tone Do would comprise an 
infinite number of distinct phenomenal tone-phases (likewise, of course, for Re and 
Mi).223 
Dainton rejects this idea - arguing instead that such' snapshots' are best thought of 
as the 'adirectional Time-Windows' mentioned back in chapter one. He notes that 
there is something uncomfortable about the claim that we ought to think of our 
221 Foster, The immaterial self, 248. 
222 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 169. 
223 Ibid., 170. 
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experience of the tone as involving experience of an infinite number of phases of that 
tone: 
Can we really distinguish, in introspection, an infinite number of distinct phases of a 
single short tone, or a perceived movement? Is there any introspective evidence that we 
can distinguish even a hundred? Physicists currently believe that intervals of time 
below the Planck duration of 10-43 seconds have no physical significance - is it likely 
that such intervals have any phenomenological significance?224 
Dainton's alternative proposal is that 'sna~shots' ought to be conceived of as 
'adirectional Time-Windows_' The 'a directional Time-Windows' model of snapshots 
that Dainton introduces appeals to a number of psychological experiments that have 
been discussed by Ruhnau_ 
In Time, Gestalt, and the Observer, Ruhnau discusses a number of psychological 
experiments concerning our perception of time. On the basis of these experiments, 
Ruhnau concludes various things about the nature of experience. The first 
experiments discussed concern the 'coincidence threshold'. In these experiments, 
two 'distinct stimuli' are presented to the subject with different temporal intervals 
between their occurrences.225 It then emerges that below a certain temporal interval, 
224 Ibid. 
225 It isn't clear whether these distinct stimuli are qualitatively identical and temporally separated, or 
qualitatively distinct and temporally separated. Cf P67 Ruhnau 
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"only one atomic event is observed."226 The temporal interval below which 'only one 
atomic event is observed' is called the 'coincidence threshold', and it turns out that 
the coincidence threshold for acoustic stimuli is 2-3m/ s, for tactile stimuli is 10m/ s, 
and for visual stimuli is 20m/ s. 
The second set of experiments discussed concern the' order threshold': in order for 
the subject of experience presented with the stimuli to be capable of determining the 
order in which the stimuli occurred, the temporal distance between the stimuli must 
exceed 30m/ s. This temporal distance is the same for all modalities. This result -
with the' order threshold' the same across alI..modalities - leads Ruhnau to posit the 
existence of a 'central processing mechanism' involved in our perception of time. 
This posit, in turn, leads Ruhnau to suggest that: 
The brain creates and is structured by adirectional temporal zones or zones of co-
temporality. With respect to external time such 'Time-Windows' appear as 'time 
quanta'. Their duration (of about 30mjs) characterises the functional level of the 
operating system.227 
I think that Ruhnau's idea here is that, within these 'temporal zones', we are not 
capable of discerning the order in which distinct stimuli occur - they are of duration 
less than the' order threshold' - hence they are adirectional. 
226 Ruhnau, "Time-gestalt and the observer," 67. 
227 Ibid., 168. 
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Dainton suggests that these 30msec 'windows' provide us with a more satisfactory 
account of what 'snapshots' are: 
These results suggest. .. the shortest distinguishable successions in experience (for all 
modalities) are of the order of 30msec ... [and] that the maximum span of immediate 
experience will be somewhere between 2-30msec (depending on the type of 
phenomenal content) and three seconds. If we assume that a total experience is a 
phenomenal succession, then given that the order threshold is around 30msec, we 
would expect successive total experiences with discernibly different contents to be 
separated by this sort of interva1.228 
. One thing to quickly note about this passage is that the first thing mentioned above, 
that Dainton suggests that the results show, is not quite right. It is not that 'the 
shortest distinguishable successions in experience are of the order of 30msec', but 
rather that 'the shortest distinguishable successions "in which we can decide which 
atomic event is the first and which is the second"229 in experience are of the order of 
30msec.' Below 30msec (but above the coincidence threshold) we can discern 
succession between atomic events: it is just that we cannot determine which atomic 
event occurred first. 
Regardless of this complication, Dainton is suggesting that 30msec is the relevant 
duration of a 'snapshot". There is clearly some similarity between the accounts of 
228 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 170-171. 
229 Ruhnau, "Time-gestalt and the observer," 167. 
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Dainton and Foster, and the unmodified naIve theory. All three accounts commit to 
'snapshots' playing a crucial role in characterising the way that experience unfolds 
over time. We now need to ask what it is that distinguishes the accounts of Dainton 
and Foster from the unmodified naIve theory. 
The crucial difference between the unmodified naIve theorist's position, and those of 
Dainton and Foster, is that Dainton and Foster have the additional ingredient of 'co-
consciousness' playing a role in their account. It is 'co-consciousness' that explains 
why it is that, at a time, the subject experiences more than just a 'snapshot' (be the 
snapshot instantaneous (as on Foster's view), or an adirectional Time-Window (as on 
Dainton's view)). Everything that falls within a particular temporal interval is 'co-
conscious', and hence experienced together. 
When specifying what does, and what does not, fall within a given Time-Window, 
Dainton and Foster appeal to the notion that temporally extended experience 
consists of a series of 'snapshots' - be they Foster's instantaneous snapshots, or 
Dainton's 'adirectional temporal zones'. By adopting this position, Dainton and 
Foster are advocating something very similar to the unmodified naIve theorist's 
position. Dainton, Foster, and the unmodified naIve theorist all advocate the 
Metaphysical PPC and they all claim that experience is to be conceived of as a series 
of 'snapshots'. The difference between Dainton and Foster and the unmodified naIve 
theorist thus appears td consist entirely in their addition of 'co-consciousness' to the 
picture. 
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The role of co-consciousness, then, is to bear the weight of distinguishing between 
Oainton and Foster's versions of the modified naIve theory, and the unmodified naIve 
theory. I now want to suggest that 'co-consciousness' is, in fact, incapable of bearing 
this weight - that we have no reason to think that' co-consciousness' is not just a 
label for the problem of distinguishing between these two different types of theories -
the modified, and the unmodified, naIve theory. 
The first problem to note about co-consciousness has already been mentioned: prima 
facie, the 'lingering contents' objection appears to have lingered on, despite the 
abandoning of P5A. Gallagher has levelled .. this charge at Oainton - his objection 
runs as follows: 23o let us consider the example of the C-major scale again. On Oainton 
and Foster's views, we have a series of total experiences, each of sufficient duration 
to take in three notes. 
We can alter Oainton and Foster's example slightly, and imagine that the 
experiencing subject starts experiencing just as the initial C is played. So, on their 
simplified picture, we have a total experience E1 (C), total experience E2 (C - 0), and 
a total experience E3 (C-O-E). 'Total experiences' are experiences in which things are 
sensed 'together' - experiences in which things are 'unified'. 
On this picture, Gallagj:ler's objection runs, the tone C is sensed for a period three 
times its duration: it is sensed for the period that it takes for the notes C, 0, and E to 
230 See: Gallagher, "Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience," 13. 
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be played. This is the very same problem of 'lingering contents' that faced views in 
the previous chapter: namely that the view gives us a phenomenologically unrealistic 
result. 
Dainton's response to this objection is to suggest that it rests upon a 
misunderstanding of his view. The objection, he suggests, illicitly conceives of 'co-
consciousness' as involving Thin-PSA: 
Gallagher ... supposes that each momentary phase of [an] extended act apprehends a 
two second long stretch of content ... The problem of ongoing contents is the product of 
the (absurd) union of PPC with [Thin-] PSA. The overlap modet at least as I intended it 
to be understood, involves embracing PPC but rejecting Thin-PSA.231 
As Dainton notes, however, even if Gallagher's objection illicitly involves conceiving 
of co-consciousness in terms of Thin-PSA, part of what is going on in Gallagher's 
objection is a question about exactly what co-consciousness is. 
Dainton's idea is that 'co-consciousness' is all that needs to be appealed to when we 
attempt to explain what 'experienced togetherness' is. It is this thought that 
motivates the rejection of the distinction between 'awareness' and 'content' 
mentioned earlier: 
231 Dainton, "TiIpe in Experience," 20. 
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It is clear that the posited acts of awareness are doing no work whatsoever in 
explaining temporal awareness. Specifically, we no longer need to posit acts whose 
contents last longer than the acts themselves, contents which are apprehended together 
at a single moment in time.232 
Unlike the Thin-PSA theorist, Dainton doesn't attempt to account for 'experienced 
togetherness' in terms of some instantaneous portion of experience being responsible 
for the representation of something temporally extended. Part of the problem that 
Gallagher's objection raises, then, is the issue of how we are to account for 
'experienced togetherness' w:ithout the Thin-PSA model in place. 
Here are some of the suggestions Dainton makes for how we are to account for 
Sensorial Time-Windows: 
How do the contents in a single phenomenal present come to be experienced as a 
unified whole if they are not apprehended by a single act of awareness of the sort 
posited by advocates of the PSA? The answer, I suggest, is that the contents in question 
are related by co-consciousness, the same primitive inter-experiential relationship that is 
responsible for the unity of consciousness at a given time. Just as all the constituent 
parts of a spatial field of content can be directly co-conscious, so too can all the 
constituent parts of a temporal field of content.233 
232 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 166. 
233 Dainton, "Time in Experience," 26. 
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A phenomenal present is a unified phenomenal expanse - its earlier and later parts are 
experienced together - and for an experience to be thus its constituents must be 
transitively co-conscious.234 
The problem for Dainton's account of 'experienced togetherness' is that it fails to 
provide any illumination about the problem of temporal experience - a puzzle that 
arises as a result of the mystery of how we should account for Time-Windows. One 
thing that is presumably meant to render 'co-consciousness' a more substantive 
notion is the claim that' co-consciousness' features in both the synchronic, and the 
diachronic cases. However, as we have seen, it can't be the same relation featuring in 
both cases, as one relation is transitive, and the other is not. 
§5. Conclusion 
We thus have reason for deeming Dainton's account unsatisfactory - namely the 
charge that his account fails to provide a substantive account of Sensorial Time-
Windows - the datum crucial to the problem of temporal experience. The same 
accusation can be directed at Foster's account - we have no reason to think of 'co-
consciousness' as providing a substantive account of temporal experience, as 
opposed to merely labelling the problem. 
234 Ibid., 27. 
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Dainton and Foster's Modified NaIve Theories, then, while they manage to avoid the 
'lingering contents' objection, and the charge that their accounts are better thought of 
as accounts of Memorial Time-Windows rather than Sensorial Time-Windows, 
ultimately prove unsatisfactory. While their accounts have the strength of adhering 
to the Metaphysical ppe, they have the weakness of appealing to co-consciousness. 
In the next chapter I shall turn to the project of providing an alternative version of 
the Modified NaIve Theory: an account that commits to the metaphysical ppe, but 
rejects the idea that the subject's experience at a time is to be characterised in terms 
of a 'snapshot'. 
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Chapter Seven: A Positive Account of Diachronic Unity 
§1. Introduction 
In this chapter I attempt to develop a version of Modified NaIve Theory that avoids 
the problem facing both Dainton and Foster - the problem being that their appeal to 
'co-consciousness' looks too much like a label for, rather than a solution to, the 
problem of temporal experience. I also want to provide an account of what motivates 
the Thin-PSA theorist, and to accommodate that motivation within an account that 
commits only to the Fat-PSA. To do this, I shall distinguish between a number of 
different metaphysical categories that describe the different ways in which items can 
fill time. These categories are: Event; Process; State; and Achievement. 
I shall argue that we can identify a particular kind of metaphysical category: the 
category of 'occurrent state', and suggest that failure to identify this category can 
lead to adoption of Thin-PSA and 'co-consciousness'. I claim that once the 
motivation for these views has been undermined, we ought to adopt a Modified 
NaIve Theory, because this type of view allows us to avoid making revisionary 
claims about the phenomenology. I also suggest that we ought to retain the 
Husserlian account discussed in chapter five as a supplement to the Fat-PSA account 
of Sensorial Time-Willdows I shall provide, because it can provide us with an 
account of Memorial Time-Windows. 
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§2. Distinguishing Between Event, Process, State, and Achievement 
The lines of thought and pieces of evidence that drive the quadripartite distinction 
between Event, Process, State and Achievement have been put to different uses. One 
use they have been put to is in distinguishing between various linguistic categories -
so on this kind of project, Event, Process, State, and Achievement are categories into 
which different kinds of expression fall. Put to a different purpose, they are used in 
distinguishing between different metaphysical categories. 
These two different uses of the data that drive the quadripartite distinction are not 
incompatible, but the usage that is important for our purposes here is the 
metaphysical one. In what follows, I shall focus on developing a picture of the 
differences between Events, States, Processes, and Achievements, conceived of as 
metaphysical categories. 
According to the metaphysical picture I want to outline, Events are composed of 
Processes, and bounded by Achievements. While there is an intimate link between 
Events, Processes, and Achievements, there is also another way that items can fill 
time: they can be States. One suggestion for what distinguishes States from Events 
and Processes is that States do not possess 'temporal parts' - I shall say more about 
this suggestion shortly .. 
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Here are some examples of these four different types of time-filler. These examples 
are supplied by Mourelatos, and are taken from his paper Events, Processes, and 
States:235 
Processes: run (around, all over), walk, swim (along, past), push (a cart). 
Events: run-a-mile, paint-a-picture, grow up, recover from illness. 
Achievements: recognise, find, win (the race), start/stop/resume, be 
born/die. 
States: desire, want, love, hate, dominate. 
What is it that determines whether an item belongs in one of these four categories? 
The easiest category to talk about here is the category of achievements. On the model I 
am proposing, achievements mark the boundaries of states, events and processes -
they mark startings and stop pings, beginnings and endings. The idea of 
'achievements' is that whenever a state, process or event starts, there will be some 
instant that marks the first point in time at which the state, process or event had 
begun to occur. This instant - the instant that marks the boundary of the occurrence 
- is an achievement. 
235 A. P.D Mourelatos, "Events, processes, and states," Linguistics and philosophy 2, no. 3 (1978): 415. 
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While it is relatively easy to specify what an achievement is, it is more difficult to get 
clear on how we are to distinguish between events, processes and states. I want to 
begin by suggesting an intuitive way in which we can draw these distinctions, before 
providing a more precise account later on. The first intuitive distinction I want to 
draw is between events and processes. Events and processes can be distinguished in 
terms of the property of telicity. 
Something is 'telic' or 'possesses telicity' if it is a progression towards an endpoint at 
.. 
which the something in question is completed. Events are telic, whereas processes are 
not. In the examples of events given above, it is clear that the relevant endpoints are 
mentioned in their descriptions (the endpoints are when a mile has been run, when a 
picture has been painted, and so on). Their descriptions contain reference to the 
point at which they are completed. Processes, however, are atelic - they are not 
progressions towards an endpoint at which they are completed. 
The feature of 'telicity' will prove important in what follows when we come to 
examine issues of individuation, for processes, unlike events, turn out not to behave 
like particulars, as far as individuation is concerned. This is due to their lacking the 
telic endpoint in terms of which particular events are individuated. Processes, it will 
transpire, behave more like mass-countable things than particulars. 
'Telicity' thus provides us with a dimension along which we can distinguish between 
events and processes. We now need a way of distinguishing between events and 
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processes, on the one hand, and states upon the other. One way that we can draw 
this distinction is in terms of the notion of 'unfolding'. Events and processes are 
things that unfold over time - we might want to say that they are ways of becoming. 
States, upon the other hand, do not unfold over time - rather, they are ways of being. 
These two ways of drawing the relevant distinctions raise two questions: firstly, we 
want to know what these properties - 'telicity' and 'unfolding' are in more detail. 
Secondly, we want to know how we can tell if a given temporally extended 
happening possesses any of these properties. I want to propose that we can answer 
both of these questions by· looking at Velleman and Hofweber's paper, How To 
Endure. 
The pressing reason for looking at Velleman and Hofweber's paper is that it provides 
a discussion of the intuitions driving two different positions: Endurantism and 
Perdurantism. The reason for looking at this issue concerns the property of 
'unfolding' that was used to draw the distinction between events and processes, on 
the one hand, and states, upon the other. One way of fleshing out this way of 
drawing the distinction is to appeal to 'temporal parts'. 
§2.1: 'Temporal Parts' 
The strategy of drawing the relevant distinctions in terms of 'temporal parts' has 
been employed by Helen Steward: 
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Events and processes have many features of their temporal shapes in common; both 
occur, both have temporal parts ... States seem to have many temporal features in 
common with physical objects. They persist through time (at least usually) and have 
no temporal parts ... states share a temporal shape with physical objects.236 
However, drawing the distinction between events and processes, on the one hand, 
and states, on the other, in terms of their similarity to physical objects doesn't 
straightforwardly furnish us with a grasp of this distinction. 
Firstly, we can note that it is possible to adopt a position about physical objects on 
which physical objects have temporal parts - the perdurantist position. Rather than 
making the commonsense claim that objects endure through time by being 'wholly 
present' at every time at which they exist - the endurantist position - the perdurantist 
claims that objects are spread out through time in the same way as events and 
processes. 
The existence of the perdurantist vs. endurantist debate thus gives us a 
straightforward objection to Steward's characterisation of the event/ process vs. state 
distinction. If we are perdurantists, the objection goes, then how are we to make 
sense of Steward's dist>inction between events and processes, on the one hand, and 
236 H. Steward, The ontology of mind: events, processes, and states (Clarendon Press, 1997), 99. 
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states, on the other? - For if states are like objects, then they do, like events and 
processes, have temporal parts. 
Of course, in response to this straightforward objection, there is a straightforward 
response. Steward can simply claim that, when drawing the above distinction, she 
has an endurantist picture of physical objects in mind - a picture on which physical 
objects do lack temporal parts. Unfortunately, it is at this point that things stop being 
so straightforward; for it is at this point that we might start to wonder what all this 
talk of 'temporal parts' is about. What is the difference being picked out when we 
say that 'X has temporal parts, but Y does not.? 
One area in which we might think to look for some clarification of this point is in the 
literature on the perdurantism vs. endurantism debate - a debate in which the 
participants are traditionally conceived of as disputing whether or not physical 
objects have temporal parts. However, when we look at some of the claims made by 
the participants in that debate, rather than finding sources of clarification about what 
'temporal parts' talk is about, we find both perdurantists and endurantists claiming 
that they don't even know what their opponent's positive thesis about the nature of 
physical objects is. 
Sider, for instance, makes the following claim about endurantism: 
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A core, positive thesis behind the three-dimensional picture has proved elusive. But 
this does not mean that we cannot proceed, nor does it mean that our discussion 
must be inherently vague. For three-dimensionalists are united in their opposition to 
four-dimensionalism, which has been precisely stated. If there is anything else to 
three-dimensionalism beyond this opposition, I challenge its defenders to say what it 
is.237 
And, correspondingly, from the endurantist perspective, van Inwagen has claimed 
about temporal parts that: 
I simply do not understand what these things are supposed to be, and I do not think 
this is my fault. I think that no one understands what they are supposed to be, 
though of course plenty of philosophers think they do.238 
Given this apparent confusion amongst some of the participants about the views that 
they are rejecting, it doesn't look as though we can straightforwardly extract from 
this debate an account of what the difference between something that does possess 
temporal parts, and something that does not, comes to. 
In a recent paper, however, Velleman and Hofweber have attempted to diagnose the 
intuitions driving both.endurantism and perdurantism - and I shall show that some 
237 T. Sider, Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time (Oxford, 2003), 68. 
238 P. Van Inwagen, "The doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts," Material constitution: a reader (1997): 
222. 
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of the ideas contained in their diagnosis are useful for our purposes. The Velleman 
and Hofweber diagnosis, I shall claim, is useful in helping us to set up the distinction 
between events and processes, on the one hand, and states upon the other. 
Velleman and Hofweber's diagnosis of the endurantism vs. perdurantism debate is, 
in part, a response to the difficulty of saying exactly what endurantism and 
perdurantism are.239 As noted above, both Sider and van Inwagen claim to have 
difficulty in understanding what the opposing thesis actually is. 
Velleman and Hofweber provide another source of motivation for looking for such a 
diagnosis - they claim that the endurantism and perdurantism debate, when 
characterised in terms of 'temporal parts', "does not lead to two coherent 
philosophical alternatives."24o The relevant distinction between the positions is not, 
on Velleman and Hofweber's proposal, to be captured in terms of 'temporal parts'. 
Rather, it is to be captured in terms of identity. I shall proceed by presenting their 
proposal, attempting to modify it in response to some concerns while retaining the 
spirit of their insight, and then use the modified proposal for our purposes in 
drawing the distinction between events/processes and states. 
239 Thomas Hofweber and J. David Velleman, "How to Endure," The Philosophical Quarterly Guly 2010): 
1. 
240 Ibid. 
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VelIe man and Hofweber clajm that perdurantism is trivially true, and that 
endurantism is 'seriously flawed' - and so, given this, it is hard to see how there can 
be a debate. About perdurantism, they claim the following: 
[An object's] being temporally extended is entailed by its existing throughout (or 
occupying) and interval of time; its being divisible into temporal parts is entailed by 
the divisibility of the interval that it occupies, into early and later. Given that the 
object's temporal extent is divisible, we can divide the object into preceding and 
succeeding temporal parts corresponding to the earlier and later sub-extents that they 
fill.241 
It looks hard to resist this line of thought. If all that is meant by 'possessing temporal 
parts' is 'occupying a temporal extent, where that temporal extent is divisible into 
earlier and later portions', then we ought to agree with VelIe man and Hofweber that 
objects do, in fact, possess temporal parts. 
Of course, there might then be some dispute about whether or not this 'innocent' (as 
Velleman and Hofweber describe it) notion of 'temporal parts' can do the work that 
the temporal parts theorist requires of it in solving the various problems that 
temporal parts theory is traditionally used to solve.242 However, this dispute isn't 
essential to our purposes here, so I shall suggest we should ignore it. 
241 Ibid., 4. 
242 Two good examples of the traditional perdurantist vs. endurantist battleground are: a) the problem 
of temporary inginsics (how is it that the same object can change its intrinsic properties over time, and 
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About endurantism, Velleman and Hofweber suggest that it is 'seriously flawed'. 
They note that if the above argument in favour of objects possessing temporal parts 
is correct, then endurantism cannot intelligibly deny the claim that objects possess 
temporal parts.243 They claim that the endurance model involves commitment to a 
picture on which objects occupy time by 'moving' along a series of temporal 
positions: 
One source of the intuition that endurance is a coherent form of persistence, we 
suspect, is an image of persistence as "a form of travel through time. On this 
conception of persistence, an object persists by travelling through time and 
occupying different places in time in its temporal entirety. This is analogous to an 
object's travelling through space and occupying different parts of space in its spatial 
entirety. But the latter is coherent only because the object occupies different parts of 
space at different times ... But movement in time can't be understood this way, since 
the dimension along which the object changes position would be the same as the one 
in which its position is being changed.244 
still be counted as the same object, given that Leibniz's law tells us that objects are identical only if they 
have the same properties?) and b) the paradoxes of material constitution (why is it that some distinct 
objects - lumps of clay and statues, for instance - can spatially coincide, flaunting our commonsense 
assumption that that distinct objects can't occupy the same spatiotemporallocation?) 
243 In fact, Velleman and Hofweber want to make an even stronger claim than 'perdurantism is trivially 
true' - they want to claim that it is a 'conceptual truth'. However, this gets us into needlessly 
controversial territory, so I have decided to present a watered-down version of their pro-perdurantist 
argument. 
244 Hofweber and Velleman, "How to Endure," 4. 
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If Velleman and Hofweber are correct that what is driving the endurantist position is 
a commitment to a picture on which objects 'travel through time', then the 
endurantist will indeed be vulnerable to this 'meta-time' objection.245 One response 
at this point is to suggest that there is no reason to think that an endurantist will find 
the 'time-travel' model particularly appealing - and so no reason to think that the 
success or failure of endurantism is to be determined by the success or failure of the 
'time-travel' model. 
.. 
However, if endurantists aren't necessarily affiliated to the 'time-travel' model, then 
this raises the further question of what it is that motivates the endurantist position, 
and what it is the endurantists mean when they say that objects are 'wholly present' 
at every time at which they are present. It is in an attempt to answer both of these 
questions that Velleman and Hofweber present their diagnosis of the intuitions 
driving endurantism and perdurantism, and it is to this diagnosis we now turn. 
Velleman and Hofweber suggest that the endurantist intuition is best captured by 
comparing the way that we think about identity of the self with the way that we 
think about the identity of events and processes. On identity of the self, they say the 
following: 
245 For more on meta-time objections see: Dainton, Time and space, 21-3. 
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What there is of oneself at a single moment is sufficient to constitute a momentary 
part of oneself - a part of the particular person who one is - independently of what 
there mayor may not be of oneself at other moments. At a particular moment, one 
isn't the entirety of one's temporally extended self, but one is entirely oneself, 
possessed of a personal identity fully determined within the moment.246 
In this passage, Velleman and Hofweber suggest that, if we look at a single 
momentary sample of a person's continued existence, that person's identity is 'fully 
determined' by that moment alone. 
I will shortly suggest that we can retain the spirit of what Velleman and Hofweber 
are saying while dropping the claim that we can somehow examine instantaneous 
temporal slices of a particular person. Before doing this, however, I suggest that we 
look at what Velleman and Hofweber have to say about the identity of events and 
processes. On the subject of processes, they have the following to say: 
Consider a process such as writing a check. Writing a check is a temporally extended 
process, with temporal parts consisting in the laying down of each successive drop of 
ink. What there is of this process at °a particular moment - the laying down of a 
particular drop - is not sufficient to determine that a check is being written, and so it 
is not sufficient to determine which particular process is taking place ... Not only, 
then, does the process fail to be present in its temporal entirety within the confines of 
246 Hofweber and Velleman, "How to Endure," 15. 
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the moment: it isn't fully determined by the events of the moment to be the process 
that it is. Within the moment, it isn't all there and it isn't fully itself.247 
In fact, 'writing a cheque' is actually an example of an event rather than a process -
though we can certainly say that the event 'writing a cheque' as composed out of the 
process of writing. 'Writing a cheque' is an example of something telic - something 
that is a 'movement' towards an endpoint at which it is completed - and thus an 
example of an event. Putting this concern about Velleman and Hofweber's choice of 
example at this point to one side, we can still examine the relevant feature of the 
cheque writing that they want to draw to our .. attention. 
When we examine an instantaneous temporal slice of a the cheque-writing 'process', 
Velleman and Hofweber suggest, the instantaneous temporal slice isn't sufficient by 
itself to determine what is in fact going on. At an instant, then, the cheque writing 
'isn't fully itself'. Velleman and Hofweber's suggestion is that the endurantist has the 
intuition that the identity of material objects is fully determined by an instantaneous 
temporal slice of the object - material objects are 'fully themselves' within the 
moment. 
As this relates to the examples, the endurantist considers material objects as 
behaving in the same ~ay as persons, as regards identity at an instant, whereas the 
perdurantist considers them as behaving more like processes. For the perdurantist, 
what there is of an object at an instant isn't sufficient to determine the identity of that 
247 Ibid. 
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object - the object isn't fully itself within the moment. I shall say more about what 
this means shortly. 
The initial way that Velleman and Hofweber talk about the examples above is in 
terms of instantaneous temporal slices of events/processes/persons. However, it 
looks as though there are two different ways that such talk can be interpreted. On the 
first interpretation, Velleman and Hofweber are committed to there potentially 
existing instantaneous temporal slices of temporally extended 
events / processes / persons. 
On the second interpretation, they have something else in mind - something 
reminiscent of what has been called the 'imperfective paradox'. An example of how 
we might come to interpret their proposal in either of these two ways can be found 
the following passage: 
For now, we shall say that a sensation abides just in case its identity is fully 
determined within each moment of its persistence; and that a sensation continues just 
in case it persists but doesn't abide. If a sensation would already be the sensation that 
it is even if it stopped after the first moment, then it can abide as that selfsame 
sensation, by persisting through subsequent moments each of which could equally 
have been its only moment of existence. But if a sensation is the sensation that it is 
,. 
only because of how it will develop, then it continues but doesn't abide.248 
248 Ibid., 16. 
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In the above passage, Velleman and Hofweber mark the distinction between things 
that behave like the cheque writing, as regards what determines their identity (things 
that continue), and things that behave like persons (things that abide). The discussion 
of 'abidance' is where the two different interpretations of instant-talk come in. As 
Velleman and Hofweber formulate the distinction, a thing that abides is a thing that 
'would already be the [thing] that it is even if it stopped after the first moment'. 
One use to which we might want to put Velleman and Hofweber's distinction 
between abidance and continuing is in distinguishing between events and processes, 
on the one hand, and states upon the other..- The distinction can also, of course, be 
used as intended - as a way of distinguishing between a perdurantist conception of 
objects (objects don't abide) and endurantists (objects do abide). 
However, as it stands, there is a reading of the abidance / non-abidance distinction 
that commits its user to the existence of instantaneous states in the former case, and 
instantaneous objects in the latter. As Velleman and Hofweber formulate the 
distinction, it looks as though a thing that abides is a thing that 'would already be the 
[thing] that it is even if it stopped after the first moment'. 
The problem with commitment to the existence of instantaneous states and objects is 
that it isn't at all clear that we have reason to think that such things exist. Firstly, it 
isn't clear under what circumstances an instantaneous state or object could come to 
be. Secondly, it isn't clear under what circumstances we would be led to posit the 
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existence of an instantaneous state or object - it isn't clear what explanatory work 
such a thing could be put to.249 
However, these problems with Velleman and Hofweber's account can be overcome, 
if instead of focussing upon the idea that we can somehow examine how things are 
with events/ states/ processes/ objects at an instant, we think of their remarks as 
appealing to something like the 'imperfective paradox'. Note that in the passage 
above, they appeal to the idea of examining what would be the case, was the 
tern porally extended event/ state/process / object to be stopped. 
This method of examining the temporal constitution of a temporally extended 
happening is reminiscent of the 'imperfective paradox'. Here is Landman on the 
'imperfective paradox': 
The imperfective paradox is the observation that for verb phrases expressing activities, 
like push a cart, the inference from the past progressive to the simple past is valid, 
while for accomplishments, like draw a circle, it is not, i.e., (1) entails (2), but (3) does 
not entail (4): 
(1) Mary was pushing a cart. 
249 That is, it isn't clear what work an endurantist could put instantaneous objects to - and the attempt 
here is to formulate the endurantist's intuition. Stage theorists, who claim that those things we 
ordinarily think of as material objects are in fact a collection of instantaneous stages that can bear sortal 
properties, would of course disagree with the above. 
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(2) Mary pushed a cart. 
(3) Mary was drawing a circle. 
(4) Mary drew a circle. 250 
The imperfective paradox can be treated as a source of insight into the differences 
between various metaphysical categories (object, event, process, state), or it can be 
treated as a datum for linguistic enquiry. The second way of treating the 
imperfective paradox - as a datum for linguistic enquiry - can crudely be thought of 
as fitting the imperfective paradox into a project on which the aim is to uncover 
various structural features of expressions that may not be immediately obvious. On 
this model, the data of (1)-(4) is to be used as part of an enquiry into linguistic 
expressions. 
Krifka is an example of someone undertaking this kind of linguistic enquiry - talking 
about the property of 'telicity' he says the following: 
It is misleading to think that a particular event can be called "telic" or "atelic" ... the 
distinction between telicity and atelicity should not be one in the nature of the object 
described, but in the description applied to the object.2Sl 
250 F. Landman, "The progressive," Natural Language Semantics 1, no. 1 (1992): 1-2. 
251 M. Krifka, "The origins of telicity," Events and grammar 197 (1998): 207. 
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On the other hand, we might take the data of (1)-(4) to tell us something about 
different types of metaphysical category - this is the kind of enquiry that I shall be 
attempting in what follows. On this way of using the data, (1)-(4) tell us about the 
properties of different types of happening - in this case, the data can be used to 
illustrate the difference between events and processes. 
The thought behind this way of using the data is that the inappropriateness of 
applying certain descriptions to certain types of temporally extended happening can 
be used as a source of insight into the metaphysical natures of those types of 
temporally extended happening. I should note at this point that there doesn't appear 
to be any reason to think that we should use the above data in one way rather than 
the other - that is, the data could equally well be used for both purposes. 
I should also note that it might appear tempting to use the fruits of the metaphysical 
enquiry to explain some of the properties of the different expressions used to apply 
to the different types of metaphysical category. If we did this, then we would be 
attempting to use the results of our metaphysical enquiry to shed light on the 
linguistic enterprise. However, this kind of project is not what I am up to in what 
follows: I am merely looking to engage with the metaphysical project. The purpose 
of drawing the above distinction between metaphysical and linguistic uses of the 
datum of the 'imperfective paradox' is just to make it clear to what kind of use the 
above data is being put: 
So, to return to Velleman and Hofweber, and how their account relates to the 
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imperfective paradox, I want to suggest that one useful way to develop their 
suggestions about identity at an instant is to use something like the imperfective 
paradox. If we take a given temporally extended something, and then ask how things 
would be with that temporally extended something was it to be stopped after it has 
been going on for some interval, then we can learn about the temporal constitution of 
that something. 
This isn't the same test as the 'imperfective paradox' - it isn't quite right to talk about 
objects being 'interrupted', and neither can we comfortably talk about states in the 
progressive ('John is knowing/believing that p'). I shall thus call this generalised 
version of the imperfective paradox the' curtailed career test'. This way of reading 
the Velleman and Hofweber account avoids commitment to the existence of 
instantaneous states and objects, and thus ought to be preferred to the first way of 
reading Velleman and Hofweber suggested above. 
§2.2: The 'Curtailed Career' Scenario 
In the imperfective paradox, we are introduced to a distinction between the way 
processes behave when halted, and the way that events behave when halted. In the 
first example of Mary pushing a cart, we discover that if Mary is halted in her 
pushing, it will nevertheless be true that Mary has pushed a cart. In the 'pushing the 
cart' case, we can note that when the pushing is stopped, it is nevertheless true that 
some pushing has occurred. 
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However, this claim must be qualified: VelIe man and Hofweber make an important 
observation about processes in their brief discussion of writing a cheque (even if it 
turns out that the example they use to illustrate the point is actually an event). They 
note that 'what there is of this process at a particular moment...is not sufficient to 
determine which particular process is taking place.' Once again, I want to shy away 
from characterising the temporal profiles of temporally extended things by 
hypothesising about how things would be with them at instants - but we can still 
retain the spirit of their suggestion in a way that doesn't require such hypothesising. 
In the cheque-writing case there is an ev,;;nt -the cheque-writing - composed of 
process - writing. We can focus just upon the writing process, and note that if the 
process of writing is stopped before a minimal interval has elapsed, it will not be the 
case that 'P is writing' entails 'P has written' - for all that the subject may have done 
at the relevant stopping point is lay down a drop of ink. For the case of the writing-
process, then, it is only after a certain amount of the process in question has unfolded 
that 'P is X-ing' implies 'P X-ed'. 
The notion of a 'minimal event' comes from the discussions of Taylor and Dowty.252 
The thought is that, for some processes, in order for it to be the case that 'P is X-ing' 
implies 'P X-ed', some minimal event must have occurred - without the occurrence 
of such an event it will not be true that 'P X-ed'. Dowty suggests that in the case of 'P 
252 See: D. R Dowty, Word meaning and Montague grammar: the semantics of verbs and times in generative 
semantics and in Montague's PTQ (Springer, 1979); B. Taylor, "Tense and continuity," Linguistics and 
philosophy 1, no. 2 (1977): 199-220. 
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is walking', 'P is walking' only implies that 'P walked' if the subject has done more 
than merely lift her foot in the air. There may be debates about what the minimal 
event in question then should be: Dowty suggests two steps, while Rothstein, for 
example, claims only one is required.253 We don't need to take a stance on these 
debates in order to note the important point for our purposes: the point being that, in 
the case of some processes, for it to be true that 'P X-ed', some minimal event must 
have occurred.254 
In the case of the event, Mary drawing a circle, we note that if she is stopped while 
drawing the circle, it is not-true that Mary has drawn a circle. It is not true that the 
" 
'drawing the circle' event has happened - rather, a different event, Mary's drawing 
part of the circle, has happened. If Mary is halted while drawing the circle, then no 
event 'Mary drew a circle' has happened. The interval that must have occurred for 
'Mary is drawing a circle' to entail 'Mary drew a circle' is the duration of the whole 
event. The 'halting' test thus reveals a difference between the temporal constitution of 
processes, and the temporal constitution of events. 
I should note at this point that I am thinking of events as particular, unrepeatable 
happenings. This conception of events enables us to formulate the distinction 
between events and processes as follows: when processes are halted, some of that 
process has happened, but when events are halted, the event has not happened -
253 s. D Rothstein, Structuring events: a study in the semantics aflexical aspect (Blackwell Pub, 2004), 19. 
254 This point may not hold for all processes - something that I shall note shortly with the distinction 
between E- and P- Processes .. 
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instead, some other event has happened. 
Against this line of thought, it might be responded that we can still talk in perfectly 
acceptable ways about 'some' of an event having occurred in just the same way as 
we can talk of 'some' of a process. However, there are a few different senses of 
'some' at work here. When 'some' of an event e occurs, before being halted, we have 
a situation in which the telic point of e is not reached. If the telic point is not reached, 
then we simply do not have an occurrence of event e. 
What has occurred is some event that is relevantly similar to the beginning phases of 
e, but which is not e. In this situation, we can talk about 'some' of an event, and have 
in mind some event relevantly similar to the beginning phases of e, or alternatively, 
we can have in mind the temporal portion of the process constituting the relevantly 
similar event, that would have constituted part of e. 
In the case of processes, however, as long as the minimal amount of process has 
occurred, we have something that counts as an instance of the process in question. 
Unlike in the case of events, there is no distinction to be drawn between some and all 
of the occurrence in question taking place. The role of the 'telic point' is thus crucial-
events possess a telic point in terms of which they are individuated, whereas 
processes do not. 
So, briefly returning to Velleman and Hofweber's proposal, we can note that a test 
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like the imperfective paradox can also be used to get clear' on what the endurantist 
intuition is. If an object exists for a certain period of time, then we can ask about how 
things would be with that object if it were destroyed at some point during its career. 
The endurantist intuition (on this revised version of Velleman and Hofweber's 
proposal) is that, even if the object is destroyed at some point during its career, it will 
nevertheless be true that the object has existed. 
The temporal structure of objects is thus, for the endurantist, to be distinguished 
from the temporal structure of events (for when events are halted during their career, 
it is not true that the event in question has I;appened - as noted above, it is rather 
that some other event has happened). The perdurantist, however, answers this 
question about objects differently. The perdurantist (again, on this revised version of 
Velleman and Hofweber's proposal) will not share the endurantist's intuition that 
the temporal structure of objects is to be sharply distinguished from that of events. 
If an object is destroyed during its career, then, on this model of perdurantism, it will 
not be true that that object has existed - rather another, numerically distinct, object 
will have existed. This is because the perdurantist has the intuition that the identity 
of an object is determined by its whole spatio-temporal career. If this is the right way 
to capture the perdurantist intuition, then it clearly leaves them vulnerable to the 
charge that their account fails to respect the distinction between the temporal profiles 
of objects and events." However, as noted earlier, our purposes here are not to 
adjudicate between endurantism and perdurantism, but rather to extract those 
elements of Velleman and Hofweber's account that are useful for our purposes. 
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Recall that we initially made this foray into the perdurantist vs. endurantist literature 
with the hope of getting a grip on what it means to say of something that it possesses 
temporal parts, and of something else that it does not. Velleman and Hofweber's 
suggestion about endurantism and perdurantism is that the distinction between the 
two views is not best captured in terms of 'temporal parts', but rather instead in 
terms of identity. In the discussion of Velleman and Hofweber, their proposal about 
identity has been somewhat modified, so that it now concerns a version of the 
imperfective paradox. More important than temporal parts, then, is the test about 
how things would be with .a given temporally extended thing, was that thing to be 
.. 
halted/ stopped/ destroyed after an interval of time. 
The important difference in intuition between the endurantist and the perdurantist 
on the reformulated version of Velleman and Hofweber's proposal was that, in the 
case of the object destroyed part of the way through its career, the endurantist (who 
is traditionally conceived of as denying that objects have temporal parts) suggests 
that that particular object has existed. The perdurantist (traditionally conceived of as 
affirming that objects have temporal parts) denies that the particular object in 
question has existed - instead, a numerically distinct object is all that can be said to 
have existed. The relevant distinction between perdurantism and endurantism is 
how they think that objects behave in the 'curtailed career' situation (when a 
temporally extended something is halted/ stopped/ destroyed after an interval of 
time). 
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The relevant distinction for our purposes, then, ought to concern how events and 
processes, on the one hand, and states, upon the other, behave in these curtailed 
career situations. Here is the passage from Steward again, in which the temporal 
shapes of events and processes are contrasted with the temporal shapes of states and 
objects. 
Events and processes have many features of their temporal shapes in common; 
both occur, both have temporal parts ... States seem to have many temporal 
features in common with physical objects. They persist through time (at least 
usually) and have no temporal parts ... states share a temporal shape with 
physicalobjects.255 
If, suitably inspired by Velleman and Hofweber, we translate the talk about temporal 
parts in the above passage into talk about how the various time-fillers behave in the 
curtailed career situation, then we ought to find that, whereas states survive the 
curtailed career situation in the same way as objects (as they are conceived by the 
endurantist) do, events and processes do not. 
We have already seen, above, that events do not survive the curtailed career situation 
- if an event is halted before completion, a numerically distinct event is what results. 
We have also seen thC\,t, below certain minimal intervals, some processes - writing, 
for example - do not survive the curtailed career situation - below minimal intervals 
255 Steward, TIle ontology of mind, 99. 
Page 308 
it will not be true that the relevant process has occurred. In fact, at this point, I 
should note that we can distinguish between two different types of process: P-
processes and E-processes. 
The types of process that render this distinction necessary are occurrences like 
smooth motion, and constant droning. These types of process are things that fit the 
intuitive description of processes - they I unfold' over time, and they do not unfold 
towards some telic point - but they appear to survive the curtailed career situation in 
the same way as states do. If a smoothly moving object, or a constantly droning noise, 
is stopped, then it will be the case that the object has moved, and the noise has droned, 
" 
no matter what interval is in question. 
It looks, then, as though there is a distinction to be drawn between two different 
types of process - those that survive the curtailed career situation no matter what 
interval is in question, and those that only survive if a certain amount of them has 
occurred. This distinction is between processes that are composed of a series of 
events of the same type (E-Processes), and processes that are not so composed (P-
Processes) . 
Examples of E-Processes are walking (a process composed of a subject taking a series 
of steps, where each cO,mpleted step is an event) and swimming (which has the same 
structure, but with strokes replacing steps). We have already encountered some 
examples of P-Processes - constant motion, and constant droning - processes that do 
not appear to be composed out of a series of events of the same type. 
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In the case of E-Processes, that some E-Process is going on doesn't always, below 
certain minimal intervals, imply that some E-Process has occurred. The relevant 
interval will certainly encompass a period of time greater than one of the E-Process' 
constituent events of the relevant type, and may even encompass a period of time 
greater than the time occupied by a number of the relevant events. In the cases of 
walking and swimming, this will depend upon whether the occurrence of one step or 
one stroke is sufficient to count as a case of walking or swimming, or whether more 
steps/ strokes are required. 
In the case of P-Processes, however, as noted above, it appears true that no matter 
what interval in which the P-Process is going on is in question, that some P-Process is 
going on implies that some P-Process has occurred. While E-Processes fail the 
curtailed career test below minimal intervals, P-Processes do not. In this regard, P-
Processes are similar to states: both survive the test regardless of the temporal extent 
of P-Process or State in question. 
To see this, we can turn to an examination of States. Paradigmatic examples of states 
are 'knowing that P', and 'believing that P'.2S6 How do 'knowing that P' and 
'believing that P' behave in the curtailed career situation? If a person knows that P 
for a certain period of time, and then their state of knowledge is curtailed for some 
reason, then we certainly can truly say of that person at the point of curtailment that 
they knew that P. Likewise, if a person believes that P for a certain period of time, 
256 Cf: Ibid., 80. 
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their belief gets curtailed, we can truly say of them at that point that they knew that 
P. States can thus survive the curtailed career situation - even if curtailed, it can be 
said that the state in question has obtained. Thus, it looks as though - so long as we 
translate her talk of 'temporal parts' into talk about survival in the curtailed career 
situation - Steward is right to suggest that states are like objects, as far as this aspect 
of their temporal shape is concerned. 
Given that P-Processes appear to behave like states in the curtailed career situation, 
we face the question of what it is that distinguishes the one from the other. The 
curtailed career scenario is not sufficient by itself to distinguish between Events, 
.. 
States, P-Processes, and E-Processes. The additional ingredient required is an appeal 
to the primitive distinction between something 'going on' and something merely 
'obtaining' - or between something 'becoming' and something 'being'. It may be that 
it is possible to provide some substantive account of this distinction, but I shall be 
taking the distinction as primitive - and focussing only on providing a linguistic test 
that enables us to discern whether or not a given temporally extended happening is 
, going on' or not. 
The relevant test for whether or not something can be said to be 'becoming' - another 
way of describing something that is 'becoming' is that it is occurrent - concerns 
whether or not we can talk about that something in the progressive. Consider again 
our examples of P-Processes and States: 
P-Processes: Constant Motion, Constant Droning. 
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States: Knowing that P, Believing that P. 
While we can talk about P-Processes in the progressive (,The noise is droning', 'the 
ball is moving') we cannot talk about States in the progressive ('John is knowing that 
P, John is believing that P). This feature of P-Processes and States reveals a difference 
in their temporal profiles: namely that states do not' go on' - they are not occurrent -
whereas P-Processes do. As noted above, this difference, between items that are 
occurrent, and items that are not, I am treating as primitive. 
So, at this stage in proceedings, we can distinguish between five different types of 
'time-filler' : 
Achievements: Strictly instantaneous, and mark the boundaries of events and 
processes. 
E-Processes: Temporally extended, and only survive the curtailed career 
situation after a certain minimal interval has elapsed. 
P-Processes: Temporally extended, survive the curtailed career situation no 
matter what interval has elapsed, and are occurrent. 
Events: Temporally extended, and don't survive the curtailed career situation. 
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States: Temporally extended, survive the curtailed career scenario, no matter 
what interval has elapsed, and are not occurrent. 
Having set up these distinctions, we can now return to the issue of temporal 
experience. 
§3: Metaphysics and Temporal Experience 
The stream of experience, we can note, is something that goes on - it is an occurrent 
phenomenon. This feature of experience is noted by O'Shaughnessy, who argues that 
the experiential, and the non-experiential, constituents of mind can be contrasted in 
terms of 'occurrence': 
Even if I am staring fixedly at some unchanging material object, such staring is not 
merely a continuous existent across time, it is an activity and therefore also a process, and 
thus occurently renewed in each instant in which it continues to exist. In short, the 
domain of experience is essentially a domain of occurrences, of processes and events. 
In this regard we should contrast the domain of experience with the other great half of 
the mind: the non-experiential half ... While many of the non-experiential contents of 
this domain could'· continue in existence when all mental phenomena had frozen in 
their tracks, say (fancifully) in a being in suspended animation at 0° Absolute, those in 
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the experiential domain could not.257 
O'Shaughnessy's 0° Absolute test reveals that the stream of experience is something 
occurrent: something that is going on. This is why, in a state of suspended animation, 
the stream of experience cannot continue to exist - for in a state of suspended 
animation, nothing can be said to be going on. The 0° Absolute thought experiment 
provides an alternative test for whether something is 'occurrent' to the 'progressive' 
test described above. 
We have already seen that the 'progressive' test reveals that the States of 'knowing 
that P' and 'believing that P' are not occurrent. Accordingly, 'knowing that P', and 
'believing that P' also survive O'Shaughnessy's 0° Absolute test. As he notes: 
The mental world of a non-experiencing being ... with all its character and contents 
intact could in principle survive indefinitely at ... 0° Absolute: all energy vanished from 
mental and physical systems, all mental change impossible ... the continuation of the 
knowledge that 9 and 5 makes 14 does not as such necessitate the occurrence of 
anything.258 
States, then, are revealed as non-occurrent by both the 'progressive' and the '0° 
Absolute' tests. Things, get more complicated, however, when we turn to the case of 
257 O'Shaughnessy, Consciousness and the World, 42-3. 
258 Ibid., 43. 
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another kind of state: a subject's phenomenal state. 
When we make claims about the phenomenology, we typically express such claims 
in terms of how things seem to the subject - 'It seems to John as if P'. We capture 
'what it is like' for the subject in terms how things seem to the subject to be - 'It 
seems to John as if he can see a red ball', 'It seems to John as if he is in pain'. If we 
examine the behaviour of claims about how things seems to the subject in the 
'progressive' test, we get the result that such claims appear to be claims about States. 
Just as it is inappropriate to claim 'John is knowing that P', it is also inappropriate to 
claim 'It is seeming to John as if P'. Both of these sentences are ill formed. Just as in 
the case of knowledge - where we say 'John knows that P', rather than 'John is 
knowing that P' - in the case of seeming, we say 'It seems to John that P', rather than 
'it is seeming to John that P'. The 'progressive' test, then, reveals that talk about 
'seeming' is talk about states. 
This feature of talk about phenomenology - how things seem to the subject - that it 
appears to be talk about states, presents us with a puzzle. We have just seen, in 
O'Shaughnessy's remarks about the behaviour of the stream of experience in the 0° 
Absolute test, that the stream of experience is an occurrent phenomenon. It is 
plausible that, in orde; for there to be 'something it is like' for the subject, the subject 
must be experiencing - i.e. the subject's stream of experience must be going on. 
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When we apply the 0° Absolute test to the case of talk about seeming, then, it also 
appears plausible that there will not be something it is like for the subject who 
remains frozen. Talk about seeming, then, appears to be talk about States, inasmuch 
as such talk cannot take place in the progressive, but also appears to not be about 
States, inasmuch as it appears plausible that there is nothing that it is like for the 
subject when frozen at 0° Absolute. 
The puzzle, then, is that talk about seeming appears to be talk about things that are 
both States and not States. To resolve this puzzle, we need to introduce an additional 
metaphysical category: the category of Occur;,ent State. Occurrent States are states that 
obtain only in virtue of the taking place of something occurrent - i.e. an event or 
process. Back in chapter two we saw that it is plausible that the temperature of the 
water in my kettle necessarily depends upon the occurrence of certain events - the 
movement of water molecules.259 
We can thus distinguish between those states that depend for their obtaining upon 
the occurrence on certain events or processes (the temperature of the water), and 
those states that are not so dependent (continuation of the knowledge that P, as 
noted by O'Shaughnessy above, 1/ does not depend upon the occurrence of 
anything").260 In contrast to the case of 'knowledge that P', in the case of the 
259 The idea of 'Occurrent States' as distinguished from 'States' is taken from: Soteriou, "Content and the 
Stream of Consciousness." 
260 One response to O'Shaughnessy's claim that the state of knowledge that P does not depend upon the 
occurrence of anything may be to say that we cannot ascribe knowledge or belief to an organism if all 
biological activity in the organism has ceased to occur. On this line of thought, in order to ascribe 
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temperature of the water, there is a necessary connection between the occurrence of 
the relevant events, and the obtaining of the state - we cannot have the occurrence of 
the events without the obtaining of the state. 
The suggestion that claims about how things seem to the subject are claims about 
Occurrent States provides an explanation of how it can be that such claims appear to 
be about things that are not occurrent, but which nevertheless fail the 0° Absolute 
test. The reason is that talk about how things seem to the subject picks out Occurrent 
States - items that are not themselves occurrent, but which necessarily depend for 
their obtaining upon the occurrence of certa~~ events or processes. 
Instead of talking about how things seem to the subject, we can talk about the 
subject's Phenomenal State - where this picks out the relevant Occurrent State of the 
subject. That the subject is in a given Phenomenal State at a time necessarily depends 
upon the occurrence of certain events or processes in the subject's stream of 
experience. I now want to propose that this picture - according to which a subject's 
Phenomenal State at a time depends upon the nature of the subject's stream of 
knowledge to an organism, that organism must be alive. On this proposal, we cannot ascribe knowledge 
to an organism in which all biological activity has ceased, for such biological activity is required if the 
organism is to be alive. However, we can respond to such an objection by noting that we can accept that 
we might be unwilling to ascribe knowledge to an organism that is not alive, but that this doesn't make 
'knowledge that P' an occurrent state. The important feature of 'occurrent state' is that the occurrence of 
certain events or processes necessitates the obtaining of some state. We can then note that the biological 
activity required for life doesn't entail knowledge that P. That there are conditions under which 
knowledge can be ascribed to the subject thus doesn't tell us that knowledge is entailed by the 
occurrence of certain events or processes. 
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consciousness over a period of time - enables us to provide a satisfactory account of 
temporal experience.261 
§4. Accounting for Diachronic Unity 
On the model I am proposing, the subject's stream of experience is an ongoing 
process - an ongoing process that can constitute distinct phenomenal events over an 
interval of time, and that has different properties at different times. The subject's 
phenomenal state at a tim~ necessarily depends upon how the subject's stream of 
experience is over a limited interval of time. The ongoing nature of the stream of 
experience is what accounts for the continuity of consciousness, and the dependence 
of the subject'S phenomenal state upon the nature of the stream of experience over 
some interval is what accounts for Time-Windows. 
Before developing this positive account in more detail, I want to show how the 
category of 'occurrent state' may enable us to account for the intuitions driving Thin-
PSA. Back in chapter one, I suggested two reasons that we might be inclined to adopt 
Thin-PSA rather than Fat-PSA. The Thin-PSA was introduced to explain what it is for 
a subject to experience a collection of items together - and thus account for the Time-
Windows claim. 
261 The claim that an appeal to the metaphysics of 'Occurrent States' is required if we are to provide a 
successful account of the perception of temporally extended happenings has also been defended by 
Soteriou. See: Soteriou, "Content and the Stream of Consciousness." 
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The first line of thought appealed to in support of Thin-PSA was that there appeared 
to be a first instant at which we could experience a collection of items together -
namely the first instant after which all of those items have occurred. The second line 
of thought was that, given that the subject's stream of experience has typically gone 
on for a period of time much greater than the period in terms of which a Time-
Window is characterised, the temporal extension of experience is simply irrelevant to 
an account of Time-Windows. 
Now, over the course of the previous chapte1's, we have seen that the Thin-PSA is not 
a viable option for an account of temporal experience - we have seen that the Thin-
PSA appears to inevitably force some form of unacceptable revisionism about the 
phenomenology. It must, therefore, be a mistake to adopt it in the first place - and, if 
a successful account of temporal experience is to be possible, the lines of thought 
driving support for it must be capable of being accommodated by some alternative 
proposal. 
As regards the first line of thought - that there is a first instant at which we could 
experience a collection of items together, the first instant at which those items have 
all occurred - we can note that the introduction of the category of 'Occurrent State' 
provides an alternative way of capturing the intuition that may be driving this line of 
argument. The starting point for the line of argument that purportedly leads to Thin-
PSA is the idea that the subject's phenomenal state depends upon the occurrence of 
certain things - the items in terms of which the state is to be characterised. 
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One crucial distinction between an 'Occurrent State' and a Non-Occurrent State can 
be illustrated by returning again to the curtailed career scenario. We saw earlier on 
that Non-Occurrent States survive the curtailed career scenario. However, this is not 
always the case with Occurrent States - for, as we have already noted - the obtaining 
of an Occurrent State depends upon the occurrence of some event or process: an 
event or process that may not itself survive the curtailed career scenario. 
Consider an example: the subject sees a red ball moving from position PI to P2 over 
a short interval of time Tl-T2. There is som~thing it is like for the subject to see the 
red ball moving in this fashion - this 'something it is like' we attempt to capture by 
saying 'It seems to the subject as if the red ball is moving from position PI to P2'. As 
we have already seen, this claim about 'seeming' picks out something Stative. That 
the subject is in such a Phenomenal State necessarily depends upon the subject seeing 
the ball moving from position PI to P2. 
A representationalist will want to say that being in such a phenomenal state depends 
not upon the subject seeing the ball moving, but rather upon the subject having a 
visual experience that represents the ball moving. In what follows, I intend to stay 
neutral over the issue of what view of perceptual experience one ought to adopt. 
This neutrality is related to a point discussed in the first chapter - that there are two 
different ways in which one might object to the Thin-PSA. I suggested that one might 
reject the Thin-PSA by claiming that for experience at a time to have the phenomenal 
character it does, it is a requirement that the object(s) of experience be temporally 
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extended. 
This line of response is unavailable to a representationalist, who maintains that all 
that is relevant to determining phenomenal character are the representational 
properties of experience. The line of response to the Thin-PSA that appeals to the 
temporal extension of the object(s) of experience I called the 'Externalist' response. I 
am not making an 'externalist' response to Thin-PSA here: rather, I am making what 
I called a 'Temporal Slice' response. According to this second line of response, 
experience at a time possesses the phenomenal character it does only in virtue of 
being a 'temporal slice' of "a temporally ex~~nded experience. This line of response 
doesn't rule out commitment to any particular view about perception. 
Now, to return to the example of the red ball, we can imagine a situation in which 
the red ball is destroyed before it gets to P2 at T2. What does this scenario tell us 
about the relationship between the subject seeing some event, and the subject's 
Phenomenal State? The first type of answer I want to consider is one upon which the 
category of occurrent state is not recognised - according to this type of answer, the 
only type of states there are, can be states that survive the curtailed career scenario 
(i.e. Non-Occurrent States). 
When discussing the ,Non-Occurrent States of belief and knowledge, we saw that 
both types of State survive the curtailed career scenario: 'John believes/knows that P' 
implies 'John believed/knew that P'. If we think that all states have to behave in this 
fashion, then this will also be the case for a subject's Phenomenal State. In the case of a 
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subject's Phenomenal State, treated as non-occurrent, the claim 'It seems to S as if P' 
implies 'It seemed to S as if P'. Plausibly, it is this line of thought that leads the Thin-
PSA Theorist to claim that there is a first instant at which a collection of items could 
be experienced together - the instant after all of the relevant items have occurred. 
On this line of thought, how things seem to the subject at a time must not outstrip 
how things seemed, so in order to get into the relevant phenomenal state in the case of 
the ball moving from PI to P2, it has to be the case that the subject has seen the ball 
moving from PI to P2. The first instant at which it is possible for the subject to be in 
the relevant phenomenal state is thus the f~.rst instant at which the subject has seen 
the relevant event/ s in terms of which that phenomenal state is to be characterised. 
The Thin-PSA theorist, then, can be read as a theorist initially attempting to provide 
some account of how the subject's Phenomenal State depends upon the occurrence of 
certain events. Without being able to appeal to the notion of an 'Occurrent State', 
however, the theorist is forced to cash out this dependence in terms of there being a 
first instant at which the State could obtain - the first instant being the instant at 
which the temporally extended upon which the state in question depends has 
occurred. 
If we are able to appe~l to the notion of an 'Occurrent State', we are able to reject the 
above line of argument for the Thin-PSA. If we take the subject's Phenomenal State 
to be Occurrent, we don't have to accept that 'It seems to S as if P' implies 'It seemed 
to S as if P'. This enables us to provide a different picture of the way the subject's 
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phenomenal state depends upon the occurrence of certain events and processes - a 
picture of the dependence that doesn't require commitment to Thin-PSA. 
In the case of the temperature of the water and the movement of the molecules of the 
water, we can note that the temperature of the water is a state that obtains 
concurrently with the relevant events involving the molecules. In just the same way, 
we can hold that the obtaining of a given Phenomenal State is concurrent with the 
event! s or process/ es upon which it necessarily depends for its obtaining.262 In the 
case of the subject who sees the red ball moving from PI to P2 over the interval TI to 
T2, we can note that the subject can be in th~,phenomenal state 'It seems to S as if the 
red ball is moving from PI to P2' from TI to T2. The subject is in that Phenomenal 
State over the duration TI to T2. 
Because, on this model of Phenomenal States, how things seem to the subject at a 
time can outstrip how things have seemed (i.e. 'It seems to the subject that P' doesn't 
imply 'It seemed to the subject that P'), there is no motivation to adopt a Thin-PSA 
model of temporal experience. Rather, we need only commit to Fat-PSA, and hold 
that talk about how things seem to the subject at an instant (talk about the subject's 
262 On an approach that commits to both the 'externalist' and the 'temporal slice' responses together, the 
relevant event/s or process/es upon which the subject's Phenomenal State depends will be mind-
independent event/s or process/es. On the 'temporal slice' response that doesn't commit to 
,. 
externalism, the relevant events or processes may be mind-dependent phenomenal events or processes. 
As discussed, I am providing this second kind of response - the response that doesn't commit to 
externalism. On my proposal, the relevant events/processes are phenomenal event/processes -
events/processes in the subject's stream of experience. 
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phenomenal state at an instant) can be made true by how things seem to the subject 
over an interval of time (the subject's phenomenal state over an interval of time) -
with the subject's phenomenal state determined by the occurrence of some 
event/ process in the subject's stream of experience. 
The second line of thought leading to the Thin-PSA was that it doesn't appear to be 
the temporal extension of experience that provides an account of Time-Windows, 
given that a subject's experience normally has a temporal extent far greater than the 
extent required to characterise a Time-Window. Now, on my proposal, the temporal 
extent of a subject's experience is of releva~ce in determining the Phenomenal State 
the subject is in over an interval of time - and is thus of relevance in determining the 
subject's Phenomenal State at a time, given that the subject's Phenomenal State at a 
time is determined by her Phenomenal State over time. By providing an account 
according to which the temporal extension of experience is of relevance in 
determining the subject's phenomenal state at a time (as well as having previously 
demonstrated that accounts that lack an account of this determination fail to account 
for the phenomenology), I hope to have shown that we ought not to find this line of 
thought persuasive. 
We are now in a position to look in more detail at how the positive proposal about 
temporal experience is to work. Over the course of the first three chapters, I 
developed a detailed· description of what exactly the phenomenology was that we 
needed to account for. Over the course of the previous three chapters, I showed why 
rival accounts of this phenomenology have proved unsatisfactory. I now want to 
demonstrate how the Fat-PSA account I have suggested can satisfactorily account for 
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the phenomenology. The various phenomenological claims in question are the four 
varieties of Time-Windows Claim, and Extreme Continuity. 
§4.2: 'Extreme Continuity' 
The first claim I want to turn to is the 'Extreme Continuity' claim. 'Extreme 
Continuity' was the claim that the boundaries of Time-Windows are not manifest in 
the phenomenology of experience. In chapter two I discussed a number of ways in 
which the boundaries of Time-Windows fail to be manifest, and also discussed a 
consideration that might lead us not to expect them to be manifest - namely, that 
there is no 'perspective' manifest in the phenomenology of temporal experience. My 
positive account of the continuity of consciousness consists in the proposal that the 
subject's stream of experience is to be thought of as one ongoing process. 
This ongoing process has different properties at different times, and composes 
different phenomenal events over different intervals of time. O'Shaughnessy's '0° 
Absolute' thought experiment discussed earlier revealed that the stream of 
experience is something occurrent, and we can also note that the stream of experience 
doesn't appear to be event-like. The stream of experience survives the curtailed 
career scenario: if the subject is experiencing, it follows that the subject has experienced. 
The different properties of the stream of experience at different times, and the 
different phenomenal events composed by the stream of experience over different 
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intervals, are what determine the subject's Phenomenal State over time, and the 
subject's Phenomenal State over time in turn determines the subject's phenomenal 
state at a time. Why is it that this picture of the relationship between the subject's 
stream of experience and her different Phenomenal States at different times allows us 
to provide an account of extreme continuity? 
On this conception of the relationship between stream of experience and 
Phenomenal State, the subject's Phenomenal State over an interval depends upon the 
properties of the stream of experience over an interval. To see how this helps us to 
provide an account of continuity, we can :eturn again to Content and the Stream of 
Consciousness: 
If we accept that the fact that a subject is in a state at a time may be determined by the 
fact that there is an interval of time, which includes that instant, during which the 
subject is in that state, then we may also be led to accept the following: The answer we 
give to the question of what state a subject is in at a time is determined by the answer 
we give to the question of what state the subject is in during an interval of time that 
includes that instant, and the answer we give to the question of what state a subject is 
in during an interval of time that includes that instant is going to be contextually 
dependent on the interval of time we have in mind.263 
If the subject's Phenomenal State at an instant is determined by her Phenomenal 
State over an interval of time, with that Phenomenal State in turn determined by how 
263 Soteriou, "Content and the Stream of Consciousness," 554. 
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the subject's stream of consciousness is over an interval of time, then there will be a 
number of different candidate Phenomenal States obtaining at a time in terms of 
which the subject's experience can be characterised. As Soteriou puts it later: 
Given that there are indefinitely many different periods of time that any instant will 
part of, it is a mistake to think that we can identify the perceptual state a subject is in by 
specifying the time at which it obtains and then ask after the content of that state.264 
On this proposal, there is no such thing as the Phenomenal State that the subject is in 
at a time: there are any number of distinct, .. non-rivalrous Phenomenal States, all of 
which provide equally good characterisations of what it is like for the subject at the 
relevant time. All of these distinct Phenomenal States obtain in virtue of distinct 
intervals of the subject's stream of experience. 
On this proposal, then, it as not as if there is any such thing as the interval relevant to 
characterising the subject's experience at a time: there are an indefinite number of 
candidates, all of which can provide satisfactory accounts of 'what it is like' for the 
subject at that time. Given this, we ought not to find it surprising that the boundaries 
of Time-Windows are not manifest in the phenomenology - for there is no such thing 
as the bounded interval whose boundaries could be manifest. 
Of course, in order for us to have a genuine account not just of extreme continuity, 
264 Ibid., 559. 
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but also of Time-Windows, we have to interpret the claim that 'there are indefinitely 
many periods of time that any instant could be part of' in a particular way - a way I 
shall discuss in more detail very shortly. The account of 'extreme continuity' I have 
provided is that the boundaries of Time-Windows are not manifest because there is 
no such thing as the Time-Window relevant to characterising a subject's experience at 
a time. I now want to turn to a discussion of how we can account for the various 
'Time-Windows' claims distinguished in chapter three. 
§4.3: Time-Windows 
The first Time-Windows claim introduced was the Phenomenal Time-Windows claim: 
'The Phenomenal Time-Windows claim': To characterise experience at a time 
we need to appeal to something temporally extended: temporally extended 
happenings are Phenomenally Present at a time. The temporal extent in 
question will be equal to or shorter than the period of time for which the 
subject has been experiencing. 
The Phenomenal Time-Windows claim, I suggested earlier, was useful in allowing us 
to set up the problem of temporal experience relatively straightforwardly, but the 
heart of the problem lies with the Sensorial and Temporal Time-Windows claims. It 
is to these claims that I shall now turn. In accounting for both of these claims, the 
Page 328 
Phenomenal Time-Windows claim will also be accounted for, as the Sensorial and 
Temporal presence are to be thought of as varieties of phenomenal presence. 
The Sensorial and Temporal Time-Windows claims were, to recap, the following: 
'The Sensorial Time-Windows claim': To characterise what is sensorially 
present in experience at a time we need to appeal to something temporally 
extended: temporally extended happenings are Sensorially Present at a time. 
The temporal extent in question will be equal to or shorter than the period of 
time for which the subject has been experiencing. 
'The Temporal Time-Windows claim': To characterise what is temporally 
present in experience at a time we need to appeal to something temporally 
extended: temporally extended happenings are Temporally Present at a time. 
The temporal extent in question will be equal to or shorter than the period of 
time for which the subject has been experiencing. 
The important common theme in all of the Time-Windows claims is that the 
temporal extent in terms of which the subject'S Phenomenal State is to be specified is 
always equal to or shorter than the period of time for which the subject has been 
experiencing. It is this feature of Time-Windows that requires us to interpret the 
claim that 'there are indefinitely many periods of time that any instant could be part 
of' in a particular way. 
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If we appeal to the notion of the subject's Phenomenal State in order to account for 
the 'Time-Windows' claim, then we need to ensure that the subject's Phenomenal 
State depends upon the occurrence of events/processes over a limited interval of 
time. The indefinitely many periods of time that the instant we are concerned with, 
when providing an account of a subject's experience at a time, must accordingly be 
limited. We cannot interpret the claim that there are 'indefinitely many periods of 
time that any instant could be part of' as telling us that we can appeal to any 
temporal interval for which the subject has been experiencing in characterising the 
subject's Phenomenal State at a time. 
Rather, we can note that, even if it isn't the case that we can appeal to any interval 
whatsoever in characterising the subject's Phenomenal State at a time, we can still 
retain the thought that there may be indefinitely many relevant intervals. The view 
being proposed can allow this is by claiming that a given instant can be part of 
indefinitely many intervals at a time, even if there is a limit to the possible temporal 
extent of those intervals. Firstly, we can note that the relevant instant is encompassed 
by indefinitely many intervals of shorter duration than the maximum possible -
there are indefinitely many ways in which the duration of the intervals in terms of 
which the Phenomenal State is characterised can vary. 
Secondly, we can note that, even if we hold fixed the duration of the relevant 
interval, there are indefinitely many periods with that duration that the relevant 
interval is encompassed by. In this way, then, the two claims: that there are 
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'indefinitely many periods of time that any instant could be part of' and that there 
are limits to the period of time in terms of which the subject's Phenomenal State at a 
time can be characterised, can be reconciled. 
The relevant interval in terms of which a subject's Phenomenal State at a time is to be 
characterised can thus be temporally limited in the way required by the 'Time-
Windows' claims. Given this, we can account for the Sensorial and Temporal 
presence of temporally extended happenings by noting that items are both 
Sensorially and Temporally present in the subject's stream of experience over an 
interval of time. Items are Sensorially and T~mporally Present throughout the course 
of a whole stream of consciousness, and what is Sensorially and Temporally Present 
in experience changes as the stream of experience goes on. In order to characterise 
the subject's Phenomenal State at an instant, however, we can only appeal to a 
limited temporal stretch of the subject'S stream of experience. 
In the discussion of Temporal Presence back in chapter three, I noted that I was 
leaving it open how, exactly, the notion of Temporal Presence was to be cashed out. I 
also noted that both the Specious Present Theorist and the Memory Theorist have 
objections to one another's accounts that prevent either from being wholly 
satisfactory. The Memory Theorist objects to the Specious Present Theorist by 
questioning how something with discernable earlier and later temporal parts can be 
experienced' as present', and the Specious Present Theorist responds by noting that it 
cannot be that a mere 'snapshot' is experienced as present, given that we don't find 
any 'snapshots' in the phenomenology. 
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In response to this exchange, I suggested that there may a way to avoid these 
problems if we provide an account that commits only to the Fat-, rather than to the 
Thin-PSA. On the view I want to propose, the Memory Theorist's conception of 
token-reflexivity as Concurrent token-reflexivity is to be combined with the Specious 
Present Theorist's observation that we need the items experienced as Temporally 
Present to be themselves temporally extended. 
I want to propose that the Metaphysical PPC provides us with our account of what it 
is for something to be experienced as Temporally Present. Recall the earlier distinction 
between the PPC (a claim about the phenomenology) ... 
The PPC: It seems as if the duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying . 
... and the Metaphysical PPC - a claim I suggested that we might want to introduce 
as a way of accounting for the PPC: 
Metaphysical .. PPC: The duration of experience in which an item X is 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying. 
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The proposal, then, is that we commit to the Metaphysical ppc. By doing this, we not 
only provide a straightforward account of the (non-metaphysical) PPC, but we also 
get an account of what it is for something to be Temporally Present in experience. On 
this proposal, for an item to be Temporally Present is for it to be represented by a 
period of experience concurrent with the duration the item is represented as 
occupying. It is experience's having the structure of the Metaphysical PPC that 
provides us with our account of what 'Temporal Presence' is. 
On this proposal, temporal experience is concurrently token-reflexive. Recall the 
discussion in chapter three, in which I clai~ed that an item is concurrently token-
reflexive if the time period occupied by the truth maker of the item is concurrent 
with the time period occupied by the item itself. My claim is that perceptual 
experience is concurrently token-reflexive - so the truth-maker for a period of 
perceptual experience will be concurrent with the period of time occupied by 
perceptual experience itself. 
Noting that there are temporal limits to the extent of the subject's experience in terms 
of which the subject's phenomenal state at a time is to be characterised enables the 
account to retain the idea that there are temporal limits to what seems to be 
temporally present to the subject at a time. Temporal Presence is thus accounted for 
by the claim that the temporal location of the stretch of experience in question 
determines the temporal location in which the objects of that stretch of experience are 
represented as occurring - with those two temporal locations always concurrent. 
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How does this position fare when presented with the problems that faced the 
Specious Present Theory and the Memory Theory? One problem that can be dealt 
with straightforwardly, on this proposal, is the Specious Present Theorist's thought 
that the items temporally present in experience must be temporally extended. On the 
Metaphysical ppe account of temporal presence, temporally extended items are 
temporally present in experience when represented by a period of experience 
concurrent with their apparent temporal location. 
How this proposal solves the Memory Theorist's objection is not so straightforward. 
There are two distinguishable lines of th!::lUght that may constitute the Memory 
Theorist's objection to Specious Present Theory. The first line of thought is that the 
only sense in which something can be 'temporally present' is if it is experienced as 
strictly present - where the 'strict' present is the instant marking the boundary 
between past and future. This line of thought thus objects to the Specious Present 
Theorist claiming that anything temporally extended can be experienced as present. 
The second line of thought that the Memory Theorist might be appealing to concerns 
the Specious Present Theorist's conception of the token-reflexivity of experience. The 
Specious Present Theorist, we noted earlier, commits to Weak, rather than to 
Concurrent, token-reflexivity of temporal presence. On the Specious Present 
Theorist's view, then, items given as occurring earlier than the time at which the 
relevant portion of experience in which they are represented can be experienced as 
present - even though, as noted, they are given as occurring before the relevant 
portion of experience. The Memory Theorist's objection to this proposal may thus not 
necessarily involve appeal to the strict present, but rather may be an expression of 
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scepticism about how something can be represented as earlier, but nevertheless as 
happening now or 'as present'. 
Now, the view I am proposing provides a way of responding to the second possible 
line of thought, because the Metaphysical ppe model of Temporal Presence commits 
to Concurrent, rather than to weak, token-reflexivity as temporal presence. On the ppe 
model, nothing is represented as occurring earlier than the relevant portion of 
experience, and also as present: the duration of experience in which an item is 
represented is always concurrent with the duration the item is represented as 
occupying. 
The view I am proposing doesn't provide a way of responding to the line of thought 
which suggests that the only intelligible conception of 'present' is the strict present 
beyond that already provided by the Specious Present Theorist: namely to note that 
we simply do not find 'snapshots' in experience, and so we ought not to expect to 
find the' strict' present featuring in experience. Despite this, I hope to have shown 
that the Metphysical ppe model has some advantages inasmuch as it avoids some of 
the difficulties facing both the Specious Present theory and Memory Theory by 
accommodating the Specious Present Theorist's conception of what gets experienced 
as present, and the Memory Theorist's conception of the token-reflexivity of 
temporal presence. 
At this stage in proceedings we have positive proposals for how we ought to account 
for the continuity of the stream of consciousness, and for three out of the four Time-
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Windows claims. We also have an explanation of the (non metaphysical) PPC -
namely, the metaphysical ppc. The final piece of the puzzle is the final Time-
Windows claim: the Memorial Time-Windows claim: 
The Memorial Time-Windows claim: At a time, the subject can retain a grasp 
of some temporally extended happening, of duration equal to or shorter than 
the period of time for which the subject has been experiencing, via a faculty 
distinct from perception: the subject's short-term memory. 
I suggested earlier - in the discussion of Husserl in chapter five - that Husserl's 
account turned out to look either like a flawed account of the Sensorial Presence of 
temporally extended happenings in experience, or of a plausible account of the 
Memorial Presence of temporally extended happenings in experience. Accordingly, I 
suggest that we help ourselves to the Husserlian account of 'retention' in providing 
an account of Memorial Time-Windows. According to this account, the subject 
retains a grasp of previously experienced items via the distinct faculty of retention. 
My purposes here are not to provide a detailed discussion of Memorial Time-
Windows and Retention - while both items may raise particular puzzles about our 
relationship to time, the main focus of this thesis is on more general problem of 
temporal experience: the puzzle that results from the following triad of claims: 
1) It seems as if we can experience temporally extended happenings. 
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2) The PPC: It seems as if the duration of experience in which an item X is. 
represented is concurrent with the duration that X is represented as 
occupying. 
3) Time-Windows: To characterise a subject's experience at a time we need to 
appeal to some interval that is equal to or shorter than the period of time for 
which the subject has been experiencing. 
As noted earlier, the claims are not themselves inconsistent - it is rather that claim two 
(the PPC) looks as though it is best accounted for in terms of the Metaphysical PPC, 
and claim three (Time-Windows) is best accounted for in terms of the Thin-PSA. The 
Metaphysical PPC and the Thin-PSA do, of course, contradict one another. By 
adopting the Fat-PSA and the Metaphysical PPC (which are not contradictory) this 
purported puzzle about temporal experience can be solved. 
§5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated how it is that one might attempt to account for 
the above three claims while avoiding inconsistency - by committing only to the Fat-
not to the Thin- PSA. I have shown how we can account for the continuity of 
consciousness - by noting that the subject's stream of experience is an ongoing 
process, different intervals of which can be relevant to characterising the subject's 
Phenomenal State at a time. As well as this, I have shown how we might account for 
the 'Time-Windows' claims: with Time-Windows accounted for by noting that while 
different intervals of the subject's stream of experience may be relevant to 
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characterising the subject's Phenomenal State at a time, these intervals are 
temporally limited. Temporal Time-Windows were accounted for by a combination of 
this claim, and commitment to the Metaphysical ppc. Memorial Time-Windows can 
be accounted for by helping ourselves to the Husserlian notion of 'retention'. 
Having provided an account of the diachronic unity of consciousness, I now want to 
return to the issue of how this discussion of diachronic unity impacts upon the 
synchronic unity issue. In particular, I shall argue, contra Dainton and Tye, that we 
cannot give the same account of both synchronic and diachronic unity. 
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Chapter Eight: The Synchronic and Diachronic Unity of Consciousness 
§1. Introduction 
In this chapter I want to return again to the issue of the relationship between the 
synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness. The problem of the diachronic 
unity of consciousness, we have noted, has two aspects to it. The first aspect is that in 
accounting for diachronic unity we need to provide an account of 'experienced 
togetherness' by giving an account of the 'Time-Windows' claims. The second aspect 
is that our account of diachronic unity of consciousness must respect the continuity of 
consciousness, where one important aspect of continuity is that the same object of 
experience can be experienced together with different items at different times. This 
second aspect of the diachronic problem is what motivates the thought that 
'togetherness' can't be transitive in the diachronic case. 
In the case of the synchronic unity of consciousness, however, there is only one aspect 
to the problem: the need to provide an account of 'experienced togetherness'. There 
is no analogue of continuity in the synchronic case - and thus no analogical 
motivation for 'experienced togetherness' not being transitive. In fact, in the 
synchronic case, as noted in chapter one, it appears impossible for us to imagine 
what it would be like for 'experienced togetherness' to fail to be transitive. It is this 
difference between how 'experienced togetherness' features in accounts of 
synchronic and diachronic unity that means that we cannot use an account of 
synchronic unity to solve the diachronic unity problem. 
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Having provided a long discussion of diachronic unity, I now want to provide more 
discussion of synchronic unity. I shall discuss the accounts of Bayne, Dainton, and 
Tye in more detail. I shall provide discussion of some of the problems facing the 
views, but I shall also suggest that these problems don't appear to be decisive for any 
of them. I conclude by showing that none of their accounts of synchronic unity are 
suitable as accounts of diachronic unity. 
§2. Accounts of Synchronic Unity 
The problem of the synchronic unity of consciousness, as both Bayne and Chalmers 
and Dainton set it up, is a problem that concerns the relationships between distinct 
experiences. One important component in this debate will thus be an account of how 
we are to individuate experiences. We have already seen, in the diachronic debate, 
that Tye has proposed that there is only one experience per period of unbroken 
consciousness. Tye is thus extremely illiberal when it comes to individuating 
experiences. His views upon the individuation of experiences are to be contrasted 
with those of Bayne and Dainton: 
I am not convinced that there is any single way in which experiences should be 
individuated. Counting experiences is not like counting beans in a dish: there is more 
than one defensible way of going about it. Plausibly it is like counting objects in a 
room or events during a meeting: one has some idea of what to do, but the idea that 
there is only one way in which to proceed is somewhat farcical. 265 
265 Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness, 2.4. 
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A typical stream of consciousness can be divided into particular experiences in many 
different ways ... I will not assume that there is anyone best way of dividing a given 
stream into its constituent parts.266 
Bayne and Dainton both suggest that it is a mistake to think that there is one 
particular way in which we ought to individuate experiences. Despite their claims, it 
is plain that Dainton and Bayne and Chalmers require that there be at least some 
constraints upon the individuation of experiences. On Dainton's and Bayne and 
Chalmers' accounts, we solve the synchrOJ}ic unity of consciousness problem by 
giving an account of how it is that a subject's 'overall experience' is related to, or 
formed out of, the multiplicity of less phenomenally complex experiences had by 
that subject at a time. I shall now set out what Bayne and Dainton have to say about 
the synchronic phenomenal unity of consciousness. 
As discussed in chapter one, Bayne and Dainton differ in what they take to be the 
primitive notion in terms of which unity is to be analysed. Bayne takes the idea that 
the subject has an overall experience to primitive, and the problem of synchronic 
unity to be the problem of how the overall experience is related to the less complex 
experiences had by the subject at a time. Bayne thus provides a 'top-down' account. 
Dainton, on the other hand, takes the subject's multiplicity of experiences at a time to 
be primitive, and take'S the problem to be that of explaining how the multiplicity 
266 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 23. 
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'composes' the subject's overall experience. Dainton thus provides a 'bottom-up' 
account. 
Bayne and Chalmers claim that we should analyse phenomenal unity in terms of 
'subsumption' - where subsumption can be analysed in phenomenological terms: 
One might go further by defining subsumption wholly in terms of the notion of "what 
it is like" as follows: A phenomenal state A subsumes phenomenal state B when what 
it is like to have A and B simultaneously is the same as what it is like to have A .. .If 
there is something it is like to be in a "set of states ... then this phenomenology will 
correspond to a phenomenal state A of the subject, and it is clear that this state will 
subsume the states in the original set in the sense defined above.267 
The answer to the question 'what does it mean to say that different states of 
consciousness are unified with each other, or that they are part of a single 
encompassing state?' is given in terms of 'what it is like' for the subject - different 
experiences are unified with each other when they are subsumed by an overall 
experience. Dainton argues that phenomenal unity can be thought of in terms of a 
primitive relationship called 'co-consciousness' that holds between experiences -
'primitive', because it is a relationship not reducible to any other type of relationship. 
While it is possible for us to talk about some of the properties of this relationship, we 
cannot say anything at all about the properties of the relationship as they are made 
manifest to us in experience: 
267 Bayne and Chalmers, "What is the unity of consciousness," 21-2. 
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When simultaneous experiences are co-conscious, what is the nature of this 
relationship, what can be said about it from a purely experiential perspective? My 
answer to the latter question will be: nothing. I will argue that synchronic co-
consciousness is a primitive feature of experience, one which cannot be analysed or 
reduced to anything else.268 
Co-consciousness, then, 'cannot be analysed' - if we want to say how co-
consciousness seems to us, we are able to give examples of instances in which it 
obtains - examples in which things are 'experienced together', but we will not be 
able to so anything about this relationship, "at least while we confine ourselves to 
describing how things seem."269 
Bayne and Chalmers and Dainton are thus in agreement that there is more to my 
having a unified consciousness than my instantiating the conjunction of a collection 
of experiences. That is, they agree that there is a difference between my having an 
experience of a certain taste and an experience of a certain smell, and my having an 
experience of a certain taste and a certain smell. They agree that there is something 
that it is like overall for normal subjects of experience which cannot be accounted for 
by ascribing to those subjects a conjunction of discrete phenomenal states - this is the 
phenomenon that they are attempting to give an account of. 
268 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 26. 
269 Ibid., 34. 
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Bayne describes Dainton's approach to this phenomenon - claiming first that there is 
something in the overall experience that is left out in ascribing a conjunction of 
experiences to the subject, and second that this something 'cannot be analysed or 
reduced to anything else' - as a 'no-theory theory' of the unity of consciousness. 
Bayne writes that his own account makes the same claim about the unity of 
consciousness: 
Even if Dainton is right to endorse a no-theory theory of the unity of consciousness, it 
is not clear that his no-theory theory is the best no-theory theory. Dainton's approach 
to the unity of conscio)lsness seems to be 'bottom-up': he builds fully unified streams 
.. 
of consciousness out of particular experiences and relations of co-consciousness. 
Alternatively, one could take total experiences and the relation of subsumption as one's 
primitives.27o 
In order for their accounts to work, then, we need a way of individuating 
experiences which gives the result that a subject has multiple experiences at once, 
one of which is the subject's overall experience. How, then, are Bayne and Dainton 
conceiving of experiences in order to get this result? It looks as though they commit 
to the following four claims that jointly constitute what I shall call 'liberalism' about 
experiences: 
1) Experiences are instantiations of phenomenal properties by subjects/in 
physical bases, at times. 
270 Bayne, "Co~consciousness," 4. 
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2) Phenomenal Properties are the properties that account for 'what it is like' 
for the subject. 
3) The same phenomenal property can be borne by distinct experiences at 
the same time. 
4) For every different collection of currently unified phenomenal properties, 
there exists an experience that is the bearer of that collection of properties 
alone. 
Claim 2) gives the definition of how we are to think of 'phenomenal properties', and 
is intended to be uncontroversial. That Bayne and Dainton are committed to claim 1) 
is shown by the following: 
I will assume that token experiences owe their individuality to three factors: their 
exact phenomenal character, their time of occurrence, and their physical basis ... I will 
not speculate exactly what form this physical basis takes.271 
I will refer to this account of experiences as the tripartite account, because it holds that 
token experiences can be individuated by reference to subjects of experience, times, 
and phenomenal properties. According to this approach, any two experiences must 
271 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 25. 
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either be had by distinct subjects of experience, occur at different times, or involve 
distinct phenomenal properties.272 
Dainton and Bayne disagree over one ingredient in their views upon the 
individuation of experiences - over whether we should individuate in terms of 
subjects of experience, or the 'physical basis' of experiences. This difference will not 
prove important in what follows, so I shall put it to one side. 
Claims 3) and 4) are, while not explicitly committed to by Bayne and Dainton, 
required in their accounts if we are to agree with the way they set up the problem of 
the unity of consciousness. Claim 4) is required if we are to agree that a subject does 
indeed have an 'overall' experience at a time. Claim 3) is required if we are to think 
that subjects have, simultaneously with this overall experience, less phenomenally 
complex experiences. 
That Bayne and Dainton are committed to claims 3) and ,4) is, I think, shown in the 
following passages: 
There is something it is like to see the book while feeling the pain. Here there is a sort 
of conjoint phenomenology, that carries with it the phenomenology of seeing the book, 
and the phenomenology of feeling the pain ... we can think of the conjoint state here as 
involving at least the conjunction A&B of the original phenomenal states A and B. But 
272 Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness, 2.4. 
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importantly, the conjoint state is itself a phenomenal state: a single complex state of 
consciousness that subsumes the individual states of consciousness A and B. It is this 
encompassing state of consciousness that unifies A and B.273 
A complete momentary cross-section of a stream is an experience ... [and] ... any 
combination of co-occurring contents within a stream is an experience.274 
Streams have component parts, and ... these parts are particular experiences ... 275 
However, Michael Tye has argued that setting up the problem of the unity of 
consciousness in a way that involves liberalism is a mistake. I shall discuss two of his 
arguments here - the 'phenomenal bloat' argument, and the 'just-more-content-
argument. I should also note that setting up the debate in terms of liberalism isn't 
part of Tye's arguments, but something I have added to them in order to bring out 
their force when applied to Bayne and Dainton's accounts. 
§3. Tye's Attempt to 'Dissolve' the Synchronic Unity Problem 
Tye suggests that Bayne and Dainton's error is to assume that subject's have multiple 
experiences at a time, and provides the 'phenomenal bloat' and the 'just-more-
273 Bayne and Chalmers, "What is the unity of consciousness," 12. 
274 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 23. 
275 Ibid., 90. 
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content' arguments in an attempt to reveal what is wrong with setting up things in 
the way that they do. 
As I read it, the phenomenal bloat objection is an attempt to show that liberalism does 
not motivate the claim that the subject has an overall experience at a time - rather, 
liberalism leads us to the conclusion that there is no overall experience. Consider a 
subject having a visual experience of book and a painful experience. If these two 
experiences are unified, suggests the liberal, then there will be something that it is 
like for the subject that cannot be characterised correctly just by ascribing to the 
subject those two experiences: we need to posit another experience which has those 
.. 
two experiences as parts. This experience bears the phenomenal properties of both of 
the experiences that compose it, and, importantly, the phenomenal property of 
unifying those experiences. 
However, Tye claims that we can then ask the question, 'what unites the new 
experience of the book and the pain with the visual experience of the book?' These 
two experiences are in fact united in the subject's experience, and so, suggests Tye, 
the answer will have to be 'another experience which has the experience of the book 
and the pain, and the visual experience of the book, as its parts. We can then ask, 
'what unites the experience which has the experience of the book and the pain and 
the experience of the book as its parts, with the painful experience?' The answer 
again will have to be 'another experience' - and so as Tye puts it, this /I necessitates 
yet another experience; and so on, without end."276 
276 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 22. 
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Tye's argument here shows that if we adopt liberalism about experiences, then prima 
facie there is no reason to think that subjects have an overall experience - rather, we 
will have to posit an infinite number of experiences in order to give an account of the 
subject's phenomenology. This argument provides us with one reason to doubt that 
Dainton and Bayne and Chalmers have set the problem of the unity of consciousness 
up correctly: if there is no overall experience, then the question of 'what is the 
relation between the overall experience and the experiences that compose it?' never 
even arises. 
How do Dainton and Bayne respond to this argument? It appears that they respond 
in the same way: 
The phenomenal bloat objection can be deflated by noting that the unifying 
experience need not be distinct from the unified experiences. Take a complex 
experience (e3) that subsumes two other experiences (el and e2). Experiences el and 
e3 are unified in virtue of being subsumed by a single experience, but that single 
experience need be none other than e3 itself. There is nothing incoherent in the idea 
of a maximal unifying experience.277 
Dainton himself does not respond to the phenomenal bloat objection in print, though 
Bayne suggests the following line of response for him: 
277 Bayne, "Divided brains and unified phenomenology," 503. 
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Dainton himself suggests that the simplest way to solve the problem is to deny that 
[Tye's proposed 'additional experiences' in the bloat objection] ... are extra or 
additional experiences; the resultant state is just [the overall experience] under a 
different name ... the combination of an experience with one of its parts just is the 
experience itself. This response has a certain phenomenological plausibility.278 
Dainton's answer here is similar to Bayne's own: both stipulate that the overall 
experience is an exceptional case, and should not be thought about in the same way 
as other experiences. While most experiences can be combined with other 
experiences to form new experiences, this is not the case with one experience - the 
overall experience. 
One motivation for this response that Bayne and Dainton may have in mind is the 
thought that the 'overall experience' just is what we are attempting to provide an 
account of in the first place - they are attempting to account for the idea that there is 
something that it is like overall for the subject at a time - they are thus entitled to 
help themselves to the notion of a 'maximal' or 'overall' experience in the account. 
However, while this line of thought might look convincing coming from Bayne -
who is giving a 'top-d,own' approach in which the notion of the 'maximal' experience 
is taken to be primitive - it is not so convincing coming from Dainton. The reason for 
278 Bayne, "Co~consciousness," 85. 
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this is that Dainton is providing a 'bottom-up' account in which what is taken as 
primitive (i.e. not susceptible to further analysis or explanation) is not the 'overall' 
experience, but a multiplicity of less complex experiences. 
If we allow Dainton to help himself to the primitive notion of the' overall' experience 
as well as to the primitive notions of the less complex experiences, and the primitive 
phenomenal relation of co-consciousness, then it begins to look as if his account will 
end up containing very little in the way of analysis: surely not every component in an 
account of the unity of consciousness can be a primitive notion? The 'phenomenal 
bloat' objection thus looks as if it succeeds in generating problems for the liberal - at 
.. 
least for the liberal who adopts a 'bottom-up' approach. 
We can now discuss Tye's second argument - the 'just more content' argument. The 
'just-more-content' argument presents a problem for the liberal who seeks to explain 
the unity of consciousness in terms of a 'phenomenal unity relation' - the strategy 
Bayne and Chalmers and Dainton employ. As discussed earlier, when the problem of 
the unity of consciousness is introduced, Bayne and Chalmers and Dainton appeal to 
the intuition that there is 'something missing' from a description of a subject's 
experience at a time if we try and characterise subject's phenomenology just in terms 
of a conjunction of experiences. To remedy this, we need to add the 'experienced 
unity' of those experiences to the description. Tye's challenge to the liberal has two 
stages: the first is to daim that what is added to the description is itself a further 
experience: 
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The experience of the unifying relation is not itself a sense-specific experience. But it 
is an experience nonetheless; for if there were no experience of the unifying relation, 
then there would be nothing it is like to have the sense-specific experiences unified.279 
The next stage is to claim that if the unifying relation is itself an experience, then we 
are faced with the question 'what unites this experience with the other experiences 
(such as the visual experience of the red car) that the subject is having?' If we want to 
say that the addition of the experience of the unifying relation has generated an 
'overall experience' for the subject (and this is what Bayne and Chalmers and 
Dainton do want to say), then there must be some kind of explanation of what unifies 
the experience of unity and the rest of the subject's experience into the overall 
experience. 
Tye claims that to provide this explanation, we have to appeal to yet another 
phenomenal unifying relation - which is itself an experience - "and now a regress 
has begun to which there is no end."280 The problem here for Bayne and Chalmers 
and Dainton is that by being liberals about experience, they allow the unifying 
relation - because it contributes to the phenomenology of the overall experience - to 
be itself an experience, and so the question of 'what unites the experiences together to 
form an overall experience?' re-arises. 
279 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 22. 
280 Ibid. 
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There are two lines of response one might give to the objection: one is to claim that 
the phenomenal unity relation is a 'self-binding' relation; and the second is to claim 
that the phenomenal unity relation is not itself an experience. If the phenomenal 
unity relation is a 'self-binding' experience - then the suggestion is that we don't 
need to explain what unites the phenomenal unity experience with the experiences 
that it unifies, as it unifies itself with them. However, this move is problematic: if 
experiences can be self-binding, then why do we need to posit an additional 
'phenomenal unity relation' in the first place - why can't we just say that experiences 
like' a visual experience of the book' bind themselves to experiences like' a painful 
experience? 
It seems that the reason we should not say this is related to the way in which the 
problem of the unity of consciousness is originally set up: if experiences are bound 
together, then the phenomenology cannot be explained by ascribing to the subject 
the conjunction of a set of experiences. There must be an additional phenomenal element 
responsible for binding those experiences together - the subject's overall experience 
must have an additional phenomenal property - and given the liberal assumption 
that any instantiation of a phenomenal property can be called an experience, it seems 
that there is nothing to stop us from calling the bearer of this phenomenal property 
an experience. 
So much, then, for the 'self-binding' approach. Perhaps, instead, the liberal has some 
way of showing why we should not think that there is an extra experience involved 
which bears the phenomenal property that explains unity. Dainton and Bayne both 
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use this method as their solution to the just-more-content argument - Dainton 
claims: 
While [Tye] is right that a regress looms if the unity relation is an experience ... this is 
not the only option. Co-consciousness is a relational property of experiences, not an 
experience, and since it is a phenomenal relation, it is by no means absurd to suppose 
that it can account for phenomenal unity as it is experienced.28t 
It is not clear to me how appeal to relational properties of experience solves the 
problem for the liberal - given that Dainton has already claimed that 'I will regard 
any experiential component of a stream of consciousness as 'an experience", it seems 
that only a stipulation about certain kinds of experiential component being made here 
has blocked the regress. Bayne also suggests that: 
A more attractive response is to deny that phenomenal unity is itself an experience ... 
the lesson to draw from the explanatory regress objection is that phenomenal unity is 
a phenomenal relation in the sense that it makes a phenomenal difference.282 
And more recently has suggested that: 
281 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 247. 
282 Bayne, "Divided brains and unified phenomenology," 503. 
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Phenomenal unity is a phenomenal relation in the sense that it makes a phenomenal 
difference, but not in the sense that it has its own phenomenal character that makes 
an additional contribution to what it is like to be the subject in question. One way to 
think about it would be in terms of different ways of undergoing experiences el-e5. In 
principle, one can have these states separately or one can have them together, as parts 
of a subsuming experience. Unity then is not an object of experience but a manner of 
experiencing.283 
The question here for Bayne, as it is for Dainton, is 'Why should we not think of the 
introduction of this phenomenal relation as introducing a further experience?' Even 
if we agree with Bayne and Dainton that n~t everything which makes a phenomenal 
difference to what it is like for the subject needs to be explained by the presence of an 
additional experience, it is interesting to note that in an earlier paper Bayne suggests 
that it is not obvious that denying that the phenomenal unity relation is an 
experience actually provides a response to the just-more-content argument: 
It is not easy to know what to make of [this] response, for it is rather unclear what the 
difference between an experience and an experiential item comes down to. In order to 
generate the regress, all the proponent of the JMC argument needs is the claim that any 
phenomenal item will be co-conscious with every other phenomenal item that occurs 
within the same complex experience, and it is not clear that (or how) Dainton can avoid' 
granting this point.284 
283 Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness, 2.4. 
284 Bayne, "Co-consciousness." 
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So, even if we agree that the stipulations made about what is to count as an 
experience by Bayne and Dainton are allowed, this might not actually succeed in 
providing them with a way out of the regress generated by the just-more-content 
argument. Given that there seem to be, if not unanswerable objections, serious 
difficulties for the liberal in providing responses to Tye's arguments while retaining 
their accounts' explanatory power, we might think that liberal accounts have gone 
astray from the outset. Perhaps if we assume liberalism about experience, then we 
will never be able to provide satisfactory accounts of the unity of consciousness. In 
this case, we should set the initial problem of the unity of consciousness differently. 
Tye makes this very suggestion: in order to avoid the problems of the just-more-
content argument and the phenomenal bloat objection, he suggests we should use a 
much more restrictive notion of experience. Rather than assuming liberalism and 
then adding further constraints to what counts as an experience in the difficult cases 
raised by Tye's arguments, he suggests that we should constrain the notion of what 
counts as an experience in general. Instead of positing a plethora of experiences at any 
one time in order to account for what is it like for that subject, he suggests that there 
is only really one experience. 
Tye's positive proposal is the 'one experience view': we can explain the unity of our 
experience by saying that in unified-experience situations there is unity of content. 
Accordingly, in Tye's' original description of the phenomenology in question, he says 
I experience presented all these things to me together.' Describing the phenomenon in 
terms of an array of different experiences, according to Tye, is a misleading 
description of the unity that we experience. Tye distinguishes between the notion of 
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an 'experience' - of which there is only one per subject - and the notion of a 
'representation': "even if some proper parts of experiences are representations, they 
are not themselves experiences."285 One line of objection to Tye's account has been to 
suggest that this distinction is merely verbal - this line of objection we shall look at 
shortly. 
If we accept Tye's description of the phenomenon, then we still ought to be looking 
for an explanation of the synchronic perceptual unity that we experience, but that 
will be explained by a property that the' one experience' had by the subject possesses 
- and not relations between experiences." Tye' s account is similar in structure to 
Bayne's - he begins with the overall experience, and then considers its relation to the 
'representations' that compose it - the 'top-down' method mentioned earlier. The 
property Tye has in mind is that of the experience's possessing a complex content: 
Phenomenal unity is a matter of simultaneously experienced perceptual qualities 
entering into the same phenomenal content.286 
One thing that might strike us as suspicious about this proposal is that, even though 
Tye claims here that the subject is only having one experience at anyone time, he 
allows that that experience involves discriminable elements - the perceptual 
qualities. Perceptual qualities are things that there is 'something that it is like' to 
have, and thus, on the liberal conception of experience, there ought to be a distinct 
285 Tye, Consciousness and persons, 40. 
286 Ibid., 36. 
Page 357 
experience corresponding to each of these qualities. Why, then, should we accept 
Tye's claim that experiences are part-whole composed of representations, rather than 
more experiences? Tye claims things like the following: 
The experience of a red square next to a green triangle at time t ... has a component-
representation at t representing a red square and a component representation at t 
representing a green triangle.287 
We might suspect that Tye has simply renamed the experiences (in the liberal sense) 
which are parts of the stream of consciousness as 'representations', and 'solved' the 
problem of the unity of consciousness with a mere shift in terminology. 
In response to this, Tye grants that it is possible that I could have had an experience 
of just a red square or just a green triangle, but claims that this does not show that 
the part of my experience that represents a red square is an experience. Talk of the 
components of streams of consciousness as 'experiences' is to be analysed 
counterfactually. Experiences, Tye claims, are maximal, which is to say that they 
cannot be parts of other experiences - the only things which we are properly entitled 
to call experiences, then, are whole, gapless, streams of consciousness: 
287 Ibid., 39. 
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A stream of consciousness is just one temporally extended experience that represents 
a flow of things in the world. It has no shorter experiences as parts. Indeed it has no 
experiences as proper parts at all.288 
Tye's motivation for individuating experiences In this way is that it enables a 
solution to the problem of synchronic unity to be provided. Against this claim, both 
Dainton and Bayne have suggested that we can still raise questions about synchronic 
unity even within Tye's framework. Dainton, for instance, suggests that: 
Suppose we accept that entire streams 'of consciousness are single experiences that 
are not composed of lesser experiences. It remains the case that our streams of 
consciousness have parts, and the even if these parts are not individual experiences, 
they are nonetheless unified in a distinctive way, and the question of what unifies 
them remains very much alive ... We could, for example, opt to talk in terms of 
'phenomenal regions' rather than 'experiences'. My current stream of consciousness 
has an auditory phenomenal region and a visual phenomenal region, and the latter is 
composed of many smaller visual phenomenal regions. The various phenomenal 
regions comprising my consciousness are unified in a distinctive way - in a way that 
regions of my consciousness and your consciousness are not - so what is responsible 
for this unity?289 
Dainton's suggestion is that Tye's illiberal stance on how we ought to individuate 
experiences is mere sHpulation about what we ought to call an 'experience'. Of 
288 Ibid., 108. 
289 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, 253. 
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course, the' one-experience' proposal is not intended by Tye as stipulation - rather, it 
is intended as a response to the failures of the liberal accounts. Whether or not we see 
Tye's proposal as giving us a substantive account of unity depends upon our 
evaluation of the success of his attack on the liberals. If we think that the liberal 
responses to Tye's attacks (stipulations about what is to count as 'an experience', and 
additionally, in Dainton's case, stipulation about the nature of the overall experience) 
are adequate, then Tye's proposal that there is only' one experience' will seem itself 
like mere stipulation. 
If, however, we think that the liberal resportses to Tye's attacks are unsatisfactory -
that the stipulations about what is to count as 'an experience' are inadequate - then 
Tye's proposal that we need some alternative way to individuate experiences will 
seem much more convincing. If the liberal is, as Tye suggests, incapable of even 
setting up the problem of synchronic unity without resorting to various stipulations 
about experiences, and this is thought to be worrying, then the 'one-experience' 
proposal will seem like a concrete proposal for how we ought to proceed. 
§4. Conclusion 
Tye's objections to the liberals are thus not decisive, but at the very least they force 
the liberals to adopt positions that are less elegant than they would otherwise be. My 
purpose here is not to adjudicate between the various accounts of synchronic unity 
that have been provided by Tye, Dainton, and Bayne. Rather, I want to conclude by 
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noting that none of their accounts of synchronic unity can be used to provide 
solutions to the problem of diachronic unity. That this is so doesn't present any 
problem for Bayne's account - for Bayne nowhere commits to saying that his account 
of synchronic unity is intended to be applicable to the diachronic case. It does, 
however, present problems for Tye and Dainton, who have both claimed that their 
accounts of synchronic unity are intended to apply to the diachronic case as well. 
We saw previously, in the discussion of Tye's account of temporal experience, that in 
order to account for the difference between the synchronic and diachronic unity 
problems, Tye introduces the distinction between the 'total' and the 'momentary' 
character of the one experience. As we saw, this proposal faces the problem that the 
content of experience isn't something that is temporally distributed over a period of 
time in the same way as the utterance of the sentence is. In the case of the non-
conjunctive utterance, we noted, while the utterance may have different properties at 
different times, the content expressed by the utterance is expressed by the whole 
utterance. 
In the case of the one-experience, Tye is faced with a choice: either he can give up the 
distinction between 'total' and 'momentary' phenomenal character, or he can commit 
to a view according to which experience has different content at different times. If he 
takes the first option, then his proposal will lack an account of Time-Windows. If he 
takes the second option, then the claim that there is 'one experience' appears merely 
verbal. 
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We also saw previously that Dainton's synchronic account faces a serious problem 
when applied to the diachronic case: the problem being his claim that the same 
relation ('co-consciousness') can be both transitive and non-transitive. This problem 
would also apply to Bayne's account, was Bayne to attempt to apply his synchronic 
account to the diachronic case. What Bayne and Dainton's accounts have in common 
is a commitment to synchronic unity being accounted for in terms of a primitive 
relation. Both accounts commit to this primitive relation being transitive in the 
synchronic case. 
Of course, as already noted, 'experienced togetherness' is not transitive in the 
diachronic case. Accordingly, when Dainton attempts to apply his synchronic 
account to the diachronic case (and were Bayne to attempt to do the same) he is 
forced to drop the claim that the primitive relation is transitive. It is this that renders 
Dainton's account of diachronic unity unsatisfactory - and may also make us 
dubious about his account of synchronic unity - for, as noted earlier, it looks plausible 
that any account of how relations are to be individuated will involve a requirement 
that for two relations to be identical is for them to have the same logical properties. 
In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated over the course of this thesis that there 
are crucial differences between the diachronic and synchronic cases of unity, as well 
as having provided a positive account of diachronic unity that succeeds in 
accounting for the phenomenology. By providing an account of how a subject's 
phenomenal state at a time can depend upon the way the subject's stream of 
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experience is over an interval of time, I hope to have shown that it is possible to 
provide an account of diachronic unity that manages to provide a satisfactory 
account of 'experienced togetherness', while remaining consistent with the 
additional phenomenological constraints that apply to the case of diachronic unity. 
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